Changing geostrategic undercurrents and Pakistan

There have been tectonic shifts in Pakistan's wider region.

One; PM Shehbaz Sharif visited China in June 2024 to revitalise CPEC, the flagship project of China's BRI. He attended the SCO summit in August-September 2025. CPEC 2.0, will focus on 5Es: exports; e-Pakistan; energy; environment; and, equity and empowerment. It will be structured around five strategic thematic 'corridors' aligning with Pakistan's 5Es. These include Growth, Innovation, Green, Livelihood-Enhancing, and Opening-Up/Regional Connectivity Corridors. CPEC is dubbed as Pakistan's 'Road to Tomorrow'.

Two; on September 17, after decades of groundwork, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia formalised their strategic partnership by signing the 'Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA)' in Riyadh. The agreement aims to strengthen joint deterrence, stipulating aggression against either country to be considered aggression against both.

Three; on September 25, 2025, President Trump met Field Marshal Gen Asim Munir at the White House for the second time - this time along with PM Shehbaz Sharif. The latest meeting was important in the backdrop of SMDA. US Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio also participated in the 90-minute Oval Office meeting, behind closed doors. As per press reports, discussions focused on security and counterterrorism (CT), US support against threats from Afghanistan, resumption of US-Pakistan military programmes and agreement to establish a "Joint CT Command" in Pakistan. Trump was receptive to conditional recommencement of the Coalition Support Fund (CSF) to Pakistan. Islamabad also sought US investments, and Washington expressed interest in Pakistan's critical minerals.

The meetings with the incumbent Trump Administration 'ostensibly' mark a significant shift in the Pak-US relations that have endemically remained strained, and at best transactional since Trump 1.0. Following factors led to reset and the American change of heart in favour of Pakistan.

India first. New Delhi not acknowledging the US role in the ceasefire during the May 2025 Indo-Pak military conflict was the immediate cause for the Trump-Modi fallout that had long been in the offing due to Indian procrastination in the trade negotiations, not allowing import of US agricultural produce and its perception by Trump Administration, as damaging economic leverage. Russian oil purchase/re-export, working against the US interests in BRICS, punitive tariffs by the US and H1B visa scam by Indians were other irritants. India's sustained position on 'multilateralism' and its emphasis on 'strategic autonomy' also runs counter to the US grand strategy, as Washington wants an anti-Beijing treaty alignment with New Delhi; and active Indian role in QUAD to begin with.

The embarrassment of the Indian military in their arrogant war imposed on Pakistan in May also diminished US expectations. The foreign policy establishment started questioning the Indian resolve and/or capability to face up to much smaller Pakistan, notwithstanding a much stronger China. There is now greater realisation of the Indian policy of 'hedging' in Washington. The debate sparked by Ashley Tellis's essay, "India's Great-Power Delusions" in the July-August 2025 issue of Foreign Affairs magazine, and the back-and-forth arguments between Tellis, Nirupama Rao, Jaishankar, Lisa Curtis and others point to a shift in the US foreign policy establishment. The sense about Indian capability and resolve to play big seems waning. Machiavelli's India under Modi, they believe, would maximise benefit without burden. Pakistan's nomination of Trump for the Noble Peace Prize, a diplomatic masterstroke, further fed to the Indian alienation.

India exited from Iran after the discovery of its proxy spy network working for Israel during the June War; and its closer alliance with Tel Aviv, a combined Saudi-Iran nemesis. Chahbahar Port faces US sanctions, and a possible rollback, quashing Indian designs to reach and exploit Central Asian markets bypassing Pakistan, exploiting Afghan iron ore from Hajigak mines in Bamiyan/Wardak, and logistically sustaining its Farkhor airbase in Tajikistan.

SMDA equally displaces India from the Saudi geo-strategic construct as it reinforces the 20% Saudi oil supply leverage which keeps the Indian economy afloat after Russian oil supply and Iranian oil imports have hit snags. SMDA also enhances Pakistan's deterrence and geo-strategic relevance vis-à-vis India and Islamabad's importance regionally, and in the Middle East.

Second, the SMDA itself. My earlier columns on the subject focused on military response to Tel Aviv/India, "if and when", dealing with perceptions and answering common doubts. Most analysts believe the US was all along onboard as; a) the KSA will not do anything tangent to the perceived US interests, neither can Pakistan afford to do so; b) the new CENTCOM Chief, Adm Brad Cooper was in the Kingdom when the SMDA was signed; c) no negative sentiment was expressed against the Agreement by either the US or Europe; and, d) Trump, Sharif and Asim met after the Agreement, in pleasant environs.

Israeli attack on Qatar 'apparently' embarrassed the US and its deep state (or elements within) too, as Washington underwrites the GCC security. The US would ostensibly want to put brakes on Israel's rogue behaviour and continue to underwrite the GCC security. However, it feels complementing this security responsibility with some sort of hybrid model of Islamic collective security makes geo-strategic and economic sense. Analysts believe SMDA provides that hybrid security umbrella. Additionally in the evolving situation in the ME, Riyadh, the major stakeholder, successfully pursues diversified relations with China and Russia in addition to America. Beijing has a long way to displace and replace the US from the region, and it understands this.

Third, change of heart in Tehran. Iran always perceived Saudi military capability enhancement as 'disruption to the Persian Gulf balance of power'. After is war with Israel, détente with Riyadh, realisation of the futility of proxy power and India's duplicity, Iran is rightly eager to become part of this Islamic hybrid model of collective security that is militarily led by nuclear Pakistan and the Saudi economic muscle.

Iran sees the Agreement as a guarantor for the regional security system of the West/Central Asia; and Middle East's OIC states. High level contacts — like the meeting between Iranian NSA Ali Larijani and Saudi Defence Minister Prince Khalid Al-Saud in Riyadh on September 16, and Prince Khalid's phone call to Iranian FM Abbas on 17 September — point to agreement about the Agreement.

Outside the Pak-Saudi bilateralism, the expansion of SMDA to other nations remains a real possibility. And now, even Indian media grudgingly accedes to Pakistan's diplomatic success and visibility on the global stage.