Can Pakistan's AI policy save it from the tech war?

Pakistan's AI policy enters a world where technology choices increasingly reflect geopolitical alignments. Recently, Pakistan unveiled its AI policy, a step in a broader transformation agenda first outlined in the Digital Pakistan Policy (2018). This particular policy builds directly on those guidelines, but more so shifting from a broad digital enablement to targeted leadership in the tech domain. What sets this policy apart is the six pillars that are interconnected and designed to "drive inclusive growth for national prosperity while preserving human rights and the rule of law". The six pillars are: (i) AI Innovation Ecosystem; (ii) Awareness and Readiness; (iii) Secure AI Ecosystem; (iv) Transformation and Evolution; (v) AI Infrastructure; and (vi) International Partnerships and Collaborations.

While all pillars address domestic issues, the last pillar addresses an important dimension that may be an outcome of geopolitical realities. Technology politics is a reality now; it has become the central point of the US-China great-power competition, resulting in a fragmented landscape with incompatible technical standards, politicised supply chains and growing pressure on middle and smaller states to choose a side. For Pakistan, technology can be both a benefactor and a challenge when viewed through this lens, and that is where the last pillar becomes essential. It explicitly states that "AI is now a determinant of national power and a domain of geopolitical competition" and that Pakistan must "position itself to benefit from multiple ecosystems without becoming dependent on a single supplier or bloc".

Pakistan's national AI policy's sixth pillar allows it to sign bilateral and multilateral agreements with leading technology nations; join global AI forums to both learn and contribute to best practices; and take part in collaborative cross-border projects while adopting global standards for interoperability. These facets are a deliberate attempt to secure policy optionality. The policy commits to developing "sovereign datasets, scalable computer infrastructure, and indigenous AI models" to reduce vulnerability to technology denial regimes. Its clause on "AI ecosystem interoperability" notes the need to ensure compatibility with "both open-source frameworks and proprietary platforms of strategic partners" which in practice allows Pakistan to integrate AI from China for rapid deployment while participating in Western AI safety and ethics initiatives. By embedding requirements for "data residency, algorithmic transparency and ethical AI compliance" into procurement and governance, the policy seeks to maintain neutrality while aligning with international norms, creating diplomatic room to manoeuvre in a time where AI supply chains are increasingly politicised.

The policy's emphasis on standards alignment also points to a broader challenge: Pakistan's limited participation in international standards bodies such as the ITU, ISO and 3GPP, where the rules on AI ethics, 5G security and quantum encryption are being set. Without representation in these forums, Pakistan risks becoming a passive consumer of standards defined by others, undermining its long-term technological sovereignty.

Beyond AI, the broader technology landscape is increasingly shaped by geopolitical forces. In telecom, Pakistan's PTA is gearing up for a 5G spectrum auction in mid-2025. At the GSMA Digital Nation Summit in Islamabad, the promise of transformative digital connectivity was tempered by a warning: spectrum prices could be set so high that they effectively stifle adoption before it begins. Open-RAN architectures offer much-needed vendor diversity, yet they introduce their own challenges: security vulnerabilities and interoperability risks that Pakistan cannot afford without bolstering national testing capacity.

The country's complete dependence on semiconductor imports, chips, fabrication tools and design software makes it particularly vulnerable to tightening global tech regimes. Much of this supply chain falls under US export controls, reminiscent of the constraints Washington imposed on China's AI chip industry in 2023. Pakistan's lack of domestic chipmaking or software autonomy leaves it exposed to sudden policy shifts far beyond its control. Meanwhile, cybersecurity remains a glaring deficit: without a fully resourced national CSIRT and sectoral ISACs, critical sectors - banking, energy, government - are left dangerously exposed to cyber threats.

The stakes peak tenfold in the realm of military technology. Pakistan's decision in 2025 to acquire 40 Chinese J-35 stealth fighters, adding to earlier J-10C and advanced missile procurements underscores the depth of its strategic alignment with China. But whatsoever, so far Islamabad has not spurned Washington. Field Marshal Asim Munir's 2025 visit rekindled cooperation around counterterrorism, and discussions on oil and rare-earth investments pointed to Washington's continued interest. This balancing act, hedging between the two powers, is definitely pragmatic but it brings its own burdens.

The AI policy rollout comes with ambitious targets: three million AI-related jobs by 2030 and 2,000 MW of dedicated power for AI data centres and crypto mining. In a departure from the comfort zone of traditional allies, Pakistan is opening new channels, including early-stage AI cooperation talks with European countries such as Romania. On the ground, a patchwork of initiatives shows how Islamabad is already navigating a fine balance: the China-Pakistan AI Smart Agriculture Lab in Faisalabad; Huawei's ICT Talent Programme training 200,000 professionals; PAF-IAST forging partnerships with both Chengdu University and European institutions; CENTAIC's reported collaboration with Chinese defence AI for the Air Force; and the Digital Dera programme bringing AI-powered farming advice to rural communities.

If implemented with discipline, the sixth pillar could deliver more than technology transfers. It could embed domestic skills in every partnership; combine Chinese infrastructure with Western innovation and governance frameworks; and elevate Pakistan's profile in the global AI conversation. Yet the very breadth of this ambition will test its resilience. Washington and Beijing may read it as strategic hedging; defence-linked AI work could draw Western scrutiny; and divergent privacy regimes risk unsettling Chinese collaboration. Without strong governance, Pakistan could remain a consumer platform for foreign technology, merely importing innovation rather than creating it.

Hence, the sixth pillar is an exercise in digital non-alignment, a recognition that in the 21st century, technological sovereignty depends as much on the management of strategic relationships as on the cultivation of domestic capacity. Done well, it could see Pakistan emerge as a credible Global South bridge in AI governance. Mismanaged, it will simply trade one dependency for another.