The legal marginalisation of Muslims in Modi's India

India is home to about two hundred million Muslims, one of the largest Muslim populations in the world, but they are a minority in a predominantly Hindu country. Since India's independence, this community has faced discrimination and violence, despite constitutional protections. The risks have increased since the 2014 election of Prime Minister Narendra Modi's Hindu nationalist BJP government, whose leaders have often made statements promoting Hindutva supremacy. These comments have frequently triggered violence by party supporters, who enjoy political protection. This insight, therefore, examines how the legal and political sidelining of Muslims in Modi's India threatens their rights and has serious implications for regional stability in South Asia.

Since Modi's re-election in 2019, the government has legislated laws that undermine Muslim rights and threaten to disenfranchise millions. Key among these are the Citizenship Amendment Act of 2019 (CAA), the abrogation of Articles 370 and 35-A in IIOJK, and the Waqf (Amendment) Act of 2025, among others.

Building on this trajectory, in 2019, the Modi administration enacted the CAA. Under the amended Section 2(1)(b) proviso, for the first time in India, a secular state, religion becomes a basis for acquiring citizenship. The law specifically fast-tracks asylum claims of non-Muslim immigrants from neighbouring Muslim-majority countries, explicitly excluding Muslims from its purview.

This concern becomes even more alarming when the CAA is considered alongside the government's plans to update the National Population Register (NPR).

The NPR is a database that collects demographic data for each resident of India, including information such as the date and place of birth of parents, even if they are deceased, along with other identity details. Critics argue that this data collection could be used to determine who qualifies as a citizen, as officials review the list and flag individuals as "doubtful residents" if their documents seem suspicious. These "doubtful citizens" will then be asked to produce documents to prove their citizenship. Those who successfully verify their claim are listed in the National Register of Citizens (NRC), a nationwide effort to identify "illegal migrants". Those who cannot prove their citizenship will not be included in the NRC list, labelled as "foreigners", and face trials in Foreigners' Tribunals.

This process has been carried out in Assam, where about two million people, mostly Muslims, were left off the final list in 2019 because of missing documents. This exclusion highlights a larger national problem, as many rural and marginalised residents often do not have historical records due to illegal migration.

Subsequently, the amended citizenship law, along with NPR and NRC, could disproportionately impact Muslim communities by making them displaced or categorising them as "doubtful citizens", since they won't be able to use CAA, like non-Muslim Indians can easily do, to obtain citizenship.

Another significant legislative change was the abolition of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution in 2019, which removed the special status of IIOJK - India's only Muslim- majority state - bringing it directly under the central government's control. Since then, Indian authorities have suppressed the rights of people in the region, often claiming it is for security reasons. Immediately afterwards, Muslim political leaders were detained or placed under house arrest, creating a political vacuum that eliminated Muslim representation and replaced it with centralised rule that lacks widespread legitimacy.

Article 35A, which originates from Article 370, was also abolished; it grants the IIOJK legislature the authority to define the state's permanent residents and their special rights and privileges. Since its abrogation, any Indian citizen can now settle, acquire property and seek employment in IIOJK, fuelling fears of demographic shifts and the erosion of Muslim landholding dominance. This abrogation appears to be an attempt to silence the voices of IIOJK's residents and undermine the core principle of representative democracy.

A similarly controversial law is the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025, which introduced changes to the management of waqf properties - charitable trusts essential to Islamic practice and welfare. Traditionally, they have served as a vital legacy of Muslim charity, dedicated to religious, educational and social welfare purposes. Their management carries deep socio- religious significance, as they are viewed not just as assets but as sacred trusts meant to benefit the community in perpetuity.

The Act's key provisions include the unprecedented inclusion of non-Muslims in Waqf Boards, which weakens the religious independence of the Muslim community. It also revokes the recognition of 'waqf by user', which acknowledges informal use of properties like mosques or graveyards without documentation. This raises concerns that many religious sites could be at risk of state acquisition.

Furthermore, restructuring waqf tribunals enables the government to appoint retired judges instead of judicial officers, which undermines the fairness of legal procedures. Overall, these changes have raised fears among Muslims about marginalisation, threatening their religious autonomy, institutional control and access to justice.

Aside from legislation, BJP politicians have renamed districts and cities with Muslim names, replacing them with Hindu ones. For example, in 2018, the BJP changed the name of Allahabad to Prayagraj, a name referencing the Hindu pilgrimage site there. This erasure of Islamic names is another attempt to weaken Indian Muslims and deny them a place in the country's history. Another concern among the Muslim community is the ban on Azaan in Mumbai. The move is seen as part of a broader issue: selective enforcement disguised as legal compliance.

In short, the BJP's strategic goal is to promote its Hindutva political agenda. These policies help the BJP secure support from Hindu voters by portraying Muslims as outsiders and fostering fear of demographic shifts and religious separatism.

The BJP-led, Hindutva-driven government frequently uses these polarising policies to divert attention from growing internal dissent and governance problems. For instance, the 2019 Balakot airstrike, conducted shortly after the Pulwama terror attack and just before national elections, was widely interpreted as a politically-motivated move to boost domestic support.

Similarly, the May 2025 Operation Sindoor - a cross-border missile strike in response to the Pahalgam attack - emerged amid escalating internal criticism, reinforcing the impression of using military action to divert attention.

As internal fissures deepen, fuelled by Hindutva-led policies of the BJP, there is a growing danger that Modi may prefer to engage in regional chest thumping to divert attention of masses in the name of nationalism. This approach will likely create more regional instability.