Beyond the durand line
In the study of history, we generally focus on the "what" part and seldom on "why". While what is factual and harmless, the why is both painful and accusatory. The advantage of hindsight is that it can turn yesterday’s brilliance into today’s blunder and yesterday’s success (or the notion of it) into today’s disaster.
The departure from an ideology, or the adjustment, is a leadership’s decision but the critical factor is the very nature of the decision-making process and prowess. The Afghan problem resides in its turbulent history, geography and the power contestation – both within and outside. Common Afghans have hardly had much role in the devastation that they have endured for so long. The Afghan destiny has mostly been decided by external forces. The states that have impacted Afghanistan have their own idiosyncrasies, prejudices, ideologies, beliefs, cultures, economic / military might, national character and political systems.
Examining the decision-making process of the major powers that impacted Afghanistan reveals how Afghans have been impacted. America, for instance, behaves like s bull in a china shop, it acts fast but not always right or with foresight. It can win wars fast, but peace slowly (Japan, Angola, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria) while China applies ancient patience and positional advantage rather than confrontation.
Russia’s decision-making excels in total war but collapses in complex crises requiring consultation and modesty. India’s strategic thought is ancient and its execution is paralysed when it fails to replace Nehru’s idealism with Chanakya’s Machiavellian thoughts.
Pakistan, with strategic resilience and under constraint acts, as a survival state remaining flexible and adaptive to challenges with core principle around denial, deterrence and diplomacy. The UK’s decision-making reflects strategic modesty -- it doesn’t lead from the front but influences from the flank. Europe is stuck in a legalistic and hesitant mindset. It can create peace but struggles to project power. Iran, a Shia state, champions resistance against global Shia victimhood while deeply struck with historical consciousness of a great empire but with siege mentality tries to survive through improvisation -- considering suffering as no failure and patience as part of the victory.
The Afghan story is not a failure in observation or action. The powers that be failed in their orientation and assumption. They misread Afghan identity, tribal structure, religious motivation and regional interplay. The core assumption has been that democracy can be imported and stability follows assistance while the West can build a system. However, regional actors, obsessed with short-term gains, saw through this myopic lens. Ironically, the Afghan elite had no ability to learn from shifting patronage. In hindsight, intrigue stops at, “What did we do wrong?” rather than “Why did we think it was right in the first place?”
Perhaps that’s exactly what Afghanistan needs. It’s wrong to claim that Afghanistan has been the graveyard of the empires – in essence it’s the collective wisdom and prudence that got buried under the rugged stones. Afghans also triumphantly claim their geography remained unchanged for centuries but one wonders what worth the claim carries when the country and its subjects have been rendered orphaned, deserted and forsaken for centuries.
The enduring relevance has been to serve as global battleground to test armouries, validate military strategies, breed extremists, promote proxies, satisfy egos and illusion of control of big powers.
Continuous power- contestation to instal favourite -- if not pliant -- regimes, Afghans have been at the mercy of outside powers with no exceptions to the present time. Under such circumstances, there obviously was, and is in the near future, no chance for Afghans to create a semblance of normalcy, let alone any regional or global relevance. Crushed by abject poverty, sanctions, violence, displacements, the worst human development, hostility with neighbours and plagued by the lowest sense of self-worth, it doesn’t stand any chance of revival. To expect it to evolve into a decent, responsible, and coherently functioning state remains a distant dream if not a delusion.
Long before it lost its physical domain, Afghanistan had already forfeited both the narrative and the cognitive domain, thanks to its own rulers’ shortsightedness. Today, it is not even a minimally functioning state. It has locked itself in a dark room and, with it, sealed the fate of millions within and around its periphery, with no silver lining. When the TTP, it’s willing ally, plant IEDs to shred innocent Pakistani lives and Pakistan, torn between restraint and rage, hesitantly bombs Afghanistan, it’s not just war; its history mocking both, replaying its oldest tragedy.
Things were bad in the past too but not that bad. A quick history salvo may shed some light on why we are where we are today. From 1947–1978, Pakistan remained suspicious -- for the right reasons -- of Afghans over the threat of “Pashtunistan”, with credible potential of an Indian hand behind it. However, Pakistan avoided confrontation using diplomacy with a desire for deep engagement. Baring sporadic skirmishes, Pakistan relied on border control. History, however, doesn’t belie that during the same era, there had been consistent desire from both sides to finding a lasting solution. A consistent proposition of a confederation between the two states had been on the table for some 30 years with varying intensities.
