The dangerous confluence and social unrest

Last week we discussed the al-Qaeda-IEA-TTP confluence of jihadi interest from across Pak-Afghan International Border and its long shadow on Pakistan, seen in the context of the recent Bannu unrest. In a letter from the Chair of UN Security Council Committee [established under resolution 1988 (2011)] to the President of the Security Council dated 3 July 2024, following observations of Member State about Afghan Emirate are summarised.

That the Islami Emirate (IEA)/Taliban are firmly entrenched across Afghanistan as ‘de facto authority/government’ with the venerable Haibatullah Akhundzada having consolidated power as Amir. And that IEA has extended its model of Islamic governance to most Afghanistan. Such consolidation has improved peace and stability internally, curtailing corruption, opium production and enhancing revenue generation, helping to sustain the Afghan economy. This is a rare acknowledgment of the positivity of the IEA’s reality.

However, there are security concerns for Central Asia and the region emanating from Afghanistan, putting in question IEA’s governance model in successfully addressing challenges like mass migration, natural disasters, water management regionally, climate change, humanitarian crisis and in particular terrorism.

Despite some initial successful operations, IS-K/Da’esh poses a manifest threat within Afghanistan, the immediate region and beyond. IEA capabilities to effectively combat this sophisticated threat remain wanting. And that IEA remains unable or unwilling to restrain TTP against Pakistan, with its support increasing for TTP overtime. On al-Qaeda, the Report acknowledges ‘some’ IEA restraining; however, Member States are concerned about al Qaeda still using Afghanistan under Taliban as a ‘permissive haven’.

There are also concerns that IEA spending on security and armed forces is disproportionately larger than other areas of governance. The Emirate’s ambitions to acquire new military capabilities without effectively checking proliferation of abandoned stockpiles of US/NATO military hardware, besides the discreet narco-trade, will continue to pose challenges and threats. Recent unrest in Badakhshan province was factored on farmers, struggling after ban on poppy-cultivation without addressing their revenue shortfall with alternative crops.

And lastly, the Report cites non-availability of ‘agreed and functioning mechanism’ for IEA’s multilateral engagement with the broader international community, the recent Doha parleys notwithstanding. The IEA, however, has pragmatic bilateral engagements with some countries without formal recognition. But there are still around 61 sanctioned officials, part of/associated with the Taliban regime.

That is where Afghanistan stands. And if the Report is any guide, the security situation under Pak-Afghan bilateralism would remain a source of concern given the TTP-al Qaeda nexus under IEA patronage, as covered last week. There are two broad strands that ought to be explored in this backdrop — that of proxy wars between the IEA-TTP-al Qaeda ‘nexus’; and Da’esh/IS-K and the ‘nexus’ playing a role in worsening Pakistan’s security situation under endemic politico-economic instability.

First, the nexus versus Da’esh. In a 2016 report by Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Countering Daesh Extremism, Pakistan had arrested around 200 IS-K operatives, and around 1,200 Pakistanis were fighting alongside Da’esh in Afghanistan, the highest number of active Da’esh supporters in South Asia. Da’esh then effectively filled the vacuum created by physical displacement of TTP, Lashkar-e-Islam (LI) and al Qaeda from erstwhile FATA consequent to military operations. Haji Namdar Group (Tazeem Amr Bilmaroof Wa Nahi An al Munkar), a Salafi group based in Khyber District was its main affiliate. Ideological significance and reasoning like emergence of Army with black banners etc aside, Khorasan area (Afghanistan, Pakistan) is favoured by Da’esh to recuperate its logistical, human and financial losses in the Middle East, and due to presence of ‘ungoverned’ spaces in Khorasan.

Da’esh had parleys with Jundullah and LI and it encouraged defections from TTP. Since October 2014, Da’esh was more focused on penetrating local jihadi organisations, as cited above, and others like al Qaeda in Indian Sub-Continent (AQIS), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Jamat-u-Dawah (JuD) and Hizb-ul-Tehrir (HuT). Attacks started during second phase of its strategy. However, large-scale attacks could not materialise, despite incipient support from within Pakistan, due to Army’s effective operations and because of differences within Afghan and Pakistani Da’esh cadre questioning each other’s loyalty. Pakistani policymakers need to take the following scenarios in dealing with the IS-K.

That Da’esh can help TTP factions or others ‘rebranding’ to provide ‘plausible deniability’ to their operations in Pakistan. Da’esh would also like to enhance its reach, lethality and numbers in stand-alone operational mode within Pakistan. Given the chasm between the IEA and Da’esh, proxy conflict involving Pakistan needs serious attention with TTP doing IEA’s bidding. Al Qaeda-Da’esh alliance is out for politico-ideological reasons with al Qaeda firmly being in the IEA camp, yet movement of ranking members across IEA, TTP, al Qaeda and Da’esh cannot be ruled out. Da’esh can also exploit opportunities to expand its recruitment and reach. Therefore, LEAs must remain vigilant and proactive to counter this potential line up.

Second, the ‘nexus (IEA-TTP-al Qaeda)’ and Da’esh exploiting the socioeconomic unrest to destabilise Pakistan. Although the IEA top leadership seems cognisant of the pitfalls of critical security situation in Pakistan, there are sizeable Afghan Taliban given to anti-Pakistan rants and antics, consistent with overall anti-Islamabad sentiment. These elements would like to even up with Pakistan especially its military, for the ‘perceived wrongs’ that Pakistan has heaped on Afghans and Afghanistan. Such hate is generally devoid of any rationality.

It is in the above backdrop that the State and the Military need to: a) exercise full control within its borders and eliminate any militant threat at cross purpose with Pakistan’s ideology, security and peace; b) undertake continued kinetic and non-kinetic operations to reduce space for fence-sitters and others to join this anti-state militancy. Relentless IBO cis and trans-frontier ‘without making noise’ be continued besides exterior manoeuvre and diplomacy; c) Bannu Peace Committee demands be given serious attention and ownership of reconciliation process be completely handed over to the K-P Government; d) domestic media environment be controlled by leading the narrative and not reacting to hostile propaganda; e) efforts be made to distance the Military from plethora of inefficient and unpopular undertakings of the present government; f) efforts to stabilise the economy under SIFC be continued with singularity of purpose and synergy; and, h) in an image makeover exercise, Army should not react to events, keep a low profile, disown publicly what it does not own, and address genuine public grievances.

The trend of heaping everyone’s inefficiencies at GHQ be arrested ‘now’ effectively, loudly and consistently.