Beneath the Eagle’s shadow, Iron Brothers hold fast

KARACHI:

Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s recent visit to China could not have come at a sharper note of irony. Even as Islamabad’s ties with Washington — Beijing’s archrival — show signs of thaw, the premier was greeted with more than the usual symbolism. Sharif, like many other leaders, attended the SCO summit, took part in the Victory Day parade, which sent the West into a diplomatic flutter, and, most importantly, held closed-door meetings with President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Qiang. He returned home with $8.5bn in deals and joint ventures, hailing them as the beginning of a “long march of economic growth.”

Beyond customary reiteration of commitment to further cement their unique relationship, the two nations also agreed to kick-start the next phase of upgraded “CPEC 2.0”. However, the key takeaway from Sharif’s trip was the “Action Plan 2025–29,” a roadmap to strengthen the two countries’ partnership as it outlines extensive cooperation in various fields, including politics, economy, trade, infrastructure, science, security, people-to-people exchanges, and multilateral diplomacy.

The “Action Plan to Foster an Even Closer China-Pakistan Community with a Shared Future in the New Era” — as it has officially been named — once again endorses the “all-weather strategic cooperative partnership,” which has remained resilient in the face of changing global power dynamics. The development came at a time when US President Donald Trump has made a surprising strategic about-turn toward Islamabad, following an extended period of near-complete diplomatic disengagement.

However, in contrast to Donald Trump’s narrowly transactional rapprochement with Pakistan — shaped by his ‘America First’ calculus and tied to tactical needs — Beijing’s new Action Plan reflects Xi’s broader vision of a “shared future for mankind.” It frames the China–Pakistan relationship not just as a bilateral bargain but as a stabilising force in an unsettled world, reiterating both sides’ backing for each other on sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity.

The Action Plan lays out a comprehensive agenda within seven domains.

First, the plan strengthens institutional linkages between parliaments, foreign ministries, and political parties. Both sides reaffirm support for each other’s core interests, including Pakistan’s commitment to the “One China” principle and China’s backing of Pakistan’s sovereignty and development. It encourages China’s mediating role in regional conflicts and commits to advancing China’s global initiatives on development, security, and governance.

Second, the plan aligns the five corridors of CPEC (Growth, Livelihoods, Innovation, Green, and Openness) with URAAN Programme, which is built on the 5Es framework: Exports, E-Pakistan, Environment/Energy, Equity/Ethics/Empowerment. Key focus areas include industrial development (special zones in Karachi and Islamabad), agriculture (joint research and training), maritime cooperation (resource exploration and management), and connectivity (Gwadar Port development, Karakoram Highway realignment, ML-1 rail upgrade). In the fields of energy and IT, the plan focuses on cooperation on power sector efficiency, digital infrastructure, AI, 5G, cloud computing, and cybersecurity. Livelihood projects will include small-scale initiatives in health, education, disaster preparedness, and climate resilience aimed at directly benefiting local communities.

Third, the plan promotes trade liberalisation under the upgraded China-Pakistan FTA, enhanced market access for Pakistani exports, and digital customs systems. Border infrastructure like Khunjerab Pass will be modernised for year-round operation. China encourages investment in Pakistan with security guarantees and pledges continued financial support through bilateral and multilateral channels.

Fourth, under the plan, bilateral research will focus on disaster management, climate change, hydropower, AI, and renewable energy. The partnership includes joint labs, scholarships, and 3,000 training opportunities. Space cooperation will expand to include satellite tech, deep-space exploration, and astronaut training, alongside broader vocational and social sector collaboration.

Fifth, the two sides will deepen strategic defence cooperation through joint military training, counterterrorism efforts, and intelligence sharing. The plan lays emphasis on protection of Chinese personnel and projects in Pakistan, opposes double standards in counterterrorism, and strengthens judicial and anti-corruption collaboration under the “Clean Silk Road” framework.

