The proliferator next door

On November 12, 2025, the US Treasury Department sanctioned 32 entities and individuals linked to Iran's ballistic missile programme including an India-based company, Farmlane Private Limited. The company was alleged to be supplying propellant material using a UAE front, which contributed directly to the development of Iranian missiles. This turn shreds the well-kept history of India's nonproliferation record that is immaculate.

This is not the first time Indian firms have been implicated in proliferation activities. Washington has previously imposed sanctions on Indian companies on transfer of dual use materials and technologies illegally. The latest inclusion of an Indian entity under Executive Order 13382, which was aimed at countering the spread of weapons of mass destruction, shows that proliferation risks lie not on Pakistan's soil, but within India's own commercial and technological ecosystem.

The irony could not be starker. As New Delhi keeps politicising the peaceful nuclear programme in Pakistan monitored by the international community, its own companies are secretly feeding supply chains that are supporting the Iranian ballistic ambitions. The nuclear infrastructure of Pakistan, which is a part of the IAEA protection, is one of the most strictly controlled in the world. India, in turn, is increasingly coming under scrutiny; not only for its domestic safety shortcomings, but also its role in the global proliferation networks of the private actors.

What makes this episode more consequential is the silence that follows. Neither the Indian government nor its media, which is otherwise very vocal about regional security, have offered explanations. The same state that accuses others of "nuclear irresponsibility" refuses to acknowledge its own proliferators. This silence is telling. It reflects a deep-seated hypocrisy that Washington, too, can no longer ignore. For years, the US has turned a blind eye to India's questionable record, driven by strategic considerations under the banner of countering China. But the latest sanctions raise a difficult question: how credible is America's nonproliferation policy when its "strategic partner" aids those very threats it seeks to contain?

It is worth recalling that India, remaining outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), has expanded its weapons programme without full-scope safeguards, and continues to resist transparency measures. The fact that US sanctions have once again traced proliferation materials back to Indian soil exposes the fragility of this façade. The world needs to understand that nuclear responsibility cannot be self-certified but it should be obtained through compliance and accountability.

The US Treasury's move is a wake-up call for both Washington and New Delhi. For the US, it is a reminder that double standards in the enforcement of nonproliferation norms weaken global credibility. For India, it exposes a growing contradiction between its rhetoric and reality. Provided Indian companies remain a channel of approved regimes, the myth of nuclear exceptionalism of India will one day fall on its own contradictions.

Nonproliferation cannot function on selective morality. Bringing Pakistan to book on its nuclear material, which has, on the other hand, stayed secure, calm and guarded, is to weaken the very principles that world security is based on. The US sanctions have also illuminated a deeper truth: proliferation is not confined to so-called "rogue states". It festers where power and privilege grant impunity.

In the end, this episode is a test: of Washington's consistency, of India's integrity, and of the international community's willingness to see beyond political convenience. If the world truly seeks stability, it must confront hypocrisy wherever it exists, even when it wears the mask of partnership.