Pakistan and Libya: defence diplomacy

Pakistan's Chief of Defense Forces' (CDF's) recent visit to Libya and his meeting with the Commander-in-Chief of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces is creating and reinforcing the optics that Pakistan's military continues to be the primary foreign policy actor. However, seen pragmatically, CDF's visit to Libya and his engagement with the Libyan military leader reflect the Pakistani military's preference for a professional military engagement designed to further both Pakistan's and Libya's state interests.

I am going to talk about five key areas to endorse the significance of this visit: the current state of Libyan politics, the leadership role of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, the role of external powers in Libya, the strategic benefits of the visit and how critics may view the military-to-military engagement between Libya and Pakistan.

Today, Libya is a politically divided country. There is a UN-backed government of National Unity (GNU) in Tripoli led by Prime Minister Abdul Hameed Dbeibeh. He exercises executive authority formed in March 2021 through a UN-facilitated process (Libyan Political Dialogue Forum), but this authority is politically contested and territorially constrained. PM Abdul Hameed leads with a hybrid governance model through which the civilian government operates under militia-controlled and enforced security arrangements. The PM does not control Eastern Libya, where FM Haftar enjoys political and military influence. The legitimacy of PM Abdul Hameed's government is procedural (UN-backed) rather than electoral, as elections have not yet been held in Libya.

Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar is the most powerful and polarising figure in Libya, who controls and dominates eastern Libya and acts as a decisive power broker in Libyan politics. He is aligned with the House of Representatives based in Tobruk. Not recognised internationally as Head of State, yet he exercises de facto authority over most of the country's territory and its oil infrastructure. He was a close associate of Muammar Gaddafi.  In the 1980's he commanded Libyan forces in Chad but was defeated and captured. After this event, he was disowned by the Libyan leader, and he went into exile in the United States which lasted for over two decades. He returned to Libya during the 2011 uprising against Gaddafi and positioned himself as the senior commander of rebel forces. Since then, he has secured Benghazi, taken control of most of eastern Libya and captured key oil terminals. Today, he controls vast Libyan territory, oil assets and the Armed Forces of Libya — and as a powerful figure, retains the ability to veto any Libyan political outcomes that he dislikes.

In 2019, in an effort to rule Libya outright, Haftar launched an offensive to capture Tripoli. His campaign failed as Turkey intervened militarily on behalf of the Tripoli-based government. Seen in this context, Turkey should be viewing the current visit of Pakistan's CDF and his engagement with FM Haftar with concern. Egypt has aided the rise of Haftar as it supports Haftar's fight against the Islamic militants and gains from the prevention of the Islamic militancy spillover. UAE also supports Haftar's government through military aid, air support and economic aid, and funding.

Russia also backs Haftar politically and has extended support to him through the Wagner group in the past. France also supports him and has extended vital intelligence sharing to his regime. According to a report by the Wall Street Journal, Saudi Arabia in 2019 offered millions of dollars to Haftar to help pay for his Tripoli campaign. In the same year, President Trump is also reported to have had a phone conversation with FM Haftar and recognised his significant role in fighting terrorism and securing Libyan oil reserves. Turkey opposes Haftar because of its geostrategic and economic interests not only in Libya but also in the Eastern Mediterranean, which contains natural gas worth $700 billion. Together with Cyprus, Israel and Greece, Turkey plans to develop a pipeline worth $7 to 9 billion to transport eastern Mediterranean gas to Europe. Turkey doesn't want Libya to fall under the sway of its competitors, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the UAE.

Given this backdrop of the role of external powers in Libyan politics, the CDF's current visit may be seen not as a political or ideological endorsement, or factional alignment with Tripoli or Haftar to support Muslim bloc politics in Libya, but as a pragmatic military and geopolitical engagement that is likely to draw strategic benefits mutually for both countries. What are those mutual areas of interest?

For Pakistan to ignore FM Haftar means ignoring half of Libya's strategic geography. Libya is seen as a transit hub for ISIS militants and a source of the spread of Islamic militancy. Pakistan's military has hard-earned counter terrorism expertise and FM Haftar stands out as a leader who is willing to cooperate with the outside world to mitigate the threat of transnational terrorism. Pakistan can extend and share best practices on counter terrorism, engage in professional military training and doctrines, provide advisory services and even defence equipment.

The Pakistan military can contribute to the training of Libyan officers, pilots, engineers and units of logistics. Libya holds Africa's largest proven oil reserves, and this engagement can open up doors for Pakistani firms and its workforce, including engineers and technicians. A safe eastern corridor in Libya means employment possibilities for many Pakistani skilled and non-skilled labourers. Before 2011, thousands of Pakistanis worked in Libya, and a new economic opening could mean more remittances beyond the Gulf states for Pakistan.

Pakistan must carefully engage and keep a balance in its relationship with Libya under FM Haftar and Turkey. Pakistan must also demonstrate to Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt that it respects their security concerns in Libya. It must also give the right indicators of supporting the UN-backed political process in Libya, and the military-to-military engagement between the CDF and FM Haftar does not mean that Pakistan supports any given political faction in Libya. Ideally, Pakistan must project this meeting as a professional engagement designed to advance counter terrorism cooperation, defence diplomacy and the possibility of future economic access without taking sides in Libya's civil conflict.