America's new MTCR policy

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The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is an informal and voluntary export control regime that bears a political understanding between the member states to curb the presumed proliferation of Category I and Category II missiles and missile technology. The MTCR is not a formal and legally binding treaty between the states. The MTCR works on a voluntary basis that is subject to amendments from time to time. It was formed in 1987 by the G-7 technological advanced countries. Currently, it has 35 members including that of India that joined the MTCR in 2016. China is not a part of the MTCR. Although China requested its membership in 2004, it was not offered for obvious geopolitical and geostrategic rivalry. Pakistan is also not part of this informal political understanding of the MTCR.

More recently, the Biden-Harris Administration introduced "New Guidance for Missile Technology Exports to Advance Nonproliferation Goals and Bolster Allied Defense Capabilities". On January 3, 2025, former president Jo Biden issued a National Security Memorandum) regarding the MTCR voluntarily. The January 3 factsheet argues, "These updates reflect a renewed US commitment to nonproliferation, while advancing the President's goals of strengthening allied defense capabilities, bolstering the US defense industrial base, streamlining defense trade, and deterring adversaries." In addition, the factsheet opines, "These policy changes will help the United States advance shared defense objectives with close allies, including the implementation of AUKUS, while maintaining a strong leadership role on nonproliferation and export control policy." Also, this politically voluntarily modified policy establishes a memorandum that "the MTCR is not designed to impede national space programs or international cooperation in such programs as long as such programs could not contribute to delivery systems for WMD."

The fundamental rationale of the MTCR regime is to curtail the export of missiles and the missile technology that has the range of 300km with ability to carry the payload of 500kg of any type of weapons of mass destruction. The US and its strategic allies and partners often consider this restraint outdated and that such guidelines need to be updated and/or modified in accordance with the US interpretation of the changing strategic environment where the US and its allies and partners consider themselves to be threatened by the perceived archrivals and their partners. That said, the US made exceptions to Ukraine and South Korea on their development of such missiles. This is not the first time the US attempted to modify the changes on a voluntary basis.

The new MTCR policy initiated by the US will help boost the US arms sales to its strategic allies and partners. The US considers that it is lagging in terms of its sales for both commercial and military purposes while countries outside the MTCR are exploiting such advantages. Such a policy will make the broader standing of the MTCR irrelevant, ineffective and biased whether one is part of the MTCR or not. As membership is irrelevant, this undermines the credibility of this informal multilateral regime aimed at curbing the proliferation of missiles and missile technology.

On the one hand, the US considers this policy shift as a better opportunity for its allies and partners to acquire missiles and the related unmanned and space launched vehicles with increasing ranges and payloads contrary to the traditional MTCR constraint measures. But, on the other hand, the US claims to be active while following the nonproliferation measures. In this context, Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, argues, "Our government may want to make love by sharing dangerous missile technology with countries it views as 'people like us.' That's a policy decision. But in this case, the White House is trying to dress this love up as if it's making nonproliferation. It's not."

This reflects that the US remains responsible for proliferating the long ranges and payloads to its strategic allies and partners which in turn will increase, arms race, security dilemma and dangerous military escalation between the rivals.