The price of patience

Over the decades, the policy of Pakistan towards its western neighbour has been based on one simple assumption: a stable government in Afghanistan will eventually lead to peace in the region. Much political and security prices were paid by Islamabad and a lot of international criticism too was taken in the hope that Afghanistan must not turn into a zone of aggressive foreign power. But, considering the escalating border tensions at the end of 2025, it appears that this longstanding approach has produced mixed, and often disappointing, results.

The Pakistan-Afghanistan relations are said to be the "mother of all relations", yet such relations struggle to exist when the expectations are one sided. Ever since 2021, Pakistan has opened its economy and logistics to Afghanistan, but in the bargain it has witnessed a steep increase in militant violence, most notably by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), otherwise known as Fitna-al-Khawarij. It is the typical Frankenstein monster scenario. Pakistan's extensive support to Afghanistan, including decades of hosting refugees, unintentionally generated conditions that were later leveraged by the TTP to expand its presence. The TTP is now launching lethal attacks like the one we have witnessed all of 2025 using safe havens in Afghanistan; and the Taliban leadership in Kabul, whose ideological ties and fear of losing their rank and file to more radical extremists such as ISKP bind them, is not going to give them away.

However, we cannot consider only the security aspect. The tragedy of this relationship is seen in the border crossings such as Torkham and Chaman. Having these gates closed not only leaves out militants but also the students who are unable to get to school, the traders whose fruits spoil in the sun, and the families divided by the Durand Line – a border that Kabul has never officially accepted. Although the October 2025 ceasefire was brokered in Qatar, the ensuing breakdown of the Istanbul talks indicates that there is the lowest level of trust ever.

Afghanistan is largely reliant on the infrastructure of Pakistan but the recent developments in contacts between Taliban officials and New Delhi being based on trade and security cooperation show that Kabul is ready to use the rivals of Pakistan in the region despite Pakistan hosting millions of Afghan refugees for years. Meanwhile, the exports of cement to Afghanistan have also decreased, and the largest companies have registered significant sales losses.

The security crisis is not a misunderstanding anymore. The TTP is a menace that has been left to flourish in Afghanistan in the unchecked areas. For the Taliban to claim they have no control over these militants while simultaneously using them as a bargaining chip is a narrative that no longer holds weight.

Pakistan now appears to be at a crossroads. The old policy of strategic patience seems harder and harder to maintain. Although measures like airstrikes and repatriation of refugees have been criticised, they indicate a change that is aligned to realist logic of security in which enduring threats eventually should be more than the costs of restraint. In realist terms therefore, it is hard to see any state defend long-term trade access and diplomatic relations where attacks associated with the same territory continue.

After all, the so-called "Mother of All Relations" should be repaired with mutual responsibility. One nation's support cannot be seen as an open-ended guarantee. The majority of recognition and legitimacy analysis implies that plausible control over militant organisations is a fundamental requirement upon governing authorities, Taliban in this instance. Until that time, the progressive change to a security-first policy which Pakistan has been in the process of making can be viewed not as strategic aspiration, but as a reactive measure to the increasing domestic security anxieties.