International trends — extending the argument

Last week, we argued that wars traditionally redefine the global order. The OpEd concluded that violence in/because of conflicts is persistent and manifests in many ways. That contemporary conflict/ war-landscape is more complex, involving proxies; more uncertain because of shifting alliances; and has high societal impact. That armed conflicts are inspired by meddlesome great powers. We concluded that prolonged military involvement erodes America's national power; and China, with 'its harmonious world', fills the void, created by a receding America. That the US defence spending for 'fighting old wars in old ways' stands overtaken by AI and technology proliferation, that have changed the character of war, in yet to be determined ways.

That dehumanisation of war; AI and bioterrorism; spread of autonomous weapons; decline of global institutions, etc are some other drivers of global instability, realigning countries in transactional regional economic blocks, casting ideology aside. Multilateralism, championed by a resurgent China, is the dominant trend. And increased turbulence and conflict would likely displace the old system, before the new one completely sets in.

This OpEd extends the argument to list other trends that dot the event horizon. Thomas L Friedman of The New York Times, in recent opinion piece, "Welcome to Our New Era. What Do We Call It?" lists some of these trends. Describing the contemporary world as 'polycene' ('poly' in Greek means 'many'), he posits that no single trend dominates the emerging world order. And a mix of following trends influences the world today.

First, the basic purpose of AI revolution is to create a machine that can perform 'polymathic artificial general intelligence (AGI)'. This machine would master knowledge (biology, physics, chemistry, computer science, philosophy, etc), all at the same time, better and faster than any human and then 'reason across all those disciplines' better and faster than a human ever could. The AGI is getting there, moving up from 'programmable computing', where computers are dependent upon human input. This shift in human cognition is enabled by microchips 'evolving from binary to poly'. Briefly, binary chips process data serially, performing one instruction after another, whereas in 'poly era', chips being mutually aware and interacting, compute in parallel, processing multitudes of tasks simultaneously. Consequently, polymathic AI strengthens while benefiting from multiple intelligences, seamlessly networked, co-improving and co-evolving in real time.

Second, climate change. Events like pandemics, natural disasters, pollution, melting of polar ice, destruction of Amazon and wars trigger multiple crises across 'planetary boundaries'. So, earth can enter 'polycrisis', bringing higher temperatures, droughts, floods, wildfires, crop failures and sea-level rise, which in turn can unleash 'economic shocks, mass migration', collapse fragile states and break down order and trust worldwide.

Third, geopolitical transformation. The combined effect of fracturing states/alliances is making geopolitics more 'polyamorous'. A lot of countries in Europe, Middle East, Africa and Latin America have become what Mr Friedman calls 'sectarian, tribal or networked, super-empowered militias'. The old world's binaries, 'East-West, Communist-Capitalist, North-South', are no more applicable, as most countries, today belong to more than one of these clubs. For example, the UAE and Saudi Arabia have conforming interests in Yemen, but conflicting ones in Libya and Sudan. And Middle powers like Brazil, India, Türkiye, Pakistan and South Africa seek 'multi-alignment'. They seek issue-based transactional advantage, rather than binding block politics.

Fourth, Mr Friedman feels warfare is also becoming less binary. States, subjected to hybrid attacks, seek hybrid responses (muti-domain, full spectrum). The 'front line' has become 'poly' e.g. Russia fights Ukraine on land, and Europe in Cyberspace, etc. Moscow's own war extends to espionage, sabotage, disinformation, meddling in EU elections, drone and maritime incursions into Western Europe and even jamming GPS signals of a commercial flight last summer, carrying the EU president.

Fifth, communities have become 'polymorphic' from binary. From the categorisation of black, white, brown; man, woman; straight or gay; Muslim, Christian or Jew, enforced by rigid social, culture, legal, prejudicial and/or income-based diversity; societies are more multi-cultural, multi-racial, multi-lingual and multi-religious. Multidirectional global migration has turned the once single-faith, single-ethnicity communities into 'polyglot (multi-lingual), polychromatic (different skin colours) and poly-religious'. This 'polyness' brings opportunities as well as conflicts.

Six, poly-economics. Economies today are no longer built on bilateral trade. Instead, economies increasingly operate inside global ecosystems through "dynamic 'interdependent webs' of knowledge, skills, technology and trust". Consequently, most trade involves more than two countries. An OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) report cites global supply chains accounting for about 70 per cent of international trade, with services, components and raw materials crisscrossing international borders. Cars and computers, for example, are designed in one country, their parts are manufactured in another, these are assembled in another country and sold in many more countries. In Polycene, Mr Friedman opines, division of knowledge in the most powerful engine.

Seven, complexity of life in Polycene. In Polycene, multinational organisations and corporations are competitors as well as collaborators. Because the ever-expanding number of 'empowered actors, connections, interactions and feedback loops' lead to sudden and massive bursts of new ideas, designs and manufacturing. This dramatically expands the complexity of human life. AI machines, robots, AI nodes, networks and actors add to this complexity. Not keeping with technology can make a generation left out in Polycene. Cumulatively, it also makes governance challenging.

The old notions, in many industrial democracies, that the best way to govern was 'some form of welfare state and two-party political systems', are no longer valid. Stakeholders need to subscribe to competing ideas and sometimes hold divergent positions, simultaneously. Disagreeing with immigration but granting human rights to immigrants is one such example.

Eight, energy provision in Polycene is a constant challenge. All solutions like carbon/methane capture, solar, wind, nuclear, geothermal, fission, fusion, besides the existing hydropower (on the decline) will be harnessed in an energy mix. Growing solarisation will make grids and electricity lines redundant the moment technology can come up with reliable and affordable solution to store electricity, like storage batteries.

Successful, adaptive, resistant and productive communities in Polycene will be the ones able to form dynamic coalitions across issues. And despite the conflict, human interdependence will remain an imperative, not a choice.

Happy New Year!