Balochistan and proxy wars: why don't they get it?
The writer heads the independent Centre for Research and Security Studies, Islamabad and is the author of ‘Pakistan: Pivot of Hizbut Tahrir’s Global Caliphate’
When powerful elites of a country consider one of the territories as a source of extraction and treat its population with arrogance and when people's basic needs remain unattended, they are prone to turn to illegal ways for survival i.e. smuggling, crime or ideologically-driven violent behaviour.
Balochistan's current woes essentially stem from two major problems. One is the internal sense of deprivation rooted in continuous, often contemptuous neglect by the powerful elites in Islamabad and Quetta. The other overbearing issue is the extraneous factors affecting the life in the province.
One of the major issues relates to the unquestioned federal support for tribal leaders, all those who are coopted into the security and political matrix as "pro-federation" Nawabs, Sardars, Jamalis, Jams, etc. By virtue of being chiefs of their respective regions, they live and enjoy lives to the fullest like uncrowned princes, unlike the average Baloch citizens, many of whom are skilled and educated but toil in poverty, unemployment and socio-political deprivation.
This nexus with the Islamabad elites serves as a carte blanch for the Baloch tribal chiefs in particular. This results in unbridled siphoning of the scarce public funds.
A roughly 19 kilometer Turbat-Buleda road in the hilly north of district Kech offers a sad but glaring illustration of this plunder by nearly all successive rulers of Balochistan. This road has been constructed and inaugurated multiple times, including once by former army chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa. Even in the current budget, another Rs39.19 million has been allocated for the completion of this road, which so far - in papers - has cost nearly three billion rupees but remains largely cratered, dilapidated and partially washed away by torrential rains within last two years.
Zahoor Buledi, a multiple times MP from the area, remained finance minister for almost three years. An investigative report in a national daily reveals that the documented funds for this project rose from Rs599 million to around Rs2.8 billion during his tenure, yet there was no indication of any work being done on this 19km stretch.
The revovery in cash of some 730 million rupees from former finance secretary Mushtaq Raisani's official residence in Quetta in 2016 or another at least 10 million rupees in cash by another official who had also served at Gwadar are just the tip of the iceberg of corruption in the province. The official caught with Rs100 million in 2016, instead of being in jail, now sits pretty in London, and reportedly "pursuing" a PhD in Baloch insurgency.
Such officials actually are facilitators of the loot and plunder of public funds. They as well as the Deputy Commissioners are often referred to as the ATMs for the political elites because of their role in project financing. No surprise that officials sit over cash stacks worth hundreds of millions of rupees.
Balochistan is awash with such examples and hence the public resentment that is then exploited by the Baloch militants as well as proxy terrorists.
And this brings us to the external dimension of the province's security woes. Baloch leaders such as Brahamdagh Bugti and Allah Nazar enjoy good rapport in India, which at one point in 2015-16 was almost ready to offer headquarters for a Baloch government-in-exile. PM Modi had only reinforced the perception of strong links with some Baloch militants by expressing concern about the "poor state of human rights in Balochistan" in his 2015 independence day address.
Sense of socio-economic injustice, disaffection and unemployment among the educated and exclusion from the mainstream obviously act as fault-lines that the vested outsiders - with the support of local facilitators - easily exploit for sowing discontent and perpetrating terror in the region. This also serves as the cover for new anti-state alliances and subversive activities. No surprise that the year 2022 saw the emergence of a vicious triad comprising TTP, BLA and Daesh Afghanistan (ISKP) that led the surge in terror both in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan.
The young Dr Mahrang Baloch also represents the sense of disaffection among the Baloch youth in particular. Her grievances require a sincere political response and not negative labeling. We need to embrace the resentful Baloch through relief and justice to prevent the vested interest from exploiting this.
The civil and security leadership must join hands to find ways to douse fires of discontent in Balochistan and balm the wounds of Baloch youth. Mere promises, nationalistic rhetoric or bravado against the "miscreants and militants" is not enough to take on the two-pronged challenge that Balochistan presently faces.
As far the proxy terrorism, it is meanwhile clear that Pakistan's conventional security approach has largely failed in Balochistan. If the authorities are convinced that the country is primarily faced with externally-driven proxy terrorism via ISKP, BRA, BLF, BRA, TTP inter alia, they will have to devise a multi-pronged, smarter and modern security regime. There is a lot to learn from China, India, Indonesia and Egypt when it comes to dealing with trans-border terror and criminal groups. Physical guarding and monitoring of terrorists and criminal gangs in the huge Balochistan province is no more feasible in today's modern means of warfare and communication. It is clearly evident from almost six simultaneous attacks of August 25-26. The dire situation certainly warrants a rethink whether Pakistan alone can get a handle on this or it is ready for a multi-national counter-terrorism campaign involving Iran, China, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Afghanistan.