On October 20, 1954, Sir Zafrullah Khan, Pakistan Foreign Minister during Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra’s visit told his US counterpart that Afghans were eager for a confederation between the two countries, expressing their willingness to drop the Pushtunistan issue in return. Not completely ignoring the idea, Pakistan, however, wanted to take a more modest approach to begin with, including economic and scientific cooperation such as exporting power from Warsak Dam to Jalalabad. Iskander Mirza and King Zahir Shah in 1954, took it to the next level wherein the former offered King Zahir Shah to be the head of the state. However, Ayub Khan’s martial law dealt a mortal blow to the idea. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, who wished to be buried in Jalalabad, also never opposed the idea. Ayub Khan, in 1962, made a loud proposition for a confederation. President Sardar Daoud Khan agreed in principle with ZA Bhutto’s idea of forging a confederation among Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran after his coup against King Zahir Shah. Daoud’s government, heavily influenced by pro USSR communist loyalists in his government, feared resistance. Meanwhile, Gen Zia removed ZA Bhutto. President Daoud, later in March 1978, during his visit to Pakistan, hinted to announce Afghanistan’s recognition of the Durand Line. However, Gen Zia advised him to defer until his visit to Kabul. The USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan, changed the entire scenario.
All these leaders, dead against each other and bred on diametrically opposed ideologies, were still pragmatic to find comfort, if not consensus, in the idea.
The cost of these missed opportunities has been colossal not just in the devastation of the two states but in millions of lives lost in later years that hasn’t stopped as yet.
From 1979–1989, Pakistan considered Soviet invasion as an existential threat, albeit an opportunity to forge a strategic alliance with Afghanistan, the US and Saudi Arabia. The deep spirit of brotherhood, helped Afghans fight against USSR by physically contributing jihadist fighters, training, arms, logistics and hosting refugees. By 1989, the Soviets were expelled across Amu Darya but the backlash in the form of militancy in Pakistan and chaos in Afghanistan resulted due to sudden US pull out.
During 1990–2001, another bloody civil war erupted in Afghanistan. Pakistan risked supporting the Taliban by recognising the regime. It was short-term gain but a long-term blowback resulting in isolation post-9/11 and extremism spill-over. From 2001–2021, US invasion reshaped the region; Pakistan tried to find the right balance by aiming for best of the two worlds i.e., engaging the US while not fully abandoning Taliban to preserve Afghan leverage. Pakistan retained the relevance, but had to pay the cost. From August 2021–2025, Pakistan considered itself betrayed when the Afghan Taliban regime turned a deaf ear to controlling the TTP. The US withdrawal ended 20 years of occupation, leaving behind a collapsed government and an emboldened Taliban.
The Taliban victory was military, not political -- with no experience of running the government, without an economic base, administrative experience or international legitimacy. The foreign aid (≈70% of GDP) vanished overnight and Afghanistan was left to face the paradox of being free from foreign occupation but dependent on foreign assistance. The Afghans continue to face economic collapse with $9 billion reserves frozen, 97% Afghans below the poverty line (UNDP), 28 million needing humanitarian aid (WFP 2024), six million on the brink of famine with one in two children malnourished, women banned from education and work. The ordinary Afghans are trapped in a state without governance, leaving them victims of their rulers’ ideology and the world’s fatigue. Yet the Taliban, instead of helping the public are still clinched to their so-called jihad mode – something that is ingrained in their muscle memory. Understandably, there is nothing else worthwhile they can do -- a dilemma for common Afghans trapped in fear and despair.
During the recent unprecedented turn of events, Pakistan's patience ran thin. The disproportionate use of force from both sides failed to distinguish the two as erstwhile companions through some of the turbulent times in history. The Afghan leadership acted naïve in upping the ante while India, like always, found a godsent opportunity in polluting the narrative battle. People, on both sides, regretted the losses with remorse barring a few who always run with the hare and hunt with the hounds.
The less said, the better on the disloyalty and ungrateful Afghan mantra which was deeply hurtful, any community trapped in a major conflict resulting in large-scale displacement for decades, suffers from stress, uncertainty and distrust. Some Afghan refugees did act aggressively, not because of inherent hostility but as a defence against perceived uncertainty. When born and raised in exile, many experience identity dissonance: they neither fully belong to Afghanistan, a place they never lived in, nor to Pakistan, a country that doesn’t fully accept them.
At no time, in the last 50 years, have the common Afghans ever been in control of their destinies. Others, both within and outside, chose for them when to live and when to perish. After 50 years, this hasn’t changed – nor is there hope in the distant future. Yet history is a relentless sculptor, it carves alliances not from affection but from necessity. The geography that once condemned Afghanistan to endless invasions and Pakistan to a perpetual insecurity may, in our or our children's lives, compel both into a reluctant embrace. Neither can truly prosper while the other bleeds.
A 2,600-kilometre-long border fails to stop bullets yet succeeds in stopping the bread. Afghanistan’s isolation will deepen until its rivers, trade routes and markets find access to Pakistan. When exhaustion outweighs ideology and survival overtakes sentiment, both will realise that their destinies, however resented, are intertwined.
The confederation once dreamt by Daoud and Bhutto and dismissed as idealism, will one day rise from the ashes, not as diplomacy, but as compulsion. The region’s future will ultimately be shaped by the realisation that neighbourhood is a blessing and not a curse. When that day comes, the border will still remain but will serve people on both sides. Peace never descends, it has to be crafted, packaged, marketed and sold by the wise on both sides-- even to those most unwilling to buy it.
The writer focuses on issues related to geopolitics and national security