Warfare — changing character or nature

The nature of warfare is evolving from kinetic to hybrid, with AI, and drones.

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Discussion here on December 26, 2024 contained some conclusions from an earlier debate, based upon one's earlier writings on the nature and future of warfare. Some way forward was suggested for Pakistan considering the dictates of modern and future warfare. Debate continues.

Military theorists typify warfare - First Generation Warfare (1GW) was characterised by 'state retaining monopoly' over conduct of warfare. 2GW involved 'linear fire and movement, supported by indirect artillery' fire. 3GW introduced 'maneuver' as opposed to 'movement'. 4GW denoted 'asymmetric warfare' and low-intensity conflict (insurgency, guerrilla war, etc). Under 4GW, boundaries are blurred between war and politics, combatants and non-combatants, and 'terrorism' is a tactic. The current 5GW or 'Hybrid' warfare is fought using non-kinetic means, like social engineering, dis/misinformation, cyberattacks, etc, using AI and autonomous systems.

The glamour of high-tech weaponry generally obscures technology's social, political and cultural downsides. We are in the throes of 4th Industrial Revolution (IR) transcending into 5th IR, which places greater than ever reliance on human intelligence, that is inventing AI. And AI-enabled systems are an inescapable reality under Hybrid Warfare. The biggest worry in the development of weaponised but unregulated AI is when machine-learning robots, especially the 'emotion bots', start writing their own codes, running outside human control. These AI-enabled autonomous machines may exploit inherent human weaknesses at a scale, speed and effectiveness previously unseen.

In the raging debate, whether warfare is concept-driven or technology-driven or both, there is broad consensus that technology has permeated all facets of warfare. Kamikaze drones in swarms were used to effect by Azerbaijan in its conflict with Armenia in 2020. However, there are theorists arguing that technology alone cannot be the sole arbiter in warfare, as war remains a dialectic between the 'opposing wills', wherein a lot depends upon the 'fog of war', the 'chance' and 'luck'. Some thinkers consider the Clausewitzian notion of war being 'continuation of policy by other means', as 'policy instead a continuation of warfare by other means'.

The practice of warfare today 'generally' restrains the use of excessive force for majority of combatants, Israel's genocidal war in Gaza being an exception. But the jury is still out for the verdict on the outcome of this asymmetric conflict, which may swing either way. We have examples like the technologically superior US/NATO-Combine losing in Afghanistan. Israeli military-technological superiority can also be blunted by 'weaponised social systems' using commercially available AI.

The November/December 2024 issue of Foreign Affairs magazine discusses the 'worlds of war', acknowledging that characterising an ongoing war becomes easier with hindsight. It claims that 'limited war' of yesteryears has become 'comprehensive' war today, entailing assemblage of coalitions, underscoring transformation in the 'demography' of warfare, and becoming a 'whole-of-society' phenomenon.

Discussion on 'deterrence' suggests traditional approaches to deterrence regaining relevance. These are 'deterrence by denial' i.e. making the attainment of objective harder for the enemy; and 'deterrence by punishment' i.e. raising the costs. At times 'deterrence by ambiguity' also works, as in case of Pakistan's nuclear policy, or Philippines' response to a Chinese provocation.

Over time the value of 'military deterrence' wanes, as systems become obsolete, technology bridges gaps, and the cost of military preparedness becomes unbearable. The US, in its National Defense Strategy 2022, has responded to this challenge through 'deterrence by resilience' that is to withstand, recover quickly from, and fight through the enemy-induced disruptions. US's main challenge is to resist the Chinese attempts to change the global power status quo.

Risks to deterrence breakdown could be possible technical failures, like in case of an errant Indian missile landing in Pakistan in 2022; misjudging rival's thresholds; and/or routine brinkmanship during crises mainly because of domestic political compulsions. Provocation can transcend into conflict, as the lines beyond become exceedingly blurred.

The Magazine maintains that although provocations can push crises up the escalation ladder, wars are intentional, and truly inadvertent wars are rare. Signaling (including forewarning) to avoid inadvertent escalation among belligerents works in crises, as in 2024 Iran-Israel stand-off. States do apply graduated pressure to change adversary's behaviour and avoid 'triggering escalatory retaliation', as seen during the cited stand-off.

One of the most interesting essays is 'Battles of Precise Mass' by Michael C Horowitz. He claims that advances in AI, at work in the ongoing wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, have brought 'mass' back to the battlefield. However, departing from 'mass being superior forces' as in World Wars, it is now 'precise mass' employed through low-cost, commercially available, disposable, 'attritable' and easily replaceable technological tools like drones, etc. The theory of warfare is shifting from 'mass' to the age of 'precise mass'. Sheer numbers and quantities in manpower, equipment and materiel may not decide the future conflict. Hence, the US is shifting to integrate emerging technologies into its military planning through a programme called 'Assault Breaker'. The USAF and US Navy's inventories today are about 1/3rd of their 1965 levels.

Pakistan's military is harnessing the trends. It can have both 'precision' and 'mass' (technologically). It can field a mix of high-end systems deployed in small numbers being costly, alongside cheaper and more attritable systems deployed in mass. This mix enables even smaller states (and non-state actors) to deploy cheaper systems in good numbers. An Iranian made Shahed-136 drone costs USD 10,000 to 15,000, flies 2,400 km one-way, compared to a US missile costing USD 1 to 2 million apiece. The Iranian attack on Israel in April 2024 - comprising some 300 drones and missiles - cost Iran approximately USD 80 million, compared to a staggering USD 1 billion Israel spent to blunt it. Indigenous R&D and mass production can bring costs further down for Pakistan. Deep reserves of these uncrewed systems are needed in long wars.

Besides, a mass strike can overcome adversary's Air Defence systems, allowing less numerous but more potent systems to sneak through. Iran could have done more damage to Israel, if it wanted to. Military planners are still looking for strategies to counter attacks by precision mass. Directed energy weapons are one possible solution.

Finally, is the Clausewitzian theorem, that only 'character', not 'nature' of war changes, still rules!