Mission creep amid an elusive off-ramp

The Iran war has stagnated. The two sides are in a state of pervasive attack and defence without causing a change in position, physically, politically or diplomatically, or what would constitute altering behaviour. Iran and Israel attack each other in situ and defend against it to the best of their remaining capability. True, people lose lives and businesses, and infrastructure will be rebuilt, but there is no substantive change in how these nations are constituted or think. Welcome to the 'trench warfare' of the modern era.

The last time the world experienced this was in World War I, or later in the Iran-Iraq War. Both exhausted themselves to the point of inability to do much beyond where they were, waiting to be disentangled. In the ongoing war, they are in their last 'oomph' in the hope that the other guy will exhaust first. They, and the world, do not deserve a war with non-existent or fleeting political objectives, and where the mission creeps in search of an off-ramp.

The ongoing Iran war has no political aims on either side, save Israel. For Iran, defiance, and an implicit sense of showing the aggressor down would be the popular refrain. Three weeks into it, they must have a sounder political reason to continue. The thousands who perish may be a small number by their count to sacrifice for the larger aim of national honour and dignity, but it is as important to give the living the same honour and dignity, and a chance at a fulfilling life.

Equally, the infrastructure and the progress that Iran has made despite the most stringent sanctions are going to waste because the leadership may hold other motives dearer. The Iranian people remain at the receiving end in the name of civilisational pride and boastful nationalism. The war thus goes on unabated. They may not throw in the towel, but when foolishness meets hardiness, catastrophe results. Gaza was wreaked; Iran is being led into one. Israel's objectives for war are being delivered at its doorstep.

Mujtaba Khamenei made some demands in his maiden speech – most likely dictated to him as he lies recovering from injury; and President Pezeshkian of Iran rehashed those in diplomatic terms – after all, he minds the state of Iran; and the IRGC spokesman threatened with ferocity of the podium. These are maximalist and can be rationalised to what is realistic through negotiations. This is how settlements conclude. But this can all come together only when an off-ramp offers itself. (The passing of Ali Larijani, who was adept at collating varying opinions in the Iranian power structure into a collective position, will make it difficult, though). Pragmatically, Iran would want an end to the stupidity of war because it is the one suffering the most and being forced to undertake desperate retaliatory steps by spreading the pain regionally against what should be good for its long-term health. Sadly, she continues to dig deeper as the war prolongs.

While the American mission seems stalled, for the moment – it has options it is avoiding – the Israeli mission remains on track. It seeks to break up Iran or degrade and weaken it militarily to the point of non-existence. The longer the war continues, Israel, in the company of the US, closes in on its objective. The US, however, remains a net loser, dispensing with its inventory of weapons, incoherent military or political objectives, and a loss of credibility as the sole superpower, appearing helpless at the hands of middling Iran, which the US has been unable to bend. That it, in effect, appears weak to its allies and peer competitors, and has abdicated its role as the world's underwriter for an order that she had so assiduously emplaced at Bretton Woods, translates into a vacuum which nations like China and Russia will be eager to fill. The US is thus the keenest to find an off-ramp and salvage what little strategic capital it can without immersing deeper into another quagmire.

The US is not finished as a power. It is facing a dilemma of choice at this point in the war. It sought an earlier end to the war, hoping its initial assault would give it optimal returns. When it did not, her commitment kept creeping up, hoping somewhere Iran would buckle. Iran did not bend and did not buckle. In the meantime, Israel continues to coast along, wreaking havoc in the company of the US. Without the US in play, Israel would neither have the will nor the strength to take on a nation as formidable as Iran.

The strategy to end the war should then be focused on breaking this nexus. Enabling an off-ramp will help. Unfortunately, the euphoria of defiance continues to inhibit Iran from seizing the opportunity when it presents itself. Most Gulf nations and the world at large seek an end to this irrational war. Iran will do well to work with them to forge an acceptable path out of it.

Regionally, and in the context of the war, Iran has a stranglehold over a chokepoint that, once hypothetical and feared, has become a reality, against which the world's strongest military must measure its response. Though humbling for the world's sole superpower, its consequences hit far. What the US may face marginally, and in a delayed timeframe, most not-so-affluent Asian and regional economies are likely to suffer much earlier in asphyxiated economies. It will render sociopolitical turmoil across the smaller and middle-income nations. Every strategy has a shelf life. It needs a specific time and environment to have its greatest beneficial effect. When ill-timed or held on to for far too long, it becomes counterproductive and damaging.

The closure of Hormuz has caused far greater pain to the world and to Iran's Muslim neighbours. Gulf nations had begun to ponder the efficacy of trusting their security to the US, and were thought to be popularly reconsidering geopolitical alignment. A relentless assault by Iran against them, in all probability, will push them back into the fold of what has been their traditional repose despite its inadequacies.

The US may appear to be far less fickle and uncertain a partner. The chance for a rapprochement between Iran and the Gulf countries would have remained stillborn despite a strong early conception. Stamping Iran's chokehold over Hormuz then becomes counterproductive in the long game. With so many of the neighbouring countries alienated by the path that Iran chooses, it may find itself surrounded by a region incompatible with its interests. Iran needs to recalibrate its strategic options and reclaim its centrality.

Can Kharg, minus its defences, be the off-ramp? Were the Marines to land there and declare victory, it might open the space for negotiating the way out of war. Returning to the larger construct of terms agreed between Iran and the US on the eve of war may deliver a win-win for both sides. The world will only breathe easier.