A crisis of governance, not foreign conspiracy

The blast at Kabul's 'Chinese Noodle' restaurant on 19 January 2026 did more than just claim lives; it exposed the fragile reality of Afghanistan's governance. Seven people, including a Chinese national, were killed and many others injured. Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), the Afghan affiliate of ISIS, claimed responsibility, presenting the attack as a strike against Chinese interests — a narrative consistent with its broader ideological motivations.

While the tragedy drew international attention, including a firm call from Beijing for the Taliban to ensure the safety of foreign nationals, the underlying story is not merely one of terrorism or foreign involvement. It is a story of a state divided against itself, where factional politics, weak institutions and competing power centres create the very insecurity that groups like ISKP exploit.

Almost immediately, former Afghan intelligence chief Rahmatullah Nabil alleged that the attack was orchestrated from Pakistan, pointing to alleged ISIS operational centres and accusing Pakistani institutions of facilitating the assault. Such claims have made headlines, but they must be treated with caution. Nabil has a history of issuing unverified allegations and shifting blame to external actors when internal failures surface. While the regional context cannot be ignored, the most compelling explanation for the Kabul blast lies within Afghanistan itself: its fractured governance, weak command structures and internal rivalry between Taliban factions.

The real forces shaping Afghanistan's insecurity are internal — rooted in the country's fractured governance and the rivalries that have come to define Taliban rule. Since the group returned to power in 2021, it has struggled to consolidate authority through functioning institutions. Instead, power has remained divided between competing factions with divergent visions for security and governance.

At the apex stands Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada, whose authority is exercised through isolation and decree. His leadership style prioritises strict ideological control, sermons and obedience, often at the expense of consultative, institutional decision-making. Ministries are expected to implement directives, not develop policy or strategy. This model may ensure doctrinal conformity, but it does little to build the administrative capacity necessary for effective governance in a complex modern state.

In contrast to the clerical faction's ideological approach, the Haqqani Network, which controls the Ministry of Interior, confronts the everyday realities of security management. Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani has publicly acknowledged the limitations of governing by fear and coercion, emphasising operational effectiveness over doctrinal rigidity — a rare and striking departure from the Taliban's usual rhetoric. This division reflects a deeper clash within the movement: between ideological control from Kandahar and practical security imperatives on the ground.

The blast revealed how these internal fissures can manifest as security failures. A high-profile attack in Kabul undermines the credibility of those responsible for urban security — primarily the Haqqani-led Interior Ministry — while inadvertently reinforcing the position of the clerical faction, which advocates ideological purity and centralised control. In Afghanistan's current political landscape, where governance is less a product of institutional mechanisms and more a balance of fractional interests, a security lapse becomes a political tool, not just a strategic problem.

This dynamic is crucial to understanding why the country remains vulnerable to attacks. In a system where ministries lack autonomy, where intelligence sharing is inconsistent and where command structures overlap without clear lines of accountability, extremist groups such as ISKP find opportunities to operate. These vulnerabilities are not evidence of external masterminding; they are evidence of a state struggling to function coherently from within.

China's reaction to the attack underscores this reality. Even as Beijing condemned the blast and called for enhanced protection of its citizens, it also revealed the limits of foreign engagement in a country with weak governance. China has been cautious but increasingly involved in Afghanistan, balancing diplomatic engagement with concerns over security. Its call for Afghanistan to safeguard foreign nationals is reasonable — but it also highlights the fundamental inability of Afghan authorities to provide that security reliably, even in the capital that is supposed to be most secure.

To move beyond this cycle of violence, Afghanistan must address its own fractures. Ministries need authority and independence, intelligence and security agencies must coordinate effectively, and factional rivalries must be managed through institutional mechanisms rather than political manoeuvring.

Governance must prioritise citizen safety over ideological purity or factional advantage. Until such reforms occur, attacks will continue to exploit the very structural weaknesses that political rhetoric so often ignores.

The Kabul blast is a tragic reminder that Afghanistan's most pressing threat is internal. While external blame may make for easy headlines, it does not reduce insecurity or provide solutions. The country's violence is homegrown, enabled by fragmented governance, weak institutions and the factional power struggles within the Taliban. Understanding this reality is essential not just for analysts or policymakers but for anyone who hopes to see a more stable Afghanistan.

True security will come not from foreign intervention or blame but from internal reform, institutional strength and pragmatic governance. Until then, each act of violence will serve as a mirror reflecting the fractures within, rather than a shadow cast by forces beyond its borders.