Policing in Kashmore

A month after citizens protesting in Islamabad were assured of police action in Kashmore, there isn't any notable progress in the context. There has been a change in police command, but the oppression of citizens, including kidnapping for ransom, extortion and other heinous acts, continues unabated, as it has for years. Four kidnapped individuals remain in the captivity of bandits for ransom in the district. Highway and shop robberies in broad daylight — as well as motorcycle and mobile phone snatching in Kashmore, Tangwani and Ghouspur — show no signs of abating.

Moreover, for years, bandits and their sympathisers have targeted the Hindu business community and the already scarce professionals, forcing many to flee the district. Now, they have begun targeting ordinary citizens for their assets, with the Naich tribe of Kashmore being the latest victims.

Though feudal and tribal warlords, ethnic and tribal sensitivities, tribal clashes, patronisation of bandits, rough katcha terrain, considerable influence of pirs, negligible role of the judiciary and marginalisation of citizens may all contribute to the 'offense industry' that causes citizens to suffer insufferably, policing — however paradoxically — also plays a role in sustaining the district's criminal landscape. Through their selective action, inaction and malefaction — or a combination of all three — the police have, over the years, sustained the feudal and tribal grip, contributed to the outbreak of tribal feuds and the rise of criminal gangs, and reinforced nearly all other precipitating factors behind the ongoing surge of lawlessness and crime in the district.

The few police commanders and SHOs who initiate decisive action often find themselves transferred. Their successors, bound by predetermined red lines, struggle to control crime. Consequently, they form nexuses with compliant local journalists and sycophants to mask criminality by securing underreporting or favourable coverage during their postings. In return, media personnel and henchmen facilitate paid postings and transfers of personnel, receive undue protocols and perks, and even exert influence over the registration of FIRs, arrests and releases.

Most SHOs in the colonial-era thana culture either have criminal records and suspicious affiliations, or are underqualified, unprofessional and locally entrenched, making them susceptible to political, feudal or tribal influence and thus poor at public dealings. These SHOs, as well as other police officers, rarely treat underprivileged victims with respect, instead misbehaving and abusing them as if their servants. Officials often refuse to register FIRs or arrest offenders unless they are paid by the victim — and even then, only if the aggressors are not associated with notorious media personalities, tribal or feudal warlords, well-connected officials, electable or so-called civil society members.

If the oppressor is notorious, as is often the case in instances of tyranny, the police usually abandon victims to divine justice or tribal retribution, which frequently sparks prolonged and intractable tribal feuds, rather exacerbating the district's criminality.

Most operations either fall short or backfire, resulting in disproportionate losses to the police compared to the criminals, primarily due to poor planning, execution and the presence of criminal sympathisers within the police ranks.

Moreover, most recoveries of kidnapped victims are actually paid settlements brokered by tribal warlords but are misrepresented by the police-media nexus as successful operations. Sponsored tribal, feudal and political influences badly undermine policing in the district. For instance, local police personnel who kill hardened criminals in encounters face exorbitant jirga fines, leaving them indebted for life and deterring others from following suit.

Despite years of heavy losses to both police and the public, the reported and officially solicited surrender of hardened criminals raises more questions about lasting peace in the district.

And the question of whether the recent (customary) change in command will truly alter district's policing or merely repeat past patterns remains to be seen.