From chaos to control: a counterterror roadmap
Last year saw no let-up in terrorist attacks in Pakistan, and if the first few weeks of 2025 are anything to go by, this year seems to be on the same trajectory. Dozens of security and law-enforcement personnel have been martyred in both ambushes by and intelligence-based raids against militants, as the country continues to battle this ever-persistent scourge.
Pakistan, particularly Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and the Newly Merged Districts (NMDs), has endured the horrors of terrorism for quite some time. Initially, there was hope that the withdrawal of US and NATO forces, along with the fall of the Ashraf Ghani government and the Taliban’s takeover in Afghanistan, would bring peace and stability to our country. However, these expectations were found to be both wishful and frustrating.
The winds of terrorism are once again raging across Pakistan, both from within and across the border, causing devastating losses in precious lives and economic setbacks.
Given the significant regional changes since 2021, particularly following the US and NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan, the need for a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy has become even more urgent.
The roots of the crisis
Grave problems don’t grow overnight or descend from heavens and militancy is no exception. We must candidly acknowledge that the radicalisation of the tribal areas reached its peak during the Afghan jihad of the 1980s, when jihadi elements from around the world converged on the region with the active support of Western intelligence agencies and our own government.
Jihadi groups played a crucial role in advancing the government’s influence on the international stage during this period. However, while this policy yielded short-term gains, its long-term consequences were disastrous. In addition to the influx of Afghan refugees, and the proliferation of Kalashnikovs and heroin, the jihadi narrative transformed the tribal areas and beyond into breeding grounds for extremism and terrorism.
Then came 9/11, which forced the international community to confront the realities of global jihadism; Pakistan failed to readjust to these shifting dynamics at the time, which led its strategic alignment into disarray. Different state institutions began operating under conflicting discourses and contradictory policies.
This period also marked the emergence of a deep societal schism. Extremist elements, empowered by earlier policies, seized the moment to consolidate their influence. Meanwhile, human rights and local nationalist groups struggled to galvanise their support base. Various radical factions grew closer, as al-Qaeda provided strategy and finances, while homegrown militant groups — including sectarian organisations and Kashmir-focused jihadi outfits — supplied manpower. Over time, the state’s control over these groups weakened, as many drew ideological inspiration from the Tehreek-e-Taliban Afghanistan (TTA).
While jihadist organisations gained strength with each passing day, Pakistan lacked a unified, coherent state policy.
Breaking down the problem
In the years since, many analysts have called for a paradigm shift in our thinking. One, the state must enable individuals enjoy their faith without any persecution from other groups with zero-tolerance for groups that incite hatred through preaching. Second, it must take action against those groups that resort to militant methods to impose their views on others. There is a need for a comprehensive de-radicalisation strategy where all institutions, from madrassas to training academies are fully purged of any radical and Jihadi material.
However, before recommendations are made with regards to law enforcement and for overall strategy, some critical points are discussed below for a clearer understanding of the origin of the problem.
The grand aim of militants in Pakistan, led by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), is to establish an Islamic Emirate modeled after the Taliban government in Afghanistan. In pursuit of that aim, the militants first try to find social space for existence of their cells in various parts of the society. This they gain by assuming the self-appointed role of moral police by invoking the principle of Amar bil Maroof wa Nahi Unul Munkar against perceived vices in the society such as prostitution, gambling, CD and music shops, dancing, internet cafes, barber shops and obscenity. Similarly by awarding severe punishments to leaders of criminal gangs, they not only inspire terror but also try to win the support of the society. They then gradually assume the role of judiciary as well by settling disputes of locals in the light of shariah principles.
Once militants establish ‘social space,’ they enter the second phase of their strategic movement — gaining ‘physical space’ to further entrench and propagate their ideology. To achieve greater socio-political power, they require unrestricted movement and the ability to operate freely. However, law enforcement agencies and educational institutions are perceived as major obstacles to their expansion.
After securing a relatively stable first phase, militants transition to a violent phase aimed at consolidating territorial control. This involves targeting schools, police stations, and security outposts through bombings and direct attacks. To demoralise and weaken law enforcement, they employ sophisticated tactics, including suicide bombings, Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs), rockets, missiles, and other heavy weaponry.
The ascendancy of the militants has been accompanied by a corresponding weakening of the state and poor governance. The state’s ability to enforce its writ has also resultantly gone down which has helped such militant groups to occupy space and enforce their control through holding courts, solving disputes, patrolling and getting revenues from the people. The state's performance in service delivery in health, education, justice, law and order has become inefficient over the years and with the accompanying weaker economic performance and growing poverty has created difficult conditions for the people, this weak governance has then resulted in worse law and order.