Sixth, the Action Plan seeks to expand cooperation in education, youth programs, media, sports, and culture. Initiatives include the CPEC University Consortium, co-productions in film and TV, translation projects, and environmental partnerships under the BRI Green Development Coalition. Sister-city and subnational ties will be strengthened.

Seventh, the two sides reaffirm support for multilateralism and the UN-centered international order. The plan calls for peace in South Asia, resolution of Jammu and Kashmir under UN resolutions, and stability in Afghanistan through inclusive governance. On global issues, they advocate for a permanent Gaza ceasefire, Palestinian statehood, equitable climate action, and stronger cooperation in the SCO, WTO, and UN forums.

Quantum leap?

“It is a significant document which is comprehensive as it charts the way forward in multiple areas, [like] political, economic, trade, investment, defence, science, technology and people-to-people contacts,” says Dr Maleeha Lodhi, political scientist and Pakistan’s former representative to the UN, about the Action Plan 2025-29. “It also commits the two countries to supporting each other in multilateral forums. This represents both continuity and a quantum leap forward in a strategic partnership that has stood the test of time.”

Pakistan's longest-serving ambassador to China concurs. “Pakistan and China have a tradition of building blocks to continuously upgrade their old and close ties. This Action Plan is one such concrete effort to give a further impetus to our all-round cooperative partnership and in that sense, a qualitative leap,” says Ambassador Masood Khalid, who played a pivotal role in the launch and consolidation of CPEC.

“The Action Plan is a sign of unflinching trust between the two countries, increasing scope and substance of their bilateral relations and China’s readiness to support Pakistan’s economic agenda,” he adds. “While reaffirming joint resolve of the two countries to carry forward CPEC 2.O, the plan has laid stress on enhancing Chinese investment in areas such as minerals, energy, agriculture, and industrial sectors.”

Former foreign secretary Aizaz Chaudhry says the Action Plan represents a broader trajectory in Pakistan-China relationship. “But I would say that it is a continuity of the process that we embarked upon in 2015 when CPEC – the flagship project of BRI – was signed. In that sense, I think this Action Plan in a way represents a continuity of that economic collaboration between the two countries,” notes Chaudhry, who has also led Pakistan’s diplomatic mission in Washington.

Dr Moeed Yusuf, former national security adviser, believes the Action Plan is a signal of Beijing’s continued investment in the relationship with Pakistan and vice versa. “But a piece of paper is not the make or break of the relationship. The bottom line is we know that we need to do more on ensuring Chinese presence is secure in Pakistan and their projects do not run into trouble and problems. That's where we need to focus rather than the plan itself,” he adds.

The timing of the Action Plan has sparked speculation that the Chinese move might be an attempt to outweigh President Trump’s move to reconfigure America’s ties with Pakistan by investment commitments, especially in the field of critical minerals and cryptocurrency. But Dr Lodhi doesn’t agree. “The timing has nothing to do with a third country. It was always planned to be unveiled after the SCO summit,” she says.

Balancing act

A glance at the history of Pakistan-US ties reveals a familiar, transactional pattern: Washington draws Islamabad close when its own strategic stakes are high, only to withdraw once those interests have been served. In contrast, China shares a deep and enduring strategic partnership with Pakistan, marked by consistency and mutual trust. Strong political goodwill, mutual respect, and a shared understanding of each other’s positions and priorities have reinforced this relationship.

This raises an important question: Can Pakistan balance its relationships with both Washington and Beijing, or will it inevitably be compelled to align more closely with one, particularly at a time when the Trump administration has shown interest in engaging with Islamabad.

“Relations with China and the US are not a zero-sum game. Pakistan has shown in the past it can have a good relationship with both countries. China, however, will continue to be Pakistan's strategic priority even as it tries to improve ties with the US. There really is no equivalence between the two relationships,” says Dr Lodhi, who has also served twice as Pakistan’s ambassador to the US.

