The two approaches to the Afghanistan problem

Currently, two different approaches are being pursued to find a solution to the Afghan problem. One is global and the other is regional.

The global approach is built around the initial American warning in 2021 to the Taliban that if they returned to power by force in Kabul, they would be accorded a global pariah status. Since then, the United States has built the non-recognition of the Taliban as a credible coercive tool that has universal backing. The idea was to withhold the diplomatic recognition of the Taliban and sustain a consensus on this non-recognition approach to force a behavioural change in the conduct of the Taliban regime. Taliban were expected to deliver at least in four key areas of global concern: respecting human rights, including the rights of women; aligning with global problems; cracking down on terrorism; and forming a more inclusive government. Since 2021, the Taliban considered this approach a non-military intervention and interference by the outside world in its internal matters – something which is tantamount to overstepping their sovereignty. Taliban considered this approach as nothing but a ploy to exclude Afghanistan from the international community. This approach had an opposite effect, and instead of submitting to the global demands, the Taliban regime became more repressive as it became more established in power. Today, there is little doubt that if the goal of the ‘non-recognition approach’ was to bring a behavioural change in the Taliban, then that has not happened, and the approach has clearly failed.

The regional approach to the problem of Afghanistan is being driven by Russia and China, with India joining them closely behind. Both Russia and China embraced the Taliban regime. Russia accorded it diplomatic recognition, and China seems to be on the threshold of doing the same. The recent visit of the Afghan foreign minister to India and the welcome accorded to him show the growing trend of this regional approach of granting semi-formal or formal diplomatic recognition to the Taliban government in Afghanistan. Both drivers of this approach, Russia and China, are motivated by their strategic rivalry against the United States. India, after its recent ‘Trump treatment’, has started signaling that it is best suitable to strengthen its ties with China rather than act as an ‘American bully’ in the region and as a counterweight to China.

The regional approach of according informal and formal recognition to the Taliban regime offers all three regional powers an opportunity to have some kind of hold, influence and control over Afghanistan – something that the global approach is devoid of. Russia’s motivation stems from how ISIS attacked its embassy in Kabul in 2022 and the City Hall in Moscow in 2024. Maybe Russia realises that the only way to combat the transnational threat that it faces from ISIS is to at least mitigate it by having a formal relationship with the Taliban regime. Also, with Russia and its interests already looked after by the Taliban, it is hard to imagine the fulfillment of President Trump’s dream of re-acquiring the Bagram Base in Afghanistan. Critically for Pakistan, China embraced the Taliban at a time when Pakistan was pressurising Afghanistan to deny safe havens to TTP. China could have added weight to Pakistan’s pressure by linking its approval of the Taliban regime to delivery on Pakistan’s demand. China didn’t do that, as a friendly relationship with the Taliban under a regional approach suits it more than a coercive relationship with the Taliban under a global non-recognition approach.

The global approach of non-recognition of the Taliban regime also translated into an American ‘over the horizon approach’ when it came to dealing with the Afghanistan problem. The Joe Biden administration utilised this approach to deal with the Taliban from a standoff distance, utilising its regional partners and drone warfare to do its bidding. The Biden administration, during this period, approved Indian attempts to subject Pakistan to global isolation, and the United States' own policy towards Pakistan was a very harsh policy of strategic disengagement, mainly because Pakistan was considered an unreliable partner.

The American approach towards Pakistan changed after the four-day war between India and Pakistan in May 2025. According to a New York Times report, the pro-peace and anti-war American president wanted PM Modi of India to also nominate him for the Nobel Peace Prize for a war that he helped end. That didn’t happen, and suddenly, President Trump was seeing how India was unwilling to align with many US preferences in the region. India’s investment in Iranian Chabahar Port, import of oil from Russia and Iran, its neutral stand on Ukraine, purchase of S-400 Russian SAM, and shift away from trade in dollars all became reasons for the United States to diplomatically push back against India and embrace the once-unreliable partner, Pakistan. The current warm embrace between the United States and Pakistan clearly suggests that Pakistan sides with the global approach to seeking a solution to the Afghan problem.

The regional approach has emboldened the Taliban. Yet, Pakistan’s greatest interest is that Afghanistan should not become another proxy battleground. The Indian support to the Taliban is similar to Iran’s support to Hamas and Hezbollah, and how a proxy battleground was created in the Middle East. Surely, Pakistan must have communicated this concern to the Americans, who would not want such a situation to develop in the region, as instability in this part of the world means instability generally for the entire world. Pakistan’s best opportunity lies in bringing together both the regional and the global approaches to resolving the Afghan problem. Pakistan, being the gateway to Eurasia and lying at the crossroads of economic interests of all three great powers in the region, can play the historical role of bringing both the United States and China together to resolve the Afghanistan problem. Pakistan did this earlier during the Cold War, so there is no reason why it cannot do this again.

The implicit element of coercion in the global approach suggests that the United States would support Pakistan to go hard against the Taliban, particularly when non-recognition has failed as a credible tool to bring a behavioural change in them. Ideally, both China and Russia must play their role in preventing any approach that translates into a military action against Afghanistan. For that, Afghanistan must be continuously pressurised to deliver on the global concerns, and India must be stopped from creating a proxy battleground in Afghanistan.

The writer is a non-resident research fellow in the research and analysis department of IPRI and an Assistant Professor at DHA Suffa University Karachi