Afghanistan — a situational recap

On February 22, 2026, Pakistan Air Force launched "intelligence-based selective" airstrikes on seven targets in Afghanistan's Nangarhar, Paktika and Khowst provinces. Pakistan claimed killing around 80 TTP militants; the news from the ground confirmed killing of high value TTP rank and file. The catalyst for strikes remained the spike in Afghan-based terrorist attacks, including a February 6 bombing at a Shia mosque in Islamabad that killed 31 people.

On February 24, IEA responded by cross-border 'fire' attacks on Pakistan's military posts in Torkham and Tirah sub-sectors. Pakistani forces responded decisively silencing the Taliban guns, as is generally the case with IEA forces, who do not give a good account during pitched engagements. Mosharraf Zaidi, PM Shehbaz Sharif's spokesperson for foreign media, warned responding "immediately and severely" to any further provocations.

Afghanistan-based TTP and other terror groups were also responsible for the attack on Federal Constabulary (FC) convoy in Karak district, the despicable burning of injured FC personnel in ambulance, the killing of a DSP in Shakardara (Kohat) and the Tuesday suicide attack in Bhakkar. This amounts to dangerous and miscalculated escalation by IEA and its protégé forces with serious consequences. That this mayhem occurs in Ramazan points to the un-Islamic and non-Pashtun credentials of the present dispensation in Qandahar, despite their lofty claims. And it had eroded any residual empathy for the impoverished Afghanistan and its hapless refugees in Pakistan. It also has badly damaged the Pashtun cause in Pakistan.

Where do we go from here! Before suggestions, let's recap some pertinent points. First, Afghanistan has always suffered from the complex of — in my formulation — 'civilisational superiority'. Social media comments by Afghans of all shades validate this observation. A Punjabi dominated erstwhile British colony, in their reckoning, does not deserve respect. Hence the disputes on Durand Line, Pashtunistan, trade, etc. Second, most Afghans, with fewer exceptions, harbour grudge against Pakistan but cannot express it openly due to consequences. Pakistan's support in their two wars of liberation carries little voluntary support, as they consider, or they are made to consider Pakistan responsible for all their ills, past, present and future. Third, agnatic rivalry (tarboorwali) runs deeper on either side of the International Border among Pashtun and Baloch tribes. A casual street survey in Peshawar and Quetta will belie the 'reciprocal' empathy for Afghan refugees. While tarboorwali can be an asset in good times; in worst times, it feeds conflict and violence.

Fourth, TTP was relocated from Pakistan into the Loya (Greater) Paktia, the Haqqani fief, in good faith during Afghanistan's occupation. Their presence under Haqqani suzerainty in Khowst, Paktia and Paktika (Pakistan's recent targets), and their absence from Qandahar, create complex political interplay between puritanical Ahmadzai Qandahar, the movers and shakers of IEA, and the Zadran Haqqanis, the military arm of the IEA, who are alliance partners of Qandahar, under Pakistan's interlocution. Total elimination of TTP has, thus, military consequences for Haqqanis, as it weakens them militarily for any potential (and not unlikely) power struggle with Qandahar. TTP fending for itself through terrorism creates bad blood between Pakistan and Haqqanis, once protégés of Pakistan, who are still dependent upon their North Waziristan logistic bases. TTP is, hence, a bone stuck in Haqqanis' neck, and Qandahar relishes to see them in their predicament.

Fifth, IEA will never rein in the TTP and other anti-Pakistan groups, as they increase IEA's 'negative relevance' vis-a-vis Islamabad, keeps Haqqani clout in check by dubbing the TTP as Haqqani problem and appeases IEA's own pro-TTP rank and file, avoiding political backlash. Sixth, till the time the cost of using Afghan soil against Pakistan is not made punishingly high for Afghanistan, Qandahar will not withdraw its tacit support for TTP. Seventh, during military confrontation, Afghan Forces will rely on proxy forces like the TTP terrorists, fire attacks on outlying border posts, commercially available drone strikes and 'some' long range fires. Pitched engagements culturally are not their forte, as morphing from a guerilla force to army takes time is expensive and complex. The melting away of Afghan National Army and Police, raised, trained and mentored for two decades by the US/NATO forces during occupation, is a case in point.

Eighth, Afghanistan has entered a new phase of 'proxy warfare', wherein the UAE and Qatar are ostensibly in the opposite camp of Saudi Arabia and Türkiye, in the wider struggle within the Islamic World, as is well known. UAE's soft support for Haqqanis, Türkiye's attempted mediation, Saudia's 'apparent' abandonment having tried hard, and Iran's pro-Northern Alliance credentials create a complex situation for Pakistan. And in all these troubled waters, India relishes to fish by providing military and economic support to IEA, and money and advisory support to TTP. And the IEA stalwarts, in their anti-Pakistan zidd (obstinacy) do not mind getting moneys and support from Hindu India that dubbed them 'terrorists' not long ago, shunning all contacts. FM Muttaqi's 2025 visit to India was 'the' watershed.

Certain other facts. Today Pak-Afghan bilateralism is critically impaired due to cited reasons, repeated major military escalations and border disruptions and trade impacts. Torkham border is effectively shut barring some critical crossings, and bilateral trade has plummeted from a potential $5 billion to less than $1 billion, triggering a sharp spike in food, fuel and medicine prices in Afghanistan, aggravating the already prevalent poverty. Pakistan has deported over one million Afghans under its "Illegal Foreigners Repatriation Plan" since late 2023.

In this 'Strategic Deadlock', Pakistan takes strong exception to IEA harbouring TTP, and demands reining it in, dispersing its rank and file and providing verifiable guarantees to the effect. Kabul hides behind the bogey of Pakistan's airstrikes as a "blatant violation of sovereignty" and considers TTP attacks inside Pakistan as Pakistan's problem, conveniently overlooking the (mis)use of Afghan soil, its commitments under the Doha Agreement (2020) and its Islamic and Pashtun responsibility. International community aligns with Pakistan's position, and Article 51 of the UN Charter allows Pakistan to extend its sphere of security. Yet, seemingly, Pakistan is in it for a long haul.

In the final analysis, Pakistan has got to do what it needs to do, unless Qandahar and Kabul stop running with the hare and hunting with the hound!