Bytes and bombs

In a world where scrolling is second nature and videos under a minute define cultural shifts, the battlefield has expanded far beyond borders and bunkers. The platforms that originally served for dance trends, lip-syncing and cat videos now use their same easy-to-use features to spread radicalisation while forming ideological beliefs.

The video-sharing platform TikTok which services 1.5 billion users worldwide operates as a dominant instrument for non-state actors, militant factions and insurgent groups who are transforming traditional warfare dynamics.

Extremist influencers together with militant organisations throughout the Middle East and Southeast Asia leverage TikTok's wide reach and emotional appeal to attract public attention and sympathy. ISIS evolved from its initial use of telegram channels to TikTok by creating visually appealing content which promotes violence to entice disillusioned youth.

The coordinated dissemination of content through social media platforms follows emotional planning and matches field operations for the purpose of achieving maximum influence.

The global phenomenon impacts Pakistan just like every other nation. The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) which stands as a designated terrorist organisation in Balochistan region has speedily adopted this shifting strategy. The organisation functions to break down CPEC infrastructure while assaulting Chinese entities operating in the area.

The situation becomes noteworthy because anti-China propaganda spreads through TikTok which is operated by Chinese firm ByteDance. The irony doesn't end there. The Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC) operates as an accused political front for the BLA while using TikTok to present its rights advocacy agenda.

The number of anti-CPEC videos has experienced explosive growth from 50 videos in 2015 to over 1,200 in 2024 while accumulating more than 35 million views in Balochistan. The hashtag #StopCPEC appeared more than 500 times between 2018 and the present day, reaching a vast audience. The narratives range from portraying CPEC as a colonising project to depicting Chinese workers as occupiers; all wrapped in emotional music, captions and cinematic storytelling.

TikTok's algorithm, which rewards engagement over accuracy, amplifies these messages with little scrutiny. The deadly Quetta railway station suicide bombing of November 2024 led the BLA to claim responsibility and resulted in the death of 32 individuals but TikTok users created tribute videos that honoured the attacker as a martyr showing how terror propaganda is being beautified and glorified during live events.

The situation extends beyond separatism or just one insurgent group. Governments globally are playing catch-up. In India, disinformation campaigns have sparked communal tensions through edited clips that go viral within hours.

In Europe, far-right networks and radical Islamists alike have manipulated TikTok to push anti-immigrant and jihadist propaganda, respectively, sometimes even within the same digital spaces.

Back in Pakistan, efforts to curb such misuse have struggled. The Cyber Crime Wing of FIA reported over 900 social media accounts involved in anti-state activity from Balochistan alone, with at least 190 operating on TikTok. Though hundreds were taken down, new ones resurfaced almost immediately.

The cat-and-mouse dynamic continues, worsened by platform's limited content moderation in regional languages and its resistance to broader regulatory compliance. So, TikTok, in its bizarre irony, has become both the stage and the scriptwriter of this evolving insurgency playbook.

To counter this digital insurgency, governments must move beyond reactive takedowns and invest in proactive, localised content moderation, algorithmic accountability, and counter-narrative campaigns that resonate with younger audiences. Otherwise, the next battlefield won't be in the mountains or the streets; it'll be on a screen, just one scroll away.