CM's denial dilemma

The recent statement by the chief minister of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, asserting that no terrorism is emanating from Afghanistan and that dialogue alone can resolve the province's security crisis, reflects a political position that may resonate with his support base but remains deeply disconnected from empirical evidence, regional security dynamics and Pakistan's own official data.

To assess the credibility of this claim, one must first look beyond Pakistan's borders.

Afghanistan today is far from the stable and controlled entity often portrayed by the Taliban. Over the past month alone, armed resistance against the Taliban has intensified across multiple provinces.

Two organised groups — the National Resistance Front (NRF) and the Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF) — carried out at least 16 attacks in a single month, killing 48 Taliban fighters, injuring 25 others and destroying several military vehicles. These attacks were not confined to remote areas; they occurred in Kunduz, Panjshir, Baghlan, Faryab, Badakhshan and even Kabul.

The geographical spread of these operations is critical.

Kunduz, long associated with militancy and cross-border movement, once again emerged as the most volatile province. Even more telling were the successful strikes in Kabul, including attacks on intelligence vehicles and checkpoints despite heavy security presence.

When armed groups can repeatedly target intelligence assets in the capital, it exposes serious gaps in surveillance, counterintelligence and governance. A state struggling to contain organised resistance within its own borders cannot credibly guarantee that militancy will not spill across porous frontiers.

This is not merely a Pakistani assessment. UN monitoring mechanisms, international media and regional governments have consistently acknowledged that militant networks with transnational ambitions continue to operate from Afghan soil. While the Taliban deny official patronage, denial does not equate to dismantlement. Sanctuaries, recruitment pipelines and operational depth persist, particularly for groups focused on Pakistan.

Pakistan's own official data reinforces this picture.

In a recent press briefing, the DG ISPR described 2025 as one of the most consequential years in Pakistan's fight against terrorism. According to figures shared at that briefing, Pakistan recorded 5,397 terrorist incidents during 2025. Of these, approximately 3,800 — more than 70% — occurred in K-P, making it by far the most affected province in the country.

The human cost has been equally stark. In 2025, terrorist violence claimed the lives of more than 1,200 civilians and security personnel nationwide. Law enforcement agencies conducted over 75,000 intelligence-based operations during the year — an average of more than 200 per day - underscoring both the scale of the threat and the intensity of the response required to contain it.

Crucially, the DG ISPR also confirmed that militants operating from Afghanistan were involved in major terrorist incidents inside Pakistan during 2025. This official acknowledgment directly contradicts the assertion that terrorism has no Afghan linkage. One may debate the extent of state complicity across the border, but denying the operational presence of hostile actors in Afghanistan ignores both intelligence assessments and lived experience.

The argument that past military operations failed to make a difference, and therefore no kinetic component should ever be considered again, is equally simplistic. It is true that earlier operations imposed heavy social and economic costs and did not address all structural weaknesses. But it is also true that without sustained intelligence-led action, terrorism would have inflicted even greater damage.

Counterterrorism has never been about force alone; it has always required a calibrated mix of enforcement, intelligence, policing, border management, political engagement and economic rehabilitation.

Dialogue, while important, cannot function in a vacuum. Talks yield results only when backed by credible enforcement and governance capacity. An absolutist rejection of any security operation, especially at a time when K-P accounts for the majority of terrorist incidents, weakens deterrence and emboldens violent actors. It also sends a confusing signal to law enforcement personnel who continue to bear the brunt of attacks on police stations, checkpoints and patrols.

Equally troubling are the economic indicators of K-P. Investment remains subdued; tourism struggles to regain momentum; unemployment, particularly among youth, remains high; and development in the merged districts lags behind expectations raised at the time of their integration. Security and economy are inseparable. No province can attract investment or create sustainable jobs in an environment of persistent violence and uncertainty.

At this critical juncture, the chief minister's priority should be governance, not political posturing. Instead of roaming the national political landscape to keep his party relevant, he must focus on restoring confidence within K-P. This requires sitting down with all stakeholders — federal authorities, law enforcement agencies, tribal leadership, business communities and political opponents — to craft a unified, province-centric strategy. No single actor can manage this crisis alone.

At a broader level, Pakistan's challenges cannot be addressed through fragmentation. Every power centre must recognise that internal disunity is a strategic liability. No institution, political party or province benefits when denial replaces realism and confrontation replaces coordination. History shows that measured cooperation between civilian leadership and state institutions has been essential in navigating complex security environments, and remains so today.

Afghanistan's instability is not a theoretical debate. It is a lived reality with direct consequences for K-P. Pakistan's terrorism data from 2025 leaves little room for complacency, and official confirmations regarding Afghan-based militants remove any ambiguity.

For K-P, the path forward lies in realism, cohesion and governance, because the cost of pretending otherwise is paid not in speeches, but in lives, livelihoods and lost opportunities.