Al-Qaeda, Bannu and the road ahead

There is a disturbing alliance of interest across Durand Line. Without being alarmist in any way, there is greater anti-Pakistan convergence among the IEA, al Qaeda and TTP. Although it ‘ostensibly’ is not authorised by the top IEA leadership, it is also not without endorsement. The recent capture of al Qaeda facilitator and leader, Amin Muhammad Ul Haq Saam Khan, aka Aminul Haq, from Gujrat in Punjab proper in a CTD-led IBO on 19 July, is a case in point. The fact that he visited Kabul last August and was ‘planning’ terrorist activities in Punjab points to a new strategy by the anti-Pakistan alliance, wherein TTP is also aided and abetted by al Qaeda. Mr Haq has been on the UN, EU and US list of wanted personnel since January 2001.

A recent UN report by the UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team reveals resurgence of al Qaeda in the region. Al Qaeda affiliate — al Qaeda in Indian Subcontinent or AQIS — founded in September 2014, now led by Osama Mahmood (since 2019), operates in Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, Myanmar and Bangladesh as its area of operations. As per the report, AQIS runs eight new training camps in Afghanistan with the one in Kunar, across Pakistan, training suicide bombers. AQIS has a strong relationship with TTP, which, as per the report, receives $50,500 monthly from IEA, paid to its Amir, Noor Wali Mehsud. That TTP has now more Afghan recruits. And TTP and AQIS were involved in Chitral attack on Pakistani forces on September 7, 2023. Moreover, the report cites emergence of another militant group Tehreek-e-Jihad-e-Pakistan (TJP) and considers it a ploy to provide ‘plausible deniability’ to TTP/AQIS operations.

The report also mentions the latest weaponry, abandoned by the US forces after their embarrassing withdrawal in August 2021, that is now available to AQIS-TTP combine, courtesy the IEA, in the form of M24 Sniper Rifles, M4 Carbines with Trijicon scopes and M16A14 Rifles with thermal scopes, in addition to the latest night vision devices (NVDs).

In recent history, Ayman Al Zawahiri was killed in a US drone strike in Kabul on July 31, 2022, after Osama bin Laden was slain in US Seals’ raid in Abbottabad on May 2, 2011. And if the insider account of the IEA ascent to power in 1990 till it was removed in 2001, as written by an aide to Mullah Omer, Abdul Hai Mutm’ain, is to be believed, IEA-al Qaeda relationship is multi-layered, deeper and religiously sanctioned. His book, Taliban: A Critical Story from Within (2019), makes a compelling reading.

The IEA-TTP-al Qaeda nexus would continue to bedevil Pakistan’s security establishment as evident from the presence of Mr Haq, and other al Qaeda affiliates on Pakistani soil, some under surveillance but most in sleeper cells not even on radar.

Terrorism is a byproduct of extremism, once it becomes violent. For a variety of social, psychological, economic and political reasons, there would always be a steady stream of recruits to be baptised in violent extremism and terrorism. Therefore, the enduring antidote is to follow a ‘counter violent extremism (CVE)’ policy at individual, organisational and environmental levels…as covered in my articles in this space in December 2023. Counter-terrorism (CT) approach includes application of both ‘kinetic’ (law enforcement, hard power) and ‘non-kinetic’ means (deradicalisation, demobilisation, rehabilitation and coming up with counter-narratives). As per studies, the kinetic to non-kinetic ratio is 20:80.

Pakistan’s kinetic application ranges from Operation Al-Mizan to the presently announced Campaign Azm-e-Istehkam; whereas in the non-kinetic domain, deradicalisation/rehab initiatives like Sabayoun (for radicalised kids in Swat); Mishal for adults; Sparley for families; Darpesh, Umeed-e-Nau, etc in Balochistan were successfully completed under Army, FC and private NGOs. This is in addition to the ‘Peace in Balochistan’ initiative under political government from 2008-2013; the National Internal Security Policy (2013-2018); and the National Action Plan (NAP) after 2015. However, like in all cases, terrorism has a lifespan and must run its complete cycle. Sri Lank finally defeated LTTE in 25 years of relentless military operations. Theoretically kinetic operations create space for effective application of non-kinetic means. So, a long-haul, under whole-of-government approach, under firm political ownership is the way to go.

In Bannu, some people in a peace rally on 19 July turned violent. Reportedly these elements stormed through the breech in the perimeter wall of Bannu Cantt, caused by terrorists’ VBIED attack on 16 July. They tried torching the soldiers’ tents pitched onsite and breaking into CSD — the military-owned superstore. Some miscreants in social media clips can be seen firing weapons, whereas most rally participants remained peaceful. In the ensuing standoff, there were some fatalities in the military’s cautionary fire. From experience, one can say with authority that military retaliation in such situations is last resort, never excessive and not targeted to kill. This notwithstanding, the sequence of events is disconcerting.

Nationalist elements, political parties and religious groups see an opportunity in it to pressurise the state and malign the military. And that makes it imperative for the military to read the situation carefully, act wisely and defuse the stand-off as amicably and as quickly as possible. Many nemeses are angling to fish in the troubled waters, including the trio identified earlier.

The rally leaders while reiterating to support stability, forwarded ten demands, including: action against good/bad Taliban; police patrolling round the clock; ‘police only’ to apprehend criminals; search operations to respect chadar-chardewari; opening of closed roads; administrative action on Taliban patrolling; presenting missing persons in courts; enhancing police capacity; ‘CTD only’ to fight terrorism; end to raids on houses/seminaries; and treatment of injured police persons in CMH Bannu. Although not all the demands are based upon full factual knowledge, these still warrant serious attention. It is important that environment-savvy, preferably Pashtun interlocutors deal with the situation from the military side. And other agencies revert to their supporting CT roles. As a side issue, military deployment on check posts be reconsidered.

There is a strong sense of Pashtun ethnic profiling and victimhood, right or wrong, that needs to be dispelled urgently, comprehensively and consistently. The lack of political support to Azm-e-Istehkam across the religo, political and ethnic spectrum should be taken as a serious indicator. We can do politics to our hearts’ content, once terrorism as an existential threat to Pakistan is defeated in all manifestations. Till then back to work!