Europe and the possibility of transatlantic divorce

In international relations every intention of a great power is premised on a notion. Russian intention to begin special operations in Ukraine was premised on the notion that the US was weak and Europe was divided and dependent on Russian energy for its survival. To a large extent the Russian notion was premised well as the other powers were caught off guard and Russian military incursion in Donbas region met with success. Similarly, Europe's support to Ukraine is premised on the notion that these Russian special military operations have posed a great danger to European security. The world doesn't question Europe's premise of insecurity, what it questions is the manner in which European countries want to meet this threat and enhance their security.

Geopolitically, European countries that are on Ukraine's borders such as Poland, Sweden, Finland or Baltic states feel more threatened and make greater rumpus of their insecurity and thus unequivocally support harsher sanctions against Moscow and greater military aid by the US and EU to Ukraine. Countries in Western Europe like France, Spain, Italy and Germany have the leverage of strategic depth and so their strategic position is not as intense and their policy is demonstrative of more fluctuation in their position and exhibit signs of compromise. These European countries are convinced that the US will prolong this war, so the doves in their establishment rightfully question whether it is beneficial for the EU to stand with the US and become part of this prolonging?

What Europe needs is a notion of strategic autonomy, which means not having the US to act as its sentry. Europeans need to work on the idea that the US should not be responsible for European security and to find a way to take back the principal responsibility of their own security. The European support for transatlantic partnership started weakening during the US unipolar moment and in the beginning of the 21st century. During this period the US committed strategic blunders as it led the global war on terror leading to its failed military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq which were not supported by all European countries. During the unipolar moment, the world witnessed that Europe had no influence on global affairs. But that time has changed. Today, Europe has the world's biggest economy, potent military capability, an expansive diplomatic network and a leadership that unlike the US takes a more humanistic approach.

Europe must start demonstrating more confidence in its own union than its union with the US if it wants to emerge as another great power and an autonomous strategic actor on the global stage. If it considers that the war is on its doorsteps than it is for Europe and not the US to decide what it wants to do with it. What the US needs is the air and naval power in the Pacific to deter China and what Europeans need is greater investment in military capabilities that prevent ground offensive against the Eastern and Central Europe. The entire dynamics of European relationship with China can change if it starts viewing it not from under the shadow of American influence but as an independent great power ready to view China as its trade partner and economic competitor and not as a geopolitical threat.

The US has anchored itself in Europe through NATO. For the last 75 years, the post of Supreme Allied Commander Europe has been held by the US mainly because it is the region's main security provider. This must end and a European country may have its own general or admiral leading this post. The notion of dominating, influencing and controlling Europe stems from the consistent American policy of preventing the emergence of a European hegemon. This policy was set by Dean Gooderham Acheson, the Secretary of State from 1949 to 1953, who had remarked that the two world wars had "taught us that the control of Europe by a single aggressive, unfriendly power would constitute an intolerable threat to the national security of United States". Today the US has over 100,000 troops deployed in European countries but Donald Trump, when in power, was heard saying, "If they are not going to pay, we are not going to protect." The US on the one hand pulls Europe in military competition with China and on the other brags about not protecting without getting paid. Europe must realise the US alone cannot simultaneously deter both Russia and China. All the US does is raise an exaggerated false alarm of a Russian bear interested in eating the European honey and thus gets a scared Europe to view Russia as a predator and China as an emerging geopolitical threat.

I make just one assumption: the 21st century is likely to witness the divorce of the US-EU transatlantic alliance and it will happen when the goodwill between the two great powers will end and European countries will finally decide to take the responsibility of their own security. The divorce of this alliance will also be accelerated when the Europeans will ultimately realise that the cold and costly winters they live in are easily preventable. This will also come from a European mindset that will not take delight on the destruction of gas pipelines like Nord Stream 2 but instead take all possible measures to ensure the security of such gas pipelines to make their winters warm and less costly.

Unlike the Americans that lavish in a world marred by military conflicts, European countries must put their right foot forward to seek dialogue and compromise and give chance to diplomacy, peace and security. This doesn't mean that they should throw Ukraine under the bus but that they should act as an autonomous strategic actor and lay its claim to the resolution of the global conflicts - through peaceful means.

Russia will continue to consolidate its hold on its gains in the Ukrainian territory. These gains have come at a huge cost and President Putin will not push back unless he has something to show for it. He is blamed for trying to divide Europe but in fact the Ukrainian conflict has only galvanised the union amongst the European countries. NATO's graduated eastern encroachment that culminated in offering NATO membership to Ukraine has been a provocative act and a big American strategic blunder. My assumption of transatlantic divorce is not just reflective of what the Europeans may do, it also suggests the possibility of not Europe but the US deciding on its retrenchment from Europe on rebirth of its isolationist policy and on budgetary grounds. Europe may walk out itself or the US may show it the door, but the possibility of this divorce in the future is not unwarranted and baseless.