Punitive Jirgas and the crisis of state justice

The incident from Musakhel should not be dismissed as a viral video or a local ritual rooted in tradition. It is a test of Pakistan's justice system, its constitutional guarantees, and the credibility of the state's writ. It once again exposes how quickly informal justice fills the vacuum when formal institutions fail to deliver timely and credible remedies.

Eight individuals were compelled to walk on burning embers to prove their innocence. This was not justice delivered through evidence or due process; it was coercion filling the space left by institutional failure. What burned that day was not only human flesh, but the promise that the Constitution extends to every citizen.

Such incidents reveal a recurring pattern. When courts are inaccessible, investigations weak and prosecutions delayed, communities gravitate toward instant, coercive forms of "justice".

Pakistan's legal framework draws a clear distinction between voluntary dispute resolution and coercive adjudication or punishment. Customary mediation, when consensual and non-punitive, is not per se unlawful. What the Constitution does not permit is the assumption of judicial or punitive authority by informal bodies.

The Supreme Court has consistently held that jirgas or panchayats which impose punishments, determine guilt or coerce compliance are unconstitutional and incompatible with fundamental rights.

The monopoly of the state lies not over all dispute resolution, but over criminal adjudication, punishment, and the lawful use of coercive power.

The Musakhel incident represents a public and cumulative violation of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Justice by ordeal has no place in a constitutional order, where pain cannot be treated as proof, and suffering cannot substitute evidence. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that executive convenience, social pressure or tradition cannot override constitutional guarantees.

This incident is not an aberration.

In Sukkur, a jirga ordered twelve minor girls to be given in marriage as compensation for murder. In Rawalpindi's Sidra murder case, family pressure and a jirga-style reconciliation attempt nearly concealed an honour killing. In each instance, informal forums assumed judicial, administrative and punitive authority while formal institutions struggled to assert control.

Forcing individuals to undergo physical harm clearly falls within offences relating to hurt and bodily injury under the Pakistan Penal Code. Caution is warranted in invoking the Anti-Terrorism Act; however, the organised, coercive and deliberately public execution of punishment carries features sufficiently grave and structured to merit serious legal consideration rather than summary exclusion.

Parallel systems thrive where formal justice falters. Delayed FIRs, compromised crime scenes, inadequate medico-legal evidence, hostile witnesses and weak prosecutions routinely undermine cases before trial. Social pressure, particularly in honour-related matters, further collapses due process, with the burden falling disproportionately on women and children.

Courts have condemned such practices repeatedly, yet enforcement remains uneven due to political patronage, local influence and institutional capacity constraints.

Reform must therefore be legally precise and institutionally realistic. Parliament should enact an explicit statutory prohibition on coercive customary punishments, creating a dedicated offence for organising or enforcing such practices. The distinction between lawful mediation and unlawful punishment must be codified. Without visible enforcement and credible prosecutions, statutory reform alone will not restore public confidence.

No child should become compensation; no innocent person should be forced to walk on fire; no murder should be buried as a "family matter".

Justice delayed does not merely deny relief; it creates traditions of cruelty. Justice delivered, through law and institutions, dismantles them.