Ungoverned spaces in particular serve as breeding grounds for violent non-state actors, allowing them to further erode Pakistan's territorial sovereignty gradually.
Dealing with the mess
Although Pakistan's Constitution, along with key legislation such as the Anti-Terrorism Act (1997), Investigation for Fair Trial Act, Anti-Money Laundering Act, Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, National Internal Security Policy, National Action Plan, and National Security Policy, provides a clear legal framework, state institutions often fail to act in a coherent and decisive manner. This inconsistency and ambiguity have led to the proliferation of strategic chaos. To address the law and order crisis effectively, the necessary actions can be categorised into four distinct levels: social, legal, governance, and law enforcement.
Social level policy may discourage irrational use of religious discourse aimed at spreading hate and glorification of crimes against humanity. The government can modernise the syllabus taught in schools, madrassas, colleges, universities and training academies. Greater restrictions need to be placed on the use of loudspeakers, social media and Internet by Jihadi and radical organisations. It may use both persuasion and force to get all religious scholars and preachers on one page when it comes to interpreting jihad and militancy. The government may come up with a comprehensive de-radicalisation programme, on the pattern of Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, to counter terrorism and extremism. Friday sermons may be properly monitored and those who have leanings towards militants may be identified. De-radicalisation programme may also include fostering of participants’ reintegration with their families and economic assistance in the post-programme period.
At the legal level, while the Anti Terrorism Act 1997 read with other laws cover all aspects of terrorism, its implementation could only be meaningful if the officers are properly trained to ensure quality of investigation. There is a critical need for specialist investigators who possess not only advanced techniques but also a deep understanding of terrorist groups and their ideological worldview. Hate speech, sectarian rhetoric and glorifying terrorism are illegal, but the enforcement of relevant laws remains weak.
Law enforcement policy may aim at strengthening the operational effectiveness of law enforcement organisations, especially police, in their actions against militants. Every district may be divided into manageable zones.
Contours of a possible counterterror strategy
As militancy is a national problem, the federal government must take the lead, as a single province cannot control the issue alone. Provinces should play an advocacy role in urging the centre to implement necessary policy measures. This includes an unequivocal declaration by the government, along with major political parties, that this war is our own. While the government may seek input from various sources, the ultimate responsibility for policy formulation under the Rules of Business lies with the sitting government.
Achieving a broad-based, though not absolute, consensus on a national counterterrorism strategy, along with negotiations and military action, is essential. Since militant bases are located in the NMDs, the southern belt, and across borders, they will remain safe havens for recruitment, training, regrouping, and replenishment unless disrupted. Their elimination requires coordinated action by the federal government and military authorities. They must also take action against militant outfits across the country to ensure they do not find refuge in any other province.
Governance and service delivery across all aspects of public service must be improved to counter militancy effectively and encourage people to support the government rather than being influenced by militants. This requires strict law enforcement and the establishment of a strong Rule of Law. Basic service delivery must be enhanced, while opportunities for employment and economic growth should be created to engage the youth and channel their energies productively. Additionally, improvements in the justice system and better law and order, including the control of routine criminal activities, are essential for long-term stability.
Militants must be actively pursued in their bases, and no-go areas should not be tolerated under any circumstances. Law enforcement agencies must target ungoverned spaces to eliminate safe havens. The Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) is the police's lead agency against terrorism; however, districts cannot be excluded from this effort. It is recommended that each district establish its own anti-terrorism units, positioned strategically in a state of readiness. Districts should also serve as intelligence hubs, equipped with the latest surveillance technology, information systems, and a focused approach to dismantling militant cells. Post-incident analyses of terrorist attacks should be systematically incorporated into these units.
Beyond targeting militants, equal focus must be placed on their harbourers, logistical providers, associates, and facilitators. A strict policy should be enforced nationwide to take decisive action against anyone supporting militancy. Additionally, a specialised counter-IED wing should be established within the police department to reduce casualties. This unit should employ jammers, reinforced vehicles, and other counter-IED techniques while receiving technical support from the military's anti-IED cell.
Intelligence committees must also strengthen and enhance the effectiveness of Joint Investigation Teams (JITs), ensuring their findings are well coordinated as part of a broader effort to dismantle militant networks. JIT intelligence should be shared across agencies and integrated into the Counter Terrorism Force (CTF) database for a more comprehensive approach to counterterrorism.
