Hormuz — alternatives and peace

Aside from Iran's de-nuclearisation, the other objectives of war set by the US-Israel Coalition (complete de-missilefication, regime change and military surrender) are not possible without boots on the ground – which in itself is a risky proposition. The two emergent default war objectives, i.e the opening of Shatt-al-Arab Hormuz and re-instilling Arab Gulf's confidence in the US security architecture, now consume policy circles in the US. Opening of Hormuz to calm the nerves around the globe is on top. Iran, on Wednesday, announced permitting 'innocent passage' through the Strait, as some 700 tankers are stuck on both sides.

Pakistan under its mature and astute diplomacy is trying to broker a deal if the Pasdaran (IRGC) could be calmed by the Iranian side. The US seems desperate to clinch a deal as the cost of war has spiraled out of control, damaging American global standing diplomatically, militarily, politically and economically, in pursuing this unnecessary 'war of choice', as most American commentators call it. Meeting between Steve Witkoff, Jared Kushner and the Iranian side in Islamabad in the coming days, would be a real icebreaker; Islamabad being close to both sides, and not party to the conflict.

Back to Hormuz. Iran's around 2,250 km southern coastline provides immense geopolitical leverage and is protected by Irani Navy, equipped with numerous speed boats, ensconced in tunneled bays, operating drones and anti-ship combos like the Chinese CM-302 anti-ship missiles. Hormuz waterway lies between Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. Musandam Peninsula, in the south, is shared by the UAE and the Omani exclave of Musandam Governorate. Iran, from inland silos or offshore platforms, controls the northern and eastern coast of this critical chokepoint, through which roughly 20% of global oil and 25% gas trade, and other vital supplies like food, grain, medicines and fertilisers pass. Iran employs an Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) strategy through 'mobile AD umbrella' and maritime swarms to challenge superior naval powers, protecting Hormuz's mountainous and difficult coastline.

The Strait contains the islands of Qeshm, Hormuz, Larak, Abu Musa, Hengam, Tunbs, etc. Hormuz is about 167 km long, with a width varying between 97 km to 34 km. It is marked by 3.2 km inbound and outbound lanes, called traffic separation scheme (TSS), with a 3.2 km median lane. Strait is deep enough for super tankers, carrying Saudi, Iraqi, UAE's, Kuwaiti and Qatari petroleum products, as a primary route for Europe and Asia. More than 85% of the crude oil (20-21 million barrels daily (mb/d) goes to Asian markets in China, Japan, India and South Korea, meeting over 80% of these countries' needs. The closure also affects Europe and Asia more than the US.

To navigate the Strait, ships pass through territorial waters of Iran and Oman, 'desirably' under the UN Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), not ratified by Iran. Since 1959, after Iran expanded its territorial sea to 22 km, Hormuz is virtually Iranian territory. This enables Iran to 'legally' obstruct sea-borne traffic, if not 'innocent'. Since 1993, Irani maritime law requires warships, submarines and nuclear-powered ships to obtain prior permission before passage through Iran's territorial waters. Oman, the other littoral state, ratified UNCLOS in 1989, but also requires 'innocent passage' and prior permission for foreign warships. The US does not recognise Irani and Omani claims.

Global oil demand is projected around 104.8 mb/d in 2026. Alterative to the Strait, the onshore pipelines can only transport a maximum of around 9-10 mb/d. All LNG must ship through the Strait. Alternative routes include Saudi Arabia's Iraq Pipeline (IPSA), with a capacity of 1.65 mb/d. Saudi East-West Pipeline (Petroline) from KSA to Yanbu on Red Sea, pumping 5.9 mb/d. UAE's Habshan-Fujairah oil pipeline to Fujairah oil terminal on the Gulf of Oman can carry around 2 mb/d. Iraq-Türkiye Pipeline (ITP) from Kirkuk (Iraq) to Ceyhan (Türkiye) carries 1.6 mb/d. And Goreh-Jask Pipeline from Goreh (Iran) to Jask (Gulf of Oman) has a capacity of 1 mb/d. Iran has targeted terminals in Fujairah (UAE) and Yanbu (Saudi Arabia). Three counties (Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain) have no pipeline alternatives and are entirely dependent on Hormuz.

Iran can also mine Hormuz. US Defense Intelligence Agency in 2019 estimated Iran to have over 5,000 naval mines, deployable via high-speed boats. The ground offensive options to open Hormuz (an achieve other war objectives) may comprise: a) Coalition – with or without UN authorisation – landing Marines/ Army on the island group within the Strait, with or without landing on the Iranian coast; or b) land on the Kharq Island also called 'Forbidden Island,' housing Iran's oil and gas export infrastructure. Kharq is 25 km off the Irani coast and 660 km northwest of the Strait; or c) invade Iran from southwest (Iraq) through Khuzestan Plain, with or without combining the assault with capturing some cities initially, including Tehran. Israel, while employing concurrent intelligence operations etc, may not contribute troops due to its Lebanon incursions and exhaustive Gaza deployment.

On the other hand, in US wargames, though Iran's simulated strategy to block Hormuz, beats American Military's material superiority, Iran's own dependence on oil exports and import of refined oil through the Strait, and passage fees etc inhibits longer closure. Iran maintains 12 days of 'domestic strategic fuel reserve' and another 50 plus days of 'floating storage'. Degradation of its oil facilities makes Tehran militarily vulnerable, and such closure 'double-faced'. Iran, thus acts as a reactive actor, curtailing its freedom to take risks under prolonged hostilities, being dependent upon the waterway. Hormuz's protracted closure is thus diplomatically, militarily and economically infeasible.

In asymmetric conflicts, tangible National Power Potential is advantageous to stronger side, in the short-term. In long-drawn conflicts, intangible like will-to-fight, and justness of cause etc play a decisive role. Denial of objectives to the stronger side also makes the weaker side win. Iran has these advantages and has demonstrated tenacity to continue. But it also has serious vulnerabilities and other punishing constraints.

Right now, the mere fact that Iran has withstood the joint US-Israeli onslaught for over a month makes Iran a winner in public perception. It is time to go for a deal, under Islamic hikmat.