Floods: how long will we continue beating our chest?
Once again, Pakistan has been hit by massive floods. Once again, our smartphones and TVs are full of pictures and videos of flood-affected areas; of displaced people carrying all their possessions on hand-drawn carts, animal-drawn carriages and on their heads; of ruined crops; of dead animals; and of abandoned vehicles. Once again, we have frightening figures on loss of life, loss of crops and livestock, and loss of aggregate production and incomes. Available figures suggest that over 1,000 people have been killed, and over 3,000,000 people have been displaced. Losses and damages are estimated at $2 billion.
The floods were the result of high and concentrated levels of rainfall in northern parts of Pakistan — both in KP and GB; and in the Punjab — both in the Indian and Pakistani side. What turned a high level of rain into a disaster has been much debated. Some experts say it was India releasing floodwaters into the rivers, of which they control the upper sections. Other experts say it was the constant and ongoing encroachments into riverine flood plains. Yet others say that the flood's impact was exacerbated by powerful rural elites who cut canals and bunds to divert waters into low-lying areas in order to prevent their own lands from being affected.
This debate will, and should, carry on. But this debate should be grounded, as much as possible, on rigorous use of data and evidence. In Pakistan, we have world-class water engineers who are very well able to do such analysis. Decision-makers should use their work to prepare policies and strategies to prevent floods and mitigate their impacts. This may well include greater collaboration with India on joint management plans and, if this is not possible, at least the development of suitable early warning systems.
At the same time, opinion-makers, such as journalists, religious leaders and media stars, should raise awareness of what each of us can do at individual level. For example, not build houses in areas near waterways at risk of flash floods, not block drainage lines with rubbish, and use riverine areas only for permitted purposes such as grazing of animals.
Will any of the sensible things suggested here, and by many other commentators, actually happen? A good starting point might be to review how things went after the last big flood in 2022.
At the time, Pakistan, quite rightly, raised a huge hue and cry about how we are one of the countries most affected by climate change, even though we contribute negligible amounts to global warming. And, thanks to the tireless effort of our representatives, the international community took notice. The Secretary General of the United Nations visited Pakistan and, after touring the affected areas, made many quotable statements such as "monsoon on steroids", "climate carnage", and flooding on a "biblical scale".
The response at national and international levels was overwhelming. At the national level, there were calls from every quarter to stop encroachment of the floodplains and of unauthorised cutting on bunds, improving water storage infrastructure both on and off the Indus basin system, and upgrading early warning systems.
The international community pitched in with money — an international conference in Geneva pledged more than $11 billion. Of this, $6.4 billion was for rehabilitation and reconstruction, and the remaining $4.6 billion was for oil financing. The largest multilateral pledges came from the Islamic Development Bank ($4.2 billion), the World Bank ($2 billion), the Asian Development Bank ($1.5 billion), the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank ($1 billion) and the EU ($544 million). The largest single-country contribution came from Saudi Arabia ($1 billion).
However, as often happens in Pakistan, implementation was abysmal. Flood plain encroachment continued; construction of water management and flood diversion remained slow; money was spent on early warning systems, but the ineffectiveness of the improved systems became obvious in the recent months.
A glaring admission of our failure came at the end of August 2025, when the Minister of Economic Affairs and the Finance Minister admitted that of the $6.4 billion of project financing, only $2.8 billion was disbursed. The Finance Ministers stated, "Let's accept that we could not come up with investable projects."
So what's next? Even if our engineers, economists and other experts come up with good polices and strategies, do we have the political will to implement these? And, even if they come up with good project ideas, do we have the capacity to turn these in detailed designs; and face the hard grind of project implementation? Based on the experience of the last few years, clearly not.
And so? It is critical that top policymakers accept the fact that the public sector, particularly at federal and provincial levels, simply cannot carry this burden. They have limited technical staff, with the bulk of recurrent costs going to salaries of support staff. Senior officers and technical officers are hesitant to make bold decisions due to possible political interference and accusations of corruption. In addition, even those who are willing to work get transferred as soon as they learn anything about the ministry or department to which they are assigned.
In contrast, there is a large untapped implementation capacity among Non-Government Organizations — from the large nationwide ones to small local ones. In addition, community organisations and other local-level institutions, built up over years of hard work, could certainly take over much implementation responsibility.
And, last but not least, we have the private sector. They efficiently run most things in the economy with minimal oversight and interference from the Government. Their experience should be harnessed for public works with appropriate oversight and M&E arrangements. Such arrangements have worked in several countries and could provide good models on which to base future interventions.
The future is ours to build - we should not fail our people again.