IEA — the myth of invincibility and India

In the ongoing debate about Pak-Afghan bilateralism, in the backdrop of October skirmish, we have so far discussed the IEA's covert and demonstrated hostility towards Pakistan; IEA's consequent violation of Pashtunwali, Islamic fraternity and/or good neighbourliness; Pakistan's ability to fight a '1.5 Front' Indo-Afghan aggression, a scenario best avoided; Afghanistan and CARs real geo-strategic and economic relevance; and the predicament of Haqqanis (HQN), labelled as the 'Haqqani Complexity' due to continued hosting of the TTP.

The October 25, 2025 Istanbul talks were salvaged by Türkiye and Qatar at the last moment. Turkish Foreign Ministry's presser reported: a) continuation of the ceasefire; b) discussion on the modalities of ceasefire implementation in Principal level meeting on November 6; and c) putting up a monitoring and verification mechanism for maintenance of peace. Press reports suggest Pakistan's unequivocal position comprising four main thrust lines: a) dismantling of terrorist safe havens inside Afghanistan; b) restraining and arresting TTP leaders and those of other terrorist outfits; c) curtailing IEA's logistic support to the TTP; and d) establishing a verifiable mechanism to monitor, report and check infiltration from the Afghan soil.

A related development has been a social media post by Sirajuddin Haqqani, IEA's interim interior minister, ostensibly under pressure from general public especially the governing IEA, with whom HQN is an alliance-partner. Siraj tried to wean himself away from his pro-Pakistan credentials, as HQN remained traditionally closer to Pakistan for reasons explained earlier. He echoed his ministerial spokesperson Abdul Mateen Qani, and literally hurled threat against Islamabad, repeating Afghan resilience and courage, reiterating the mantra of "Afghans... tested on the battlefield... and Durand Line is an imaginary line", as reported by Afghan Tolo TV. In contemporary Afghanistan, the optics of being soft on Pakistan is akin to lesser Afghan-ness. Certain other aspects need elaboration.

First, the myth of defeating two superpowers in tandem needs to be seen in context, as some myths can lead to overreach, misplaced overconfidence and arrogance. The defeat of the USSR in Afghanistan in the 1990s was not possible without international support, funding, equipment, and Pakistan's crucial, steadfast and uninterrupted training, advisory and logistic support. Any denial is tantamount to "hiding the sun behind a finger", as they say in Pashto. Without Islamabad's decisive support, Afghanistan would have been a Soviet republic with communists of PDPA still in charge.

As far as the conflict with the US-NATO Combine goes; without Pakistan's alleged 'double game'; and without countless sessions with Western leaders — civil and military — that this scribe is a witness to, where Pakistan constantly pushed for a negotiated settlement; Kabul's touted 'First Republic' under Karzai/Ghani et al would still be battling IEA; Taliban would still be holed up in Tora Bora; Tajiks' minority would still be lording over the Pashtun-majority IEA; and Qandahari Shura would have surrendered to the 'kafir' Western forces, as they offered, once ousted from power (2001). Rumsfeld rejected the offer. Let's not kid ourselves with delusions, half-truths, outright forgetfulness and ungratefulness. Every single iteration is historically proven and well documented. And IEA, although in obstinate denial, knows the facts and the real story behind their touted 'victory'.

Second, Afghanistan's overreach to India, and the reported Indo-Afghan nexus raises pertinent questions. IEA's unrecognised interim regime run by clerics stands isolated and is considered a 'lost cause' by major stakeholders. Its warming up with India is a paradox. The reception of FM Muttaqi in India during his recent yatra betrays the caution with which New Delhi is willing to embrace its former terrorist-nemesis. India would remain cognisant of the international community, especially the US/Western sensitivities, more particularly after the recent downturn of its ties with Washington. Collecting negative baggage from ties with isolated Afghanistan makes limited strategic and diplomatic sense for New Delhi.

Delhi's support 'beyond' some cosmetic morale boosting and probable military aid including training would be counterproductive for India itself. Bharat is already perceived as a bad actor fishing in troubled waters, from Ukrainian oil to its clever iterations of 'strategic autonomy' and hedging policy. It would never like to be seen as terrorism (read IEA) sponsor, breaking ranks with international community in support of a regime that stands accused of violating diplomatic norms and agreements, like Doha Agreement (2020); is non-inclusive and non-representative; and is accused of gender apartheid against its own people.

Besides, not everyone in the IEA sees the situation like FM Muttaqi does. It is not lost on the IEA rank and file that it was just yesterday when India dubbed them as terrorists; shunned all contacts with them; and ran the US/NATO bases in Afghanistan under occupation, by providing auxiliary manpower, etc. Everyone in the IEA does not see Hindu India with genocidal policies in Kashmir, and its close alliance with genocidal Israel, through the same prism. Hence collusion between Hindu India and Muslim Afghanistan against Muslim Pakistan may be a temporary 'convergence of interests', unlikely to go far.

Third, having run the course of peace, amity and good neighbourliness, Pakistan seem to have exhausted all options to inculcate a behavioral change in the IEA, from bellicosity to brotherhood. On the maximum-minimum scale Islamabad's minimum ask is restraining of TTP by Kabul from its murderous attacks inside Pakistan. And that is where the intent and capability of IEA, its factions and its leadership come into question. At this point, it seems IEA is using terror against Pakistan as an instrument of policy, as outlined in my last column. Pakistan's two policy calibrations; that of using force against terrorist hideouts inside Afghanistan, and Islamabad warming up to the former Afghan stake holders will have major implications for IEA.

Fourth, for a long time, Pakistan has been justifying IEA's irrationality to the wider world, in its desire to have a stable western flank. Support for ideological Qandahar and muscular Haqqani power centres sprang from the same desire. However, IEA's consequent empowerment has gone sour under the changed environment. For this and other known reasons, the international community, especially the West Plus and Pakistan, are slowly gravitating towards a possible regime change.

We discuss Afghanistan's military geography, its power centres, the possible regime change along with Pakistan's ethno-religious policy predicament next week.