How doctrine feeds strategy

We old-timers have a problem. We remain stuck in a groove. But then there is that age-old maxim: the more things change, the more they remain the same. This came about like nowhere else than in that short conflict between India and Pakistan. As the young AVM of the PAF rattled term after term that had us scratching our cerebral nooks to make meaning, so seemed the equally impressive Air Marshal Bharti of the IAF — Aurangzeb's equivalent — struggling to fathom what this younger version of him from across the line was trying to explain.

Perhaps the audiences, like all of us — and I blame them not; fighter flying anyway is esoteric and otherworldly — were happy enough to know and understand the bottom-line 6-0, that the erudite AVM was so effective in delivering.

Is it all as new for it to be unfathomable? Let's dissect. It begins with 'domain superiority' and includes 'spectrum-dominance'. It is easier to explain 'domain superiority' because it is similar to air superiority, that to us old fags was the sine qua non for success in air operations. It always had shades: should it be local, transient, pervasive or absolute. In the post 70s world of combat air operations and campaign planning this is what air forces vied for. In that bargain the entire war would be over, and the air forces would remain consumed with winning the air superiority battle.

Their contribution to the total-war effort that the nation had entered was left unattended. The army and the navy had frequently complained about the air force fighting its own parallel war at the cost of support to the surface forces. Conceptually the surface forces thought of the air force as an adjunct to their respective missions and hence the lien they perceptibly claimed over the air force. Whoever coined the original mission for the air force — it evolved in WWII — left that phrase hanging 'provide support to the surface forces'. Though this wasn't meant to be as literal as it sounded.

We in the air force began talking about 'effects' which needed to be complementary to what the surface forces were engaged in. Also, we coordinated operations with the surface forces where in an extended way benefit would fall to the war on the ground — the 'effect'. Air Force's independent role began evolving with time making a significant distinction of its space in complementing the national effort along with the army and the navy, not in their support.

This was pivotal to doctrinal manifestations in the PAF. Simply put, we needed control of the air to be able to bring any meaningful support to the mission of the army or the navy, and that justified our time and effort to win air superiority first. The mission had various manifestations and needed a sequential campaign. A more prudent distinction over time was to calibrate the physical parameters of time and space for which air superiority was needed and not seek pervasive or absolute control of the air.

In due course someone realised that the air force's only job in the world was not to win control of the air per se but to do something with it after it had been attained. Air forces are inherently offensive and meant to deliver death and destruction on the enemy. Deterrence through pain and punishment on an enemy to keep him from any offensive intent was inherent in this doctrinal evolution of strategic intent.

As the first step air superiority, once a strictly defensive orientation, changed to an offensive conception. Mindsets moved scales and each air superiority mission turned offensive in spirit and purpose. Literally, the pilots and the combat controllers were walked through the stages to such an end. There were no borders in the air and sky was to be won and owned as a piece of contested real estate. It would then be used for the purpose it was secured - to deliver pain whether from the air or on the ground. This doctrinal reorientation was successfully learnt, understood, practiced and mastered over the years.

What then is 'domain superiority'? Simply, the control of the medium that a force must operate in. It needs tools appropriate to that end. Either you acquire those or develop those and then learn to integrate those in a complementary application which multiplies your power potential. It needs orchestration, timing, application, control and coordination. If this system is developed, rehearsed and practiced repeatedly over years, perfection ensues. Just as an example the doctrinal evolution and changes in operational art within the PAF have accrued over three decades. It begins by changing the way people think of aerial combat and practicing the art to perfection. Tools come along the way adding to the lethality of it all.

The current arsenal of tools available to a warrior now is far more diverse, complementary and force multiplier in effect. Cyber-warfare, space and satellite communication linkages and use of the electromagnetic spectrum as indeed their denial in complementarity to kinetic air operations is the new gamut. The PAF was able to outdo the IAF in all these domains; but to that end each was a component of a bigger sheet wherefrom played the music of success.

Electromagnetic spectrum is now the medium of play over which the entire labyrinth of force engagement, air, land or sea, is laid out. Without the capacity to integrate the new backdrop in force application and operational schemes any force in the new arena is a lost force unable to keep its orientation and composite strength. 'Dominating the spectrum' too needs tools, timing, coordination and effect.

This brings into focus the importance of perfection in command and control and the efficiency in decision-making. With so many accompaniments of tools, processes and coordination only AI assisted command and control can suffice. Human interface is the key but to bring all to sing from the same page is the secret and that needs automation, networking and exemplary leadership, which is involved, engaged and fearless.

Missilery too uses the medium of air regardless of its mode of launch. With the war having changed form it is time to consider structures and their relevance to the modern war. Armies are essential though their roles need to be modified. Conquering spaces may not be as relevant now but holding spaces still is. Also, specific to our own strategic environment, a lot of geographical extremities cannot do without the presence of boots-on-the-ground.

The fight against terrorism and facing off BLA secessionists remains a different kind of war in progress. Yet the role of missile warfare is something that the army must seriously consider in its construct and create a structure from within to take up what appears as the most likely and critically dominant part of any future war.