The finances of militants must be strictly monitored and curtailed through a comprehensive strategy. In this regard, Hundi and Hawala businesses should be closely monitored and kept under strict vigilance to prevent illicit financial flows that support militant activities.
A national awareness campaign should be launched to educate Pakistanis about the horrors of extremism and its consequences, including terrorism and militancy. Currently, there is no such campaign in Pakistan, making it difficult to build public support against extremists. It is essential to counter militant narratives by exposing their cruelty, misuse of religion, and duplicity through sustained media and information campaigns. Additionally, efforts to engage and mobilise the youth, prevent their radicalisation, and provide them with meaningful opportunities must be a key focus of both development and communication policies.
In addition to promoting cultural and sports activities — which militants seek to suppress to weaken society — special efforts must be made to help the public recover from psychological duress. This requires coordinated action at all levels of government and civil society to promote healthy activities and ensure their wide coverage. Such initiatives will send a strong message to militants that the people remain resilient and will not succumb to their threats, and serve as a great riposte to the ‘prophets of doom’.
Moreover, special attention must be given to madrassas and mosques, which have been misused by extremist elements. These are vital social institutions and should be supported by the government, particularly in terms of madrassa curricula and student welfare, ensuring they receive similar incentives as government school students. Similarly, mosques that are misused to spread hatred must be identified, and their caretakers should be controlled and, where necessary, replaced by local administration through a system of support and incentives.
In all government-controlled religious institutions, sermons should be delivered to counter militant propaganda. Additionally, a comprehensive database of teachers and students in madrassas is necessary to ensure proper oversight. Any institution found preaching extremism should be identified and dealt with in accordance with the law.
While the 25th amendment has administratively integrated NMDs with KP, there is a need for full-scale socio-economic development and stronger civil administration.
Following the 9/11 attacks, police forces worldwide have taken on the role of high policing, with significant investments in dedicated anti-terrorism units trained to dismantle terrorist networks through intelligence and counterterrorism operations. However, in Pakistan, policymakers have largely overlooked high policing, with intelligence agencies continuing to perform this role. There is an urgent need to shift this responsibility to the police through increased investment in training and funding for specialised units across the country. The proposed NACTA should coordinate the activities of these units, while the arrest and investigation of suspected militants should be the responsibility of police anti-terrorism units.
Intelligence agencies have their own networks and access to critical information. Therefore, a Joint Intelligence Committee, comprising representatives from all agencies, should be established at both the provincial and divisional levels. This committee must convene at least once a month to share intelligence, ensuring better coordination. The collected information should also be accessible to NACTA and the Counter Terrorism Departments, leading to more effective dismantling of terrorist cells. Such a framework will enhance cross-referencing, facilitate follow-up actions, and improve overall intelligence-sharing and coordination.
Additionally, the Investigation for Fair Trial Act should be implemented in letter and spirit to ensure more effective and legally sound investigations. With it in effect, police forces should be provided with modern intelligence-gathering and reconnaissance equipment to enhance their operational capabilities.
From the experience of developed countries, it is evident that culprits are identified swiftly due to the extensive presence of CCTV surveillance. Pakistan must also invest in CCTV cameras across major urban centers and other sensitive areas. Additionally, the use of metal detectors and security screening devices is essential to deter potential acts of terrorism. Greater integration of state-of-the-art information technology should become a core part of policing culture. Technologies such as mobile locators, web and email data analysis, and other digital tools must be leveraged, with police equipped with the necessary resources and a dedicated cyber and electronic surveillance wing.
The police’s investigative capacity must be strengthened through the establishment of a centralised database of FIRs, granting investigators access to mobile phone data, and modernising the force with advanced scientific evidence collection methods. This includes DNA analysis, automated fingerprint identification systems, and other forensic technologies.
Conclusion
Borrowing the famous lines from Charles Dickens (1859), we find ourselves at a moment where both optimism and fear coexist. With wise and resolute leadership, we can transform this challenging winter into a hopeful spring. By adhering to the principle of peaceful coexistence with all neighbors, preventing any militant group from using our land for attacks, and taking decisive steps to dismantle cross-border networks, we can create a more stable future. If sustained anti-terrorist action is required, the nation must be prepared for it. Like other countries that have faced terrorism, we must not allow short-term losses to deter us from our long-term objectives and vision.
Dr Syed Akhtar Ali Shah is a former Secretary to Government, Home & Tribal Affairs Department and a retired IG. He can be emailed at: aashah77@yahoo.com
All facts and information are the sole responsibility of the author