Afghanistan — the perils of cuddling India

The Islamic Emirate, while governing Afghanistan, is also undergoing a journey of self-discovery. Afghan Taliban are unschooled in the art of governance and diplomacy; bedevilled with internal fissures; faced with the existential paradox of presenting a unified front to the rest of the world despite differences on critical issues like girls' education; unable and unwilling to get out of the TTP quagmire that has the potential to derail their ties with their only true interlocutor, Pakistan; and are not optimally managing a faltering economy, while the US humanitarian largesse, billed at around $50 million per month, is coming to an end, after Trump regained power. So, it is natural for IEA to hedge…that is to look for alternatives in alliances and trade. Let's call it 'hedging diplomacy'.

During past two weeks, we discussed the economic potential of Chahbahar Port Project (CPP) for Afghan and Central Asian trade. This, yet to be exploited potential, now remains in doldrums after Trump rescinded Chahbahar's exemption from the US sanctions, that previously allowed this Irani port to process humanitarian cargo for Afghanistan, and Indian trade with Afghanistan and Central Asia. India secured this sanction-waiver in November 2018 during Trump's earlier term. In 2024, New Delhi signed a 10-year agreement with Iran, allowing India Ports Global Private Ltd to operate and manage a terminal at CPP.

IEA's foreign forays with China, Russia and Iran are nuanced, leveraging Afghanistan's strategic position and its natural resources; structured around economic collaboration, border security and CT, albeit with uncertain outcomes. Kabul's 'apparently' shadow, backchannel diplomacy relies on negotiations tinged with 'possible' ideology, operating outside the prevalent norms, sans IEA's formal recognition. It is mostly transactional and is centred around geopolitical considerations that override concerns for interim government's legitimacy. China, Russia and Iran are not encumbered by Western diplomatic protocols and constraints.

China is a leading party interested in extracting mineral resources projected at over $1 trillion, including the sought-after 'rare earths'. However, Beijing remains cautious and refuses to open Kabul-Kashghar route through the fabled Wakhan Corridor, given its concerns vis-à-vis ETIM and Taliban religiosity, 'potentially' disturbing its Xinjiang Muslim region.

Russia aims to extend intelligence and security cooperation with IEA to safeguard its Central Asian soft underbelly from IS-K operations, especially in Tajikistan. Moscow would like to serve its broader geopolitical ambitions in Afghanistan to checkmate the West Plus.

Last September, FMs from China, Iran, Pakistan and Russia met to discuss IEA's CT operation against IS-K, TTP and ETIM, besides issues like regime rigidity and inclusivity. IEA's quest for foreign investments is generally eclipsed by its inability and unwillingness to resolve some of the cited issues.

Doctrinaire Kabul, meanwhile, has 'pragmatically' focussed upon the value of business alliances, spanning mining, infrastructure development and power generation, involving Irani and Pakistani corporations since 2023. Hence, Kabul's diplomacy seeks to: a) pursue Chinese economic support, b) extend intelligence collaboration and security cooperation with Russia, c) preserve relations with Iran to dilute Pakistan's trade/other leverages, and d) improve ties with New Delhi deferring to historical links, and 'hedge' against Pakistan. All this, while keenly trying to elicit financial support from the West Plus, directly or indirectly.

Nonetheless, Kabul's foreign relations are complicated by an insecure position, as countries approach Afghanistan in self-interest only. Beijing looks for stability, economic benefit and consistency; Russia wants mitigation of terrorism, needing Kabul as a useful player against West Plus; and Iran eyes trade corridor despite sectarian differences.

In all this, it is the Indo-Afghan bilateralism especially the January 2025 Dubai meeting between Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri and IEA interim FM Amir Khan Muttaqi, that raises eyebrows in Islamabad. In historic terms, pre-Taliban, Indo-Afghan relations were significant as validated through India's Afghan Lodhi Empire (1451-1526 AD), Kabul being the summer capital of the Mughals (1527-1857 AD), the numerous Indian princely states ruled by Afghans during the British Raj, the presence of Afghan heengwala (Afghan traders in asafetida) in the Indian imagination, and the lure of Indian trade, culture and cinema in Afghan folklore.

However, geostrategy has moved in gallops since the US/NATO occupation of Afghanistan, and the Pakistani-engineered war of liberation under the IEA, when India stood out by its staunch opposition to the Taliban. If it is lost on Afghans, a reminder is in order that Pakistan's moral, material and physical support in the twenty years' long war, wherein Islamabad was liberally blamed for playing a double game, was to ensure that the 'strategic dividend' is accrued to Pakistan, obviating a two-front security challenge vis-à-vis India and Afghanistan simultaneously.

That Shegara (doing good) under Pashtunwali and Islamic fraternity demand Afghans not befriending the enemy of their friend, especially when the tried and tested friend is also a friend-in-need and a neighbour. Islamabad has stood by Afghans through thick and thin and rightly expects and deserves favour in return.

India's re-insertion into Afghanistan is Islamabad's 'red line', and this point needs to sink in well. Protecting the accrued strategic dividend at all costs is existential to Pakistan. If Afghan overtures are angry reaction by IEA under its hedging diplomacy, these are sadly not steeped in rationale and realpolitik. Kabul also needs to realise the lingering psychological dependence of its citizenry on Pakistan. Despite the doves on both sides, Islamabad's shift from geo-politics to geo-economics is not coming anytime sooner.

Beyond TTP's ominous clouds that force IEA to hedge against Pakistan, there is bright sun on either side. Central Asia's trade potential, touted through Chahbahar and potential connectivity, will remain a pipedream without Pakistan. If Iran could substitute, the centuries-old transit trade would be passing through its Sistan-o-Balochistan, instead of Karachi and Gwadar.

The somehow disconcerting sentiment even among Pashtuns in KP and Balochistan nowadays including many saner voices, is considering Afghans endemically ungrateful. Although compassion for their suffering and the sense of generosity under Pashtunwali's shegara, and Islam, induces Pakistan to continue extending a helping hand to Afghan brethren, especially the refugees, the goodwill is at greater risk, if not salvaged by the wise among the IEA.

New Delhi meanwhile should wait for greater Indo-Pak reconciliation that Pakistan desires in sincerity but under no pressure!