Big powers need to reassess postures towards Pakistan, India

The recent Indo-Pak crisis has been temporarily defused by a still fragile ceasefire. Yet, this crisis has major policy implications not only for the subcontinent, but for the world's two major global superpowers, the US and China, which are locked in increasingly intensive great power competition.

The impact of the unfolding great power competition has become particularly acute within South Asia. Much has been said about Pakistan's historical alliances with the US, and its growing strategic embrace with China, and America's simultaneous bet to help prop up India to counter China. However, these strategic policy postures cannot remain static but must instead be subjected to constant revision.

The post-Pahalgam conflict was a defining moment which should provide strategic thinkers and policymakers ample reasons to reassess their postures, especially if they want to prevent another steep and slippery escalatory crisis between the neighbouring nuclearised rivals.

Pakistan did not take long to side with the US during the Cold War, joining regional alliances such as SEATO and CENTO, way back in the 1950s. As India decided to remain non-aligned, the US had to walk a regional tightrope to prevent the Indians from joining the Soviet camp. While Pakistan was disappointed that the US did not come rushing to Pakistan's aid during its 1965 and 1971 wars with India, a lot of US aid poured into Pakistan to entice Presidents Zia and Musharraf to subsequently cooperate with the US in neighbouring Afghanistan.

Following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, and before the post-9/11 US-led invasion of Afghanistan, Washington also became convinced of the need to simultaneously bolster its relations with New Delhi. Bill Clinton onwards, all US administrations have been wooing "the largest democracy in the world", considering it a natural ally to counterbalance the steady rise of Communist China.

China, on the other hand, had extended the hand of friendship to Pakistan, viewing it is the ideal strategic ally to exert pressure on India, soon after the Sino-Indian war in 1962. China's relationship with Pakistan remained modest during the Cold War years, but when the US started bolstering its relationship with India, China also became convinced of the need to integrate Pakistan into its ambitious BRI vision. Alongside its economic relationship with Pakistan, the Chinese military also began forging closer ties with Pakistan, quickly supplanting Pakistan's reliance on American military hardware.

However, the burning question now is, how China and the US will reposition their stances towards India and Pakistan following the post-Pahalgam confrontation? The US, alongside other regional mediators, did manage to secure de-escalation this time around. President Trump was quick to claim credit for defusing this crisis.

Yet, his stated willingness to even resolve the 'fifteen-hundred-year-old' Kashmir dispute seems more a self-aggrandising assertion rather than a signal indicating a shift in America's longstanding stance of not meddling in this thorny dispute, especially without India's consent. While Pakistan has decided to nominate Trump for a Nobel Peace Prize, perhaps in the bid to pander to his ego, not many serious Pakistani analysts expect him to help resolve the Kashmir dispute.

Conversely, many strategic advisors within the US still want it to continue bolstering India's capabilities. China may also have to pay the price of increased stress in its already strained relations with India for choosing to side openly with Pakistan during the recent military confrontation. India's decision to hold IWT in abeyance does not bode well for enabling regional stabilisation, especially if India chooses to disregard the recent decision by the International Court of Arbitration.

Instead of using the Indo-Pak rivalry as another arena for proxy confrontation, a saner geostrategic recalibration necessitates placing greater emphasis on restraint, and the systematic mitigation of tensions between India, Pakistan and China. More cooperative approaches to water sharing and softening existing borders do exist, but they are unfortunately not being given the attention they need within our increasingly unstable and transactional world.