Closed borders: answer to terrorism and stability?

Raging terrorist incidents, declining exports, struggling manufacturing, frozen ties with both India and Afghanistan, shuttered east-west borders, continued political instability and a self-serving political cacophony by the PML-N and PPP — along with a letter by 44 US Congress members to the American Secretary of State on Pakistan's internal political situation — hardly inspire confidence. Will the new notification on the CDF address these mounting challenges? And can the closure of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border realistically reset Kabul's stance on its "jihadi" allies?

Let us begin with the surge in terrorist violence. In the first eleven months of 2025, Pakistan saw a near 25 per cent escalation in terrorism, recording 1,188 attacks and security operations, which resulted in 3,187 fatalities. As usual, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan accounted for roughly 92 per cent of all attacks and 96 per cent of fatalities. Fatalities jumped from 316 in August to 425 in October — the month Pakistan closed the border — even as talks took place in Doha and Istanbul. Between September and November alone, casualties reached a staggering 1,137, and December opened with yet more carnage.

Pakistan attributes this spike to TTP sanctuaries in Afghanistan. Kabul, however, continues to assert that it is doing its best to prevent its soil from being used for cross-border terrorism. The result is a vicious, self-serving battle of narratives — often illogical and accusatory — creating the impression of a near-permanent rupture.

To reinforce its security claims, Pakistan suspended all cross-border human and cargo movement on October 11. The Taliban regime, in turn, escalated pressure through hostile messaging and a relentless propaganda blitz. Intelligence meetings in Doha, Istanbul and Riyadh failed to narrow the gap between Pakistan's demands and Kabul's willingness — or ability — to deliver.

But will closing the border rid Pakistan of terrorism? Why would it? The malaise has far deeper internal and external roots. Proxy terrorism — carried out by groups such as TTP, ISKP, ETIM/TIP and Al-Qaeda — remains a regional reality.

Domestically, Pakistan's own portrayal of its counter-terrorism efforts often reinforces global fear. How is a Chinese, American or European investor supposed to react when the DG ISPR publicly states that 67,023 intelligence-based operations have been carried out since January 2025, alongside 4,729 terror incidents in eleven months? The instinctive foreign reaction is simple: "This country is infested with terrorists." Such messaging hardly helps the SIFC's efforts to attract investment.

Moving to external trade, November 2025 marked the fourth straight month of declining merchandise exports in the current fiscal year. Exports fell to about $2.39 billion — a 15.4 per cent drop from $2.83 billion in November 2024.

Exports to Afghanistan — formal and informal — amount to over $3 billion annually. Yet, after Pakistan shut the border on October 11, most cross-border trade has collapsed. Insight Research notes that fresh fruits, vegetables, pharmaceuticals and the cement sector are the most exposed because of their dependency on Afghan markets. Cherat Cement, Fauji Cement and Maple Leaf Cement, which supply most of the 7 per cent of Pakistan's cement exported to Afghanistan, will be hit hardest. The Pakistan Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (PPMA) says medicines make up roughly $187 million of Pakistan's $1.8 billion in formal exports to Afghanistan. Similarly, kinnow exports — worth about $150 million annually to Afghanistan and Central Asia — have effectively come to a halt.

Does weaponising cross-border trade — with a landlocked country whose access Pakistan is bound to facilitate under international norms — serve Pakistan's interests? And will such coercion force Kabul to meet Pakistan's demands on the TTP?

A larger question also arises: are the recent terrorist attacks solely due to the Afghan Taliban's unwillingness to act on counter-terrorism concerns, or are they the result of externally backed proxy terrorism? If the latter is true — as official claims suggest, with India accused of financing and supporting violence — how will sealing borders, restricting visas and shutting down trade curb a threat that allegedly originates beyond Afghanistan?

Intelligence estimates suggest the TTP receives and spends around $60 million annually on operations, logistics and the upkeep of fighters and families. This underscores an organised, well-funded proxy network rather than a problem solvable through border closures.

Recent regional incidents further illustrate the complexity. The killing of five Chinese nationals in Tajikistan was no coincidence; it aligns with broader regional proxy terrorism. Beijing has long accused Uyghur militant groups — ETIM/TIP — of operating from Afghanistan's Badakhshan and Farah provinces, urging Kabul to crack them down. After the Tajikistan attack, Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi signaled a willingness to cooperate on border stability, yet China insists on tangible action against ETIM/TIP, whose fighters have reportedly returned from Syria and other conflict zones to sanctuaries in northern and eastern Afghanistan.

The convergence of internal and external threats — including transnational jihadist networks — illustrates the limits of simplistic, reactive measures. If Pakistan acknowledges that terrorism is externally financed and regionally integrated, then punitive actions such as sealing borders and halting trade with Afghanistan cannot be the primary tools of state strategy.

What this complex spectrum of challenges demands instead is a sober, long-term, dispassionate strategy. Afghan authorities cannot absolve themselves of the responsibility of the activities of the terrorist groups operating from their soil. Pakistan, for its part, must engage critical stakeholders — regional powers, Afghan authorities, internal political actors, and its own economic sectors — with a progressive mind for coherent terror and trade policies rather than episodic knee-jerk responses. Self-harming short-term tactics may provide temporary political optics but offer no lasting relief.

Closed borders may create pressure, but they cannot resolve trans-border proxy terrorism, revive exports, attract investment or deliver stability. Enduring security and economic recovery requires a holistic, strategic approach — free from reactive impulses.