Ambassador Chaudhry echoes Dr Lodhi’s view. Pakistan, he says, has also had sustained periods of engagement with the United States. “Even when the government-to-government relationship has oscillated, the people-to-people relationship has remained strong during those times. I personally do not see these two relationships as zero-sum,” he adds.

Ambassador Khalid, meanwhile, underscores the unique nature of Pakistan’s relationship with China, which he believes cannot be swayed by any political or diplomatic exigency. He says that Pakistan’s relationships with China and with the US are neither identical nor incompatible. Both have their own history and a different trajectory. “Pakistan does not believe that the relationship with one will be at the expense of other. Pakistan would like to pursue each relationship on the basis of its individual strength and potential following the principle of bilateralism and seeking mutually beneficial collaboration with both,” he adds.

“Our ties with China are strategic and longstanding, and a reset in relations with the US does not mean a downturn in our relations with China. I think the US also would understand Pakistan’s position.”

Dr Yusuf, on the other hand, believes it entirely depends on the trajectory of the US-China contestation. “In our region, it’s going to be more and more difficult. The geography dictates that with China's neighbour India, which is a US partner, even if there is a hiccup right now, it is more likely that South Asia becomes the backyard for this competition,” he says. “It's going to be very difficult. But as I said, there is no option. And so Pakistan, I think, will try and stay the course to find a way to work with both.”

No-camp politics

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has described China as “the most potent and dangerous near-peer adversary the United States has ever faced” and cautioned of drastic impacts if Washington doesn’t act. “If we stay on the road we're on right now, in less than 10 years virtually everything that matters to us in life will depend on whether China will allow us to have it or not,” Rubio stated during his confirmation hearing before the US Senate earlier this year.

Rubio’s statement offers a glimpse into the Trump administration’s approach to South Asia and the Indo-Pacific. Successive US administrations since the early 2000s have placed their strategic bet on India as a counterbalance to China in Washington’s broader geostrategic rivalry with Beijing. However, this strategy has yielded few results — partly due to Delhi’s fixation on Pakistan and partly because of its pursuit of a multipolar global order.

This may have prompted Trump to recalibrate US policy in an effort to either wean Pakistan off its growing dependence on China or, at the very least, offer Islamabad strategic alternatives. Lisa Curtis, a senior official in Trump’s first administration, spoke of this strategy in a VOA interview ahead of Trump’s second term. “It’s not in the interest of the United States to see Pakistan fully dependent on China,” she said.

Ambassador Chaudhry says it is not an either/or scenario, as cooperation and differences often coexist in relations between states. “Therefore, Pakistan should be able to maintain its relations with both China as well as the United States, predicated on its own national interests,” he adds. “Wherever the national interests of Pakistan converge with China or the US, there is ample space for Pakistan to cooperate with either or both. I believe that this is doable. This is also the line that most nations take at this point in time.”

Ambassador Khalid agrees that a relationship with either country does not limit Pakistan’s ability to have a cooperative relationship with the other. “The areas of cooperation offered by the US and China are not entirely similar, but they have their own potential. Pakistan would like to benefit from the help offered by both for its economic development,” he says.

Analysts argue that it would be a strategic misstep for Pakistan to lean too heavily toward the United States while relegating China — especially given that India, despite current hiccups, will remain Washington’s strategic priority in the region.

Islamabad is cognisant of the potential pitfalls of overalignment with either side. “Pakistan has made it clear that it is not going to be part of camp politics,” says Dr Yusuf. “This is not out of love for the US or China. Our economy is so dependent on both countries that we can't afford to choose one over the other. Otherwise, we'll become proxy battlegrounds.”

Former NSA Yusuf believes “both China and the US recognise that Pakistan is not going to pick a side against the other. I think Pakistan's made it pretty clear to all. Actually, China and the US for the most part have never asked Pakistan to do that starkly.”

That said, the Trump administration appears increasingly fixated on China’s growing assertiveness on the global stage — backed by its rapid technological advancement and economic rise. Nothing illustrates this obsession more clearly than Trump’s knee-jerk reaction to China’s Victory Day parade, where President Xi Jinping was flanked by the leaders of Russia and North Korea. “Please give my warmest regards to Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-Un as you conspire against the United States of America,” he wrote in a post on Truth Social.

