Trump, Putin and Pakistan: the shifts in a fluid world
The writer is a former Secretary to Government, Home & Tribal Affairs Department and a retired IG. He can be reached at aashah77@yahoo.com
The relations between Pakistan and the United States have always been defined by utility rather than trust. From the Cold War to the post-9/11 era, Pakistan was useful when Washington needed an ally, but once the mission ended, it was quickly discarded. That legacy of transactionalism continues to haunt the relationship today.
In the 1950s and 60s, Pakistan joined SEATO and CENTO, lent Washington the Badaber base and aligned itself against the Soviet Union. Yet when the 1965 war broke out with India, it found itself abandoned. In the 1970s, Pakistan played a decisive role in paving the way for US-China rapprochement, but when East Pakistan collapsed, Washington did little to help. The Afghan jihad of the 1980s again made Islamabad indispensable, but the taps were shut once the Soviets withdrew. After 9/11, Pakistan was dubbed a "major non-NATO ally" but was soon blamed for instability and sidelined when the Taliban resurged.
This history matters because it frames the present. The recent warming of ties between Islamabad and Washington is less a strategic reset than another tactical engagement. The US wants Pakistan to stay neutral in the Iran-Israel conflict and possibly be available as a discreet channel to Tehran. Pakistan, for its part, seeks recognition, market access and a boost to its fragile economy.
These developments cannot be seen in isolation. Former President Donald Trump's recent meeting with Vladimir Putin, his Russian counterpart, points to a potential shift in the global chessboard. If, in the future, the two leaders are able to settle the Ukraine issue, Washington's foreign policy would be freed from one of its most consuming entanglements.
A US-Russia understanding would also alter India's energy calculus. Since 2022, India has been one of the largest buyers of discounted Russian oil, even as it deepens its partnership with Washington through QUAD. The arrangement has required careful balancing: avoiding Western sanctions while keeping Moscow engaged.
Trump has, however, made it clear that he has no intention of imposing tariffs on India. If Ukraine is resolved and Western pressure on Moscow subsides, New Delhi will be able to buy Russian oil with fewer constraints. This would give India breathing space and consolidate its economic resilience - something Pakistan cannot ignore.
For Islamabad, India's comfort with Russian energy has two implications. First, it strengthens New Delhi's ability to sustain defence spending and regional assertiveness, widening the asymmetry with Pakistan. Second, it risks marginalising Pakistan in a world where India is both a partner in QUAD and a beneficiary of Russian oil.
This is why Pakistan must use the current thaw with Washington wisely. Diplomatic prestige is useful, but real gains will come only if Islamabad secures trade concessions, attracts investment and translates rhetoric into economic dividends. Pakistan's cryptocurrency sector, with 25 million active users, and its untapped mineral wealth could benefit if linked to serious US investment.
At the same time, Trump's public support for Pakistan's army chief carries domestic risks. It is likely to consolidate the military's dominance over civilian institutions, with the parliament reduced to a rubber stamp and civil liberties curtailed further. Foreign policy dividends will mean little if they are accompanied by democratic erosion at home.
From Washington's perspective, Pakistan fits into three immediate objectives: balancing China without alienating India; ensuring stability in Afghanistan; and safeguarding oil routes through the Arabian Sea. These are functional aims, not a declaration of strategic partnership.
India, meanwhile, is closely monitoring. Any sign of US-Pakistan military cooperation is viewed in New Delhi as a threat to the QUAD's coherence. Washington is acutely aware of this sensitivity and is therefore likely to frame its engagement with Pakistan in narrow terms — counterterrorism, humanitarian cooperation and crisis management — to avoid alarming India.
The Trump-Putin meeting in Alaska on August 15 highlights how quickly the chessboard can shift. A settlement in Ukraine would empower India, strengthen Russia's oil economy and reduce Washington's dependence on European allies. Pakistan could easily find itself sidelined if it fails to secure tangible gains from its current relevance.
The lesson is clear: Pakistan must avoid repeating history by tying itself too closely to another cycle of American tactical needs. Strategic autonomy will not come from rhetorical balancing but from disciplined negotiation, economic diversification and internal stability.
For now, Washington's warmth offers a small opening. Whether Islamabad can turn that into lasting dividends depends on whether it plays the long game — or falls, once again, into the familiar trap of short-term utility followed by long-term neglect.