Why does our bureaucracy underperform?

Not many would dispute that a variety of the problems Pakistan faces today, and indeed has faced in the past, stem from the underwhelming performance of our bureaucracy. The question that comes to mind is: why does our bureaucracy underperform?

To answer this, we need to appreciate that when people say "bureaucracy" they are conflating a system of governance, bureaucracy, with the people who work in it: bureaucrats.

To understand what is going wrong, one has to look at these conflated elements separately. Britannica defines bureaucracy as a "specific form of organisation defined by complexity, division of labour, permanence, professional management, hierarchical coordination and control, strict chain of command, and legal authority."

Max Weber, the German philosopher known for his study of bureaucracy, believed "that the advantage of bureaucracy was that it was the most technically proficient form of organisation, possessing specialised expertise, certainty, continuity and unity." And here there is an implied definition of a bureaucrat as a person possessing specialised expertise.

So where is the problem? Is it in bureaucracy as a system, or in bureaucrats as people? I would argue that it is more in the system than in the people.

Aspiring civil servants in Pakistan must pass the Central Superior Services (CSS) exam. This is a rigorous, multistage process intended to recruit people for Pakistan's elite civil services. It begins with an initial multiple-choice screening test. Those who qualify then sit a comprehensive written exam comprising 12 papers. Subjects include, for example, English essay writing, current affairs, political science, law and so on.

This is a highly competitive, merit-based process. Of the 15,000 or so candidates who took the exam in 2024, a total of only 229 were selected – a 2.5% pass rate, indicating its extreme competitiveness.

Given this highly selective process, it is clear that only the best and brightest are chosen. So, the problem, it would appear, is not in the people per se. It seems to begin with the process that follows selection.

At some point, candidates are assigned, based on preference, merit and availability, to one of several "services". These include, for example, the Pakistan Administrative Service (PAS), Foreign Service of Pakistan (FSP) and Police Service of Pakistan (PSP).

All successful candidates go through a six-month course called the Common Training Programme (CTP). This is a fairly general programme covering subjects such as law, economics, IT and office management. It is followed by a six-to-12-month course tailored to the needs of the respective services to which the candidates have been assigned.

So, after a year or so, these newly minted bureaucrats are considered ready to take on the world. Notice that all of them have had a fairly general education across diverse subjects. Contrast this to professional education in engineering, medicine, finance, sciences and the like, and it is clear that it takes many years for professionals to earn their spurs.

And here lies the problem. People who have been given only a relatively brief, general education are suddenly put into positions of authority which require years of training, expertise and experience.

The problem is compounded by the constant rotation of officers from one agency to another. An officer assigned to the agriculture ministry can be transferred the next day to the petroleum ministry, then to the finance ministry, and then to the science ministry, and so on. And it is expected that he or she will be master of the new discipline on day one.

This is where bureaucracy, the system, fails these young bureaucrats. They are bright, but not superhuman. Expecting that one of them can one day run the nation's agricultural policy, the next day its petroleum organisations, and the following day the railways network is to invite disaster. And this is precisely what is happening in Pakistan and why the system is failing to deliver.

In a nutshell, we have placed woefully unprepared generalists in positions of power that need highly specialised education, training and years of experience.

Unfortunately, the system we have in place for our civil servants has been inherited relatively unchanged from colonial times. What we do not seem to realise, or choose to ignore, is that times have changed. We cannot afford to hold on to the lore of generalists of the past in an age of specialisation.

So, what can be done to right this wrong? First, let us not blame our bright young bureaucrats who reach where they do on the basis of merit and competence.

While much needs to be changed in the system, one simple reform can go a long way in fixing what is wrong: make it mandatory that when a young officer fresh out of the Civil Services Academy is assigned to a ministry, he or she spends their entire career in the same ministry. So, someone assigned, for example, to the finance ministry stays there until retirement. This will allow the officer to develop, through experience and training, the specialised skill set that is needed for matters of global finance.

So that when he or she faces a polished, highly trained investment banker or the minions of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank or any other professional from the private sector, he or she can look them in the eye as an equal in knowledge and experience. This will ensure that Pakistan does not get sold down the road. The same goes for all other ministries. Sometimes the simplest solutions lead to the most significant outcomes. Recall that Max Weber held that the "possession of specialised expertise" was one of the advantages of a bureaucracy. And it is precisely the system's failure to develop this expertise in its people that has let us down.

THE WRITER IS CHAIRMAN OF MUSTAQBIL PAKISTAN AND HOLDS AN MBA FROM HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL