Embracing Afpakistan
The expression AfPak that has gained currency, despite belated efforts by the US government to suppress it.
The expression AfPak that has gained currency, despite belated efforts by the US government to suppress it, has not been received well in Pakistan. This probably reflects a perceived slight in being de-linked from India (not that Indo-Pak was much liked), and linked to a ‘backward’ Afghanistan. A more dispassionate consideration of what underlies the coining of this neologism, however, may persuade Pakistanis even if reluctantly to embrace rather than reject it.
Richard Holbrooke first used the term publicly in February 2009: “First of all, we often call the problem AfPak, as in Afghanistan Pakistan. This is… an attempt to indicate and imprint in our DNA the fact that