Rethinking mineral security
The writer is an academic and researcher. He is also the author of Development, Poverty, and Power in Pakistan, available from Routledge
Powerful nations treat critical minerals primarily through the lens of national interest and security. This narrow focus, however, risks repeating the mistakes of the past: deepening inequality, harming the environment and leaving ordinary people behind.
Consider the Green Revolution of the mid-20th century. It relied heavily on high-yield crop varieties, mechanisation and chemical inputs, all aimed at boosting food production. While productivity soared, the benefits were uneven. Landless farmers were marginalised, and rural ecosystems suffered from overuse of fertilisers and irrigation. A top-heavy, capital-intensive approach that privileged output over human well-being further disempowered poor in several countries, including Pakistan. Today, the rush to secure critical minerals could produce similar consequences if it ignores the needs of the many.
A team of researchers writing in Nature recently cautioned against conflating "critical minerals" with "energy-transition minerals". Most minerals deemed critical by the EU, the US or Australia — titanium, beryllium and rare earths used in electronics or defence — have little to do with renewable energy. Conversely, vital energy-transition minerals like copper often fall outside these lists because they are not considered a supply-risk.
This distinction underscores a deeper truth: 'criticality' is a geopolitical construct. For countries in the global North, lithium, cobalt, rare earths and gallium are essential to sustain technology and military power. In the global South, priorities are strikingly different. Populous, resource-rich but low-income nations need gypsum, limestone, potash and phosphates for housing and food; iron and zinc for fortifying diets; chlorine and fluoride for safe water; and cement for schools and infrastructure.
Many countries sitting on 'critical' mineral reserves cannot process these resources domestically. Congo, for example, provides 70% of the world's cobalt for EV batteries, yet it controls an insignificant sliver of the industry's value chain. Many African countries produce millions of tons of minerals annually which are vital for fertiliser production but then rely heavily on fertiliser imports to meet local needs.
Pakistan mirrors these asymmetries. It possesses abundant copper, coal, salt, limestone and gypsum, yet it imports fertiliser, iron and steel at high cost. For Pakistan, and many developing countries, true mineral security means using natural resources to meet domestic needs before trying to supply global supply chains. While exporting 'critical minerals' may generate substantial revenue for a narrow elite, translating these gains into broad societal benefits will prove challenging for an economy captured by entrenched interests.
A mineral-security agenda driven solely by the priorities of powerful nations is inherently prone to conflict and neglects human needs. Past experiences with mineral-driven growth show the risks: corruption, elite capture, widening inequality, environmental damage and conflict.
Some countries have tried to capture more value from domestic resources and advance industrial policies. Since 2014, Indonesia has restricted or banned the export of several critical minerals. Several African nations, including Ghana, Nigeria and Zimbabwe, have followed suit. Bolivia and Zambia have instead sharply raised export taxes, royalties and fees. Yet, such restrictions also risk slowing the global green transition, fueling price volatility and intensifying trade and geopolitical tensions.
For poorer countries sitting on reserves of critical minerals, the surge in global demand represents the opportunity to advance growth and development. Export revenues earned from critical minerals could also help secure domestic supplies of key minerals needed for agriculture (phosphate, potassium), water treatment (aluminum, copper), and construction (limestone, iron, gypsum). Industrialised nations must support such mutually beneficial goals, or else, we may see a spike in proxy conflicts fueled by the maximalist scramble for critical resources.