Afghan dead end

Pak-Afghan relations have reached a dead-end following the collapse of Istanbul talks due to the Taliban's refusal to give a written commitment to end their support for terrorist groups based in Afghanistan that repeatedly attack Pakistan. Accordingly, Pakistan is no longer bound by the ceasefire agreement of 18 October and reserves the right to respond with force against any terrorist attack emanating from Afghan soil.

Owing to geopolitical compulsions, Pakistan has consistently sought friendly relations with Kabul to avoid a two-front simultaneous confrontation involving Afghanistan and India. Additionally, cooperation with Afghanistan has been essential for regional connectivity with land-locked Central Asian States.

However, successive Afghan governments, including the present Taliban regime, have tried to leverage Pakistan's compulsions through hostile behaviour for extracting unilateral concessions. In particular, they have connived with India to promote secessionist and terrorist groups in Pakistan while rejecting the internationally recognised border with Pakistan.

Presently, as verified by UN reports, Taliban have provided bases to the TTP and BLA, while also extending generous funding and access to latest abandoned American weaponry. Moreover, Taliban and Indian intelligence agencies maintain close cooperation and coordination over terrorist attacks in Pakistan, including against Chinese interests.

Taliban hostility has increased with their growing engagement with India. They were the only entity, apart from Israel, that supported the Indians after the Pahalgam incident last April. During his recent visit to Delhi, the Taliban foreign minister also endorsed the Indian claim over Kashmir and sought Indian funding for hydro-electric projects on the Kabul River in a potential move to use water as a weapon against Pakistan, just as the Indians have done.

Such behaviour is at the very least incongruent in view of Pakistan's efforts to support the Afghans, especially after the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1979. Pakistan aided the Afghan Mujahideen in their struggle against the Soviets and gave refuge to 4 million Afghans. Pakistan also tried to end the Afghan civil war following the Soviet withdrawal in1989, through the Islamabad and Mecca accords. Thereafter, Pakistan supported the Taliban as the only viable solution to the internecine conflict. However, the Taliban's extremist policies and sanctuary for terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda made them an international pariah.

Yet, even as Pakistan joined the American "War on Terror" after 9/11, leading to the ouster of the Taliban from power, Pakistan made a distinction between Al-Qaeda terrorists and the Taliban, based on the calculation that eventually the Taliban would return to power once the US withdrew. Later, this policy of engagement with the Taliban was also supported by regional powers, including China, Russia and Iran. Eventually, when America sought an honourable exit, Pakistan facilitated the Doha agreement of 2020 in which the Taliban committed to close all terrorist bases.

This commitment raised hopes in Pakistan that the Taliban would shut down TTP and BLA bases as well as sanctuaries of the ETIM and ISIS that threatened China, Russia, Iran and the Central Asian states. There was also an expectation that under the Taliban rule, the two countries would finally develop friendly relations while facilitating regional connectivity, especially within CPEC.

Initially, the Taliban were responsive, asking for time to deal with different terrorist groups on their soil and indeed needed support to do so. However, once they established their control domestically and began to engage with the international community, their attitude started to change, particularly towards Pakistan. Border posts were attacked and the border fencing pulled down together with an unprecedented upsurge in TTP and BLA terrorist attacks. By 2025, a stage has been reached where the Taliban claim that terrorism from Afghan soil is Pakistan's internal problem while blatantly refusing to shut down terrorist bases as demonstrated in their stance in the Istanbul talks.

Consequently, Pakistan is now faced with two competing compulsions: ensuring its security through use of force against Afghan-based terrorists or preventing simultaneous confrontation with Afghanistan and India. However, while such geopolitical compellence is important, it is no longer imperative for a nuclear weapon state like Pakistan. Moreover, there can be no compromise on national security which takes obvious precedence. Even as Pakistan remains committed to improving bilateral relations with Afghanistan, this cannot be done at the cost of the country's security interests.

In view of Taliban's intransigence, there can be no quick fix to the current impasse. What is required is a long-term and sustained multi-pronged strategy that involves military, diplomatic and political tools.

Militarily, Pakistan must reserve the right under international law to eliminate terrorist bases within Afghanistan through targeted aerial strikes based on actionable intelligence. The border should also be sanitised through fencing and mining together with surveillance and monitoring, and terrorist infrastructure within Pakistan should be destroyed.

Proactive diplomacy should be used to expose both the Taliban and their Indian collaborators for sponsoring terrorism, not just against Pakistan but other countries as well, especially China. This ought to be pursued in relevant international forums and at the bilateral level. Friendly countries that have encouraged Pak-Afghan engagement, such as China, Russia, Turkey and Qatar, and are now fully aware of Taliban obduracy, should be involved in this process. At the same time, engagement with the Taliban should continue to seek mutually acceptable solutions, including through third-party and informal channels, such as tribal jirgas. The Taliban should also be offered incentives such as potential diplomatic recognition, economic assistance and trade concessions once they change their policies.

Most importantly, a sustained political process would be needed domestically since no terrorist or secessionist movement can be defeated without public support. In particular, this requires ending domestic political polarisation, especially in KPK and Balochistan provinces by resolving the genuine grievances of the local people. In addition, there ought to be generous investment in these provinces to promote employment, education, healthcare and infrastructure development in order to win hearts and minds.