Gilgit-Baltistan — some history, some future

My piece last week concerning my recent travels in Gilgit-Baltistan evoked public interest. Connectivity — air and land — as highlighted remains the foundational issue for tourists and people of the area. One local reader commented "...travelling, not for pleasure but [even] under absolutely unavoidable situations, is torturous to say the least. I left Gilgit in mid-1970s and the misery of rough travelling is unendingly continuing." The observation went on, "times have changed everywhere else for better, except the unforgiving stretch of Karakorum Highway (KKH) from Thakot to Gilgit, and at Tatta Pani ahead of Chilas."

So, if there is one issue that should command all time, urgent and continuous attention, it is road travel and air-connectivity. Keeping Babusar Pass open the year around and making road conditions between Thakot and Chilas and at Tatta Pani better, bearable even if temporarily, would alleviate the local suffering and make the lofty tourism claims worthy of the time, words and efforts spared for them. Uninterrupted electricity supply is also an existential calling that needs to be answered. Only then will the utopian travel and tourism bonanza materialise.

The same reader was skeptical about Diamer-Bhasha-Dasu dam projects. He wrote, "The two projects on KKH will bring a lot of goodness for all in the country, less the people of GB. They are destined to face the brunt of these projects now, with nothing to gain subsequently." These are serious observations demanding serious attention.

Another issue highlighted remains the constitutional status of GB within and with Pakistan. Locals lament that since GB has no impact on national politics, because its people have no right to vote at the national level, the area remains a political backwater. And it is not a priority for any political party or its leader. Thanks to the military's attention, the GB commands some attention, infrastructural uplift and connectivity, as highlighted in my successive writings.

Historically GB has remained a hub on one of the Silk Routes linking China and Central Asia with West and South Asia. Rock carvings (petroglyphs) in GB suggest human presence around 2000 BCE. These early inhabitants practised the Bon religion, before Buddhism arrived around the 2nd Century CE. From the 7th to 9th Centuries CE, Buddhist Patola Shahi dynasty governed the area that was contested by China's Tang dynasty and the Tibetan Empire. Sufi orders introduced Islam to the region from Persia and Central Asia between 14th to 16th Centuries, ending the Buddhist era. Skardu's Maqpon dynasty under Ali Sher Khan Anchan unified the region and included Chitral and Ladakh in his dominions. The dynasty ruled GB, Chitral and Ladakh, collectively called 'Little Tibet' effective the 13th Century, till Dogra took over.

In 19th Century, Kashmir's Dogra rulers annexed GB to their princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. GB then was under the British paramountcy. Fearing a Russian invasion, the British founded Gilgit Agency in 1889, establishing civil and military control. Just before the 1947 partition of British India, the British terminated GB's lease (undertaken in 1935), handing Gilgit Agency back to the Maharaja of Kashmir. The predominantly Muslim population detested Dogra rule, and the British-led Gilgit Scouts, staged a bloodless coup on November 1, 1947, and overthrew the Dogra governor. A provisional government, the "Islamic Republic of Gilgit", was briefly formed before unconditionally acceding to Pakistan on November 16, 1947. Gilgit Scouts, then moved to take Baltistan, completing annexation with Pakistan by May 1948.

Pakistan has not formally integrated the region as a province, due to its presumable link with the ongoing Kashmir dispute, and instead administers it as federally controlled "Northern Areas". The "Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance Order, 2009" renamed the region as 'Gilgit-Baltistan', granting it self-rule with an elected legislature. The area at present enjoys semi-provincial status, although the local population desires and demands full integration as Pakistan's province. The issue, perceptually at least, remains contentious with India, which has claim over the entire territory of Jammu and Kashmir including GB.

CPEC and KKH enhance GB's strategic importance, besides its untapped mineral resources, hydropower potential and tourism appeal. GB's a little under 73,000 km, house an estimated 1.7 million people practicing Sunni, Shia and Ismaili sects of Islam in unique cultural diversity and languages.

The area's constitutional status remains the first and the foremost matter of importance. Article 370 of the Indian Constitution granted a special, semi-autonomous status to the former state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) within India, if temporarily. This article was abrogated by Modi Government in August 2019, and the Supreme Court of India subsequently in December 2023, upheld the abrogation as constitutionally valid. With India repealing the cited status for the occupied Jammu and Kashmir, there is no reason for Islamabad to stick to similar archaic position overtaken by events, and to continue to keep AJ&K and GB into constitutional limbo.

These two regions should have been declared as Pakistan's provinces immediately after the Indian revocation of Article 370 in 2019. The area and its people deserve full citizenship, equal status and all constitutional rights including the right to vote. The timidity of decision-makers, shying away from such declaration is not understood and needs bold attention and correction. With the present drive to add more provinces to Pakistan, GB and AJ&K should be included into the impending constitutional reform, as and when carried out.

Along with the cited connectivity issues, electricity woes, and constitutional status, the Government needs to be wary of the rising sectarianism in the area, especially in the Gilgit Valley and Chilas on the KKH. Iran's more than friendly attention especially in the Skardu area deserves a bilateral audit. One feels the time is just right to move on this burning issue and others between Islamabad and Tehran.

Iran seems to have realized the value of Pakistan's sincere relationship in the backdrop of Iran's June war with Israel, wherein Islamabad especially its military leadership provided not only unflinching support, it also pleaded Iran's case, where it mattered. Following the Agha Kahn's model, Tehran can lend social and economic support to the area ensuring sectarian peace and harmony, that will benefit all communities.