Taliban: military movement or a political force?

Taliban's first conquest of Afghanistan came in 1996 when, as a military movement, Taliban stormed Kabul, the capital. The conquest resulted in the first Taliban rule of Afghanistan which lasted for almost 5 years from 1996-2001. After the US military intervention in Afghanistan in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the Taliban were removed from power. They had no political role to play in Afghanistan until their return to power in August 2021. It is in this gap of almost 20 years that the world treated the Taliban only as a militant organisation and a rogue military outfit that had no role to play in Afghan politics.

Did the world miss the opportunity to engage with the Taliban? Wouldn't the world be different if the Taliban were politically engaged during that period? Could such a world assist in transition of the Taliban from a military movement to a political force?

Ultimately, the US chose to directly engage with the Taliban movement and created the circumstances for the Taliban's return to power in August 2021. The lost opportunity of dealing with the Taliban for 20 years may be considered a big mistake. After being removed from power in 2001, the Taliban were willing to surrender, yet they were deprived of this opportunity and with it the opportunity to become part of any political process in Afghanistan. The political consequence of this mistake was that the movement returned to power in 2021, with no political experience in the last 20 years that they were left out of Afghan politics. Today, the Taliban are considered a political force, but only a force that the world is struggling to deal with, as it is considered a repressive regime that rules over 40 million Afghans in a strategically vital area of Eurasia. No wonder Russia has recognised the Taliban government, and China is engaged with both the Taliban and Pakistan to work out a trilateral engagement.

Taliban's re-conquest of Afghanistan came at a time when Iran and Pakistan, with whom it shares a long border, were experiencing turmoil at home. Iran fought a short war of 12 days imposed by the US and its ally Israel. Pakistan, on the other hand, faced military aggression by India and fought a short war of four days. Pakistan also faced an upsurge in terrorist attacks, deepening economic troubles, rising inflation and growing dependence on IMF loans. Yet, both Pakistan and Iran enjoy a great degree of influence in Afghan politics, and play a vital role in providing access to a landlocked Afghanistan to the outside world. Iran is also facing financial pain as it bears the brunt of international sanctions.

Thus, both the big neighbours of Afghanistan have problems of their own. And if the big neighbours have problems then it is a challenging proposition for the Taliban to rebuild its image to be recognised not as a military movement but a political force. Add to this the apprehension of both Pakistan and Iran that Afghanistan may export unrest, refugees and militancy across the borders, and this makes matters of good governance by the Taliban even more challenging.

The US leads the global consensus on the diplomatic isolation of the Taliban, which raises important questions on the role of external powers in the recognition of the Taliban as a political force. Russia and China lead the external powers that are contributing to the erosion of this global consensus. When the world treats the Taliban as a militant resistance and insurgent group with a religious ideology that has created a repressive regime, it misses a point that the Taliban today enjoy political power in Afghanistan, and they have come to power after engaging in a prolonged conflict against the US-led coalition forces. Not just as a de facto ruling authority, but a movement that enjoys a good degree of support from the people of Afghanistan. If the US could treat the Taliban as a political force, engaging it in a political process that led to the Doha Agreement in 2020, then it could surely consider helping the Taliban in transitioning from a militarised insurgency to a political governing body. This will help the Taliban in reshaping the internal dynamics and rebuilding Afghanistan, and may positively influence all external stakeholders to recalibrate their geopolitical calculations about the future of Afghanistan.

Pakistan has a complex relationship with the Taliban, featuring strategic patronage and periods of engagement and disengagement. Pakistan facilitated the Doha peace process as its security, regional alliances and internal stability are all linked with a stable Afghanistan, which only a legitimate and credible political authority in Afghanistan can create. Pakistan is thus inclined to diplomatically support the Taliban's political ascendency. Pakistan's great diplomatic challenge is to convince the outside world to stop looking at the Taliban government as a product of radical Islamist insurgency based on religious extremism, tribal conservatism and external sponsorship, but as a political entity capable of good governance, statecraft and diplomacy. The Doha Agreement stands out as a watershed moment of this recognition and has laid the groundwork for re-determining assumptions about the political capacity of the Taliban and treating them as a political force.

Pakistan's military establishment has historically pursued the policy of 'strategic depth' in Afghanistan. But the time for such strategic preference is over. Today, Pakistan's policy adjustments are more in line with supporting the creation of a regional bloc headed by China, in which Afghanistan is likely to play a crucial role. In the case of Pakistan, the pursuit of strategic depth in Afghanistan can be interpreted through Prof Mearsheimer's theory of offensive realism. The theory helps in understanding the security dilemma Pakistan faces and how it attempts to enhance its security by supporting the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, and how, in return, it has increased the internal security issues of Pakistan due to the resurgence of TTP. The realist theoretical framework helps best to understand the evolving nature of Pakistan's Taliban policy.

The current Taliban government has assumed all state functions, and unlike their first tenure, they now face the responsibility of state-building. The major driver of Pakistan's current relationship with the Taliban is the latter's inaction against TTP. Pakistan resorted to cross-border airstrikes in April 2022 against the TTP sanctuaries in Afghanistan, and Pakistan's assertive posture is also indicative in the form of enhanced border control, border fortifications and implementation of its policy of return of Afghan refugees. To bring about a change in Afghan state behaviour, Pakistan needs regional support of not only China, CARs and Iran but also Russia, the first country to formally recognise the Taliban government.