Middle East War — military notes

In Operation ‘True Promise (va’de-ye sādeq)-I, Iran retaliated against Israel proper on April 14, 2025, firing missile/drone barrage from Iran proper. Now, since February 28, 2026, 'True Promise-4' is underway in response to the joint US-Israeli attack. The euphoria of quick victory over Tehran after the killing of Khamenei on the first day of Operation 'Epic Fury' through popular uprising is over. And the war — on both sides — is continuing.

One has always wondered about the competence of the US/Western General Staff in advising their political masters about the nature of military operations. Long ago, I quizzed an American General about their faulty expectation of Iraqi people garlanding the invading US/Allied troops after the fall of Saddam Hussain in February 1991. The war in Afghanistan similarly lacked direction and was criticised as the 'war in search of a strategy' and a 'strategic failure'. The ignominious US/NATO withdrawal in August 2021 from the 'graveyard of the empires' still haunts the West Plus. And in the Russo-Ukraine War, there was euphoria about the Ukrainian Counter Offensive in November 2022, turning the tables on Russia. There would be petrified silence when challenged as to how a numerically inferior side (Ukraine) could attack to dislodge a stronger side (Russia), that was on the defensive. Principles of war remain inviolable.

In June last year, the joint US-Israeli attack on Iran likewise aimed at obliterating Iran's nuclear programme, defanging its missile systems and ensuring regime change. In 12 days, having faced devastating missile strikes from Iran, the Coalition announced a ceasefire. One is again amazed at the US Central Command as to how President Trump can achieve his stated war objectives — Iran's denuclearisation, de-missilefication, regime change and unconditional surrender — through air and intelligence operations alone. Either the General Staff has no understanding of the nature of war (hard to believe) or they slavishly succumb to political expediencies (likely) or the politicians just bulldoze their way irrespective of the cool, calculated military advice (most likely).

Let's quickly review Comparative Combat Power (CCP) potential. The Coalition side first. Like in the past, the Coalition offensive included Cyber/Electronic Warfare to suppress the Irani AD in effective SEAD operations, targeting networks, communication grids, jamming satellite uplinks, radar feeds and integrating ground-based Mossad/CIA agents for target identification, like Khamenei and the consequent BDA (battle damage assessment).

The Coalition focus has remained on attacking Pasadaran (IRGC), among the over 4,000 targets, hit so far. Besides Natanz, another discreet underground nuclear facility at Minzadehei, NE of Isfahan, where missiles are paired with nuclear technology, was targeted, demonstrating the extent of US-Israel intelligence penetration. However, unlike in June 2025, Coalition was unable to insert commandos and build a drone base inside Iran to target missile sites due to relative vigilance by Iran, and purges of Indian and Afghan nationals. Deeply burrowed missile sites have, so far, survived.

To achieve air supremacy, USAF have employed B-2 Spirit (targeting hardened sites), B-1 Lancer and B-52 Stratofortress as Bombers; F-22 Raptor (for air superiority), F-35A/B/C Lightning II, F-15E Strike Eagle and F/A-18F Super Hornet as fighters; E-3 Sentry (AWACS), RC-135 spy planes; MQ-9 Reaper drones for support and ISR; and USS Abraham Lincoln and USS Gerald R. Ford are carrier strike groups. IAF employs F-35I "Adir" (for air-to-air kills), F-16I Sufa, F-15L and F-15I Ra'am.

The around 200-plane armada includes F-16 (cruising range 450 km) and F-35 (range around 1,200 km), needing midair refueling for the over 3,000 km roundtrip. Israel has only about seven KC-707 Boeing refuellers, insufficient for sustained and protracted offensive without the US help. Refueling requirement limits range and loitering time, making pay load lighter over targets in Iran, needing multiple revisits for optimal destruction. The known problem of relative shortage of heavier munitions, the bunker busting GBU-43/B, would likely persist in prolonged conflict.

Israeli offensive is also dependent upon Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the GCC's airspace. Jordanian and Saudi airspace restrictions compel IDF warplanes to take the relatively longer route over southern Syria and Iraq, around 2,000 km one way. Coalition needs Iraqi airspace to loiter/attack and avoid Irani AD.

In its missile inventory, Israel's Jericho-3 (range over 4,800 km) is yet to be field-tested; Jericho-2 is short in range (around 1,700 km). IDF's Hellfire missiles, Delilah cruise missiles, Popeye (AGM-142) and Guided Advanced Tactical Rocket — Laser (GATR-L) are aircraft-launched, in air-to-air and air-to-ground modes.

The US after 'reported' Irani ballistic missile/drone hits has taken the USS Abraham Lincoln away to Central Indian Ocean, dimming, as of now, the prospect of escorting fuel tankers through the Strait of Hormuz. Israel's layered AD comprises some ten 'Iron Dome' batteries at the bottom tier, firing its own missiles to intercept incoming threat objects. 'David's Sling' constitutes the next rung in short and medium-range AD up to 300 km, and it fires Stunner and SkyCeptor hit-to-kill interceptors. Above David's Sling, Arrow Systems are deployed. Arrow-2 (American Patriot's upgrade) fires fragmentation warheads up to 90 km at incoming ballistic missiles, and Arrow-3 destroys incoming missiles in space. F-35I stealth fighter jets also help destroy low flying drones and cruise missiles.

During June, a compelling reason for ceasefire was shortage of AD munitions in Israel, with even the US stocks down by 25%. Hence during the last days, IDF would let those Irani missiles pass through which would land in unimportant spaces. However, sneaking Irani hypersonic missiles caused considerable damage and fear in Israel. This time, short-medium and intermediate range THAAD batteries were redeployed from US bases in the UAE and KSA to beef up Israel's AD. This left US bases vulnerable to Irani Drone-Missile Combos, causing considerable damage, especially in the UAE.

Coalition does not have long-range drones, except Luces, the US copycat of Irani Shahed drones. Ukraine has, on the US request, sent some drone/UAV units to defend US base in Jordan.

Iran's de-nuclearisation, as agreed in Geneva talks, may 'still' be possible if the new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, slightly injured on Wednesday, is allowed to settle down. In case of no progress on hidden enriched uranium, Iran may face ground offensive, as regime-change, for now, is out.

Irani response, ground offensive possibility and Pakistan next week... continued.