“There are now growing tensions between the US and China, and that puts Pakistan and many other countries in a bind. But this is not an ‘either/or’ scenario for Pakistan yet. From Pakistan's perspective, one hopes it doesn't get to that anytime in the foreseeable future,” says Dr Yusuf.

It is, however, a given that Pakistan is unlikely to take any step that would entangle it in a geopolitical game aimed at undermining China’s interests. “As China is Pakistan's strategic priority it cannot and will not be part of any US effort or coalition that aims to contain China. That limits the space for the Pakistan-US relationship. But that doesn’t mean it can’t find areas of convergence and of cooperation with the US,” says Dr Lodhi.

What next?

Launched in 2015, CPEC was hailed as a “game-changer” for Pakistan’s economy. However, a decade later, the multibillion-dollar initiative appears to have lost steam, marred by controversies and delays. Chronic political instability, debilitating financial crises, mounting security concerns, and poor communication have hindered the timely execution of key CPEC projects, limiting its impact on Pakistan’s socio-economic development.

Former diplomats believe the Action Plan offers another opportunity to Pakistan to tap the full economic potential of its unique partnership with the world’s second largest economy through CPEC 2.0.

“Pakistan's priorities with China should be acceleration of CPEC 2.0, implementation and prioritisation of investment and trade cooperation through enhanced business-to-business contacts and partnerships and by leveraging market access already provided through the Free Trade Agreement and working to secure more such access,” says Dr Lodhi.

Officials acknowledge that Pakistan has yet to realise even one-fifth of CPEC’s potential. The country’s greatest shortcoming lies in its failure to boost exports — an essential requirement for meeting debt and investment-related obligations. The issue, they admit, is not with CPEC itself, but with Pakistan’s own systemic shortcomings.

“Whatever we have promised to implement must be implemented no matter what within the timelines while keeping Chinese secure. That's what is needed. Nothing else will matter,” says Dr Yusuf.

To ensure this, Pakistan has to have a supra oversight body. “A high-level task force should be considered to supervise the implementation of the Action Plan. A new vigour and direction with clarity on end results combined with unflinching sense of commitment is needed,” suggests Ambassador Khalid. “We also need to overcome our capacity deficit.”

He further says that Pakistan needs to redouble its efforts to attract Chinese investment by improving ease of doing business and by providing one-window facilitation to Chinese investors. “Pakistan’s economy can make a turnaround by 2029 if we are able to achieve even 50 to 60% of the goals set out in the Action Plan,” adds the former diplomat.

While the Action Plan reaffirms long-standing diplomatic, economic, and security ties, experts warn that its true test lies in Pakistan’s ability to implement the roadmap, particularly under CPEC 2.0. As global alignments shift with Washington drawing closer, they urge Pakistan’s leadership to tread carefully in an ever-complex geopolitical landscape, avoiding the trap of binary diplomatic choices.

Senator Mushahid Hussain Syed, former chair of the Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee, stresses this point, describing the Action Plan as the most comprehensive strategic blueprint in the history of Pak-China ties.

He notes that while the tentative rapprochement with Washington is welcome, the ties offered by the Trump administration were limited in scope, only focusing on what he calls the three Cs: crypto, counterterrorism, and critical minerals. “Such a relationship is unlikely to outlive the Trump administration,” he says. “The good news is that Pakistan has strategic space for the next three years. Both the Americans and the Chinese know it — the strategic relationship that truly matters is the one Islamabad enjoys with Beijing.”

Experts argue that if backed by strategic vision, political will, governance reforms, and a secure investment environment, the Action Plan could finally steer Pakistan toward long-delayed economic dividends. But if left to stagnate, as CPEC has, they warn, the writing on the wall is clear: it risks becoming yet another missed opportunity.