Inadequacies, business closures and security management

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The writer heads the independent Centre for Research and Security Studies, Islamabad and is the author of ‘Pakistan: Pivot of Hizbut Tahrir’s Global Caliphate’

The 23rd Meeting of the Council of Heads of Government (Prime Ministers) of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (15-16 October 2024) passed peacefully. It offered Pakistan the opportunity to host a high-profile multilateral meeting. One would assume that active Chinese and Russian diplomacy made the event possible. And it is the combined weight of the two that convinced India to send in its Minister for External Affairs, Dr S Jaishankar, a sort of ice-breaking as far as New Delhi's refrain from engagement with Pakistan in all forms.

As a whole – a successful gathering. But let us look at what cost and whether success was possible without clamping down businesses and critical access roads to Islamabad. Before we delve into the costs that accrued from crude security measures adopted, let us briefly look at the joint communique in general.

Unlike the SCO Heads of States huddle at Astana, Kazakhstan, on July 4, 2024, the Islamabad meeting failed to specifically name any country about terrorism and its proponents i.e. proxy terrorists. Even the grizzly genocide in Gaza found no mention in the communique. No forward movement was reported as far as the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS) is concerned.

Ironically, member states – mostly autocratic regimes acting in contravention of fundamental democratic rights – advocated "respect for the right of peoples to independently and democratically choose their political, social and economic development".

They also preached the idea of creating a "community of common destiny of mankind and the development of dialogue on the idea of One Earth. One Family. One Future".

Ironically, achieving this goal is extremely difficult when member states enforce strict visa regimes, with young, talented entrepreneurs and IT professionals finding it hard to get visas to Russia, China or Central Asian Republics.

Business connectivity and people-to-people contacts thrive – as they did among the US-European countries – with more effortless cross-border mobility and ease of business. Most members of the SCO lack this facilitation.

Also, relations among several member states hardly promise any real movement forward – Pakistan-India relations are riven with acrimony; China and India harbour mutual grudges; Russia is wary of India's geo-political tilt towards the US; and Iran-Pakistan relations remain problematic and accompanied by suspicions because of Pakistan's current leaning towards the US. This complexity prevents substantial engagement in the regional counter-terrorist structure (RATS).

One would hope that the new shift to Economic Connectivity perhaps levels the ground for a uniform taxation/tariffs regime among the SCO countries – something that has largely been missing thus far because of rigid national policies in the member states.

Now, let us examine the cost of Pakistan's management of the SCO conference.

The security of the delegates took precedence, of course. But what about the security of the ordinary Pakistani, traders, commuters, daily wage workers, transporters, and workers at food and beverage outlets figure? What about the trucks carrying perishable items that remained parked for days because of the "general holiday"?

A reckless decision by the federal government, complied with by the Rawalpindi Administration, led to the closure of schools and businesses for nearly three days in Islamabad and Rawalpindi.

It is a two-way loss. The government lost tax revenues. So did the people mentioned above. The real question is: who will compensate the small businesses and those dependent on daily wages and sales? They have already suffered because of the government's overreaction to PTI protests. Where is the compensation for the lost man-hours?

At stake were the route from the airport to the Convention Center and the two big hotels in the Red Zone – a radius of at most two kilometers. What common sense dictated the close of the rest of Islamabad? How does a shopping mall, hotel, school or restaurant ten kilometers away from the Convention Center or the Serena Hotel jeopardise security?

This highlighted the extremely outdated security management abilities – if one were to put it in a nutshell.

It took a friend, for example, five hours to get to the international airport. Several stories revolved around the same point: the reckless closure of roads and key access points to Islamabad's red zone. Closing the airport road to and from Islamabad for a few hours makes sense, but why for several days?

Couldn't the administration wizards provide certain time slots for arrival and departure of all foreign delegates? That would have caused a minimal suspension of traffic and business.

It is strange that a nation that prides itself in being at the forefront of the anti-terror fight for over two decades still deploys crude measures for the security of foreign delegates. Instead of intelligent and non-intrusive management, the entire security bureaucracy seems to act like a headless chicken – banking on "closure, suspension, exclusion" regarding security. No regard whatsoever for the plight of the common people, particularly those who are already reeling from crushing inflation but are forced out of business because of foreign guests for several days.

What message are we conveying to the world – by virtually marking the "completion" (not inauguration) of the new Gwadar Airport or by shutting down social and business life instead of showcasing a normally functioning capital? Instead of listening to the sweet talk by Shehbaz Sharif, the delegates would rely on their diplomats based here, who serve as their eyes and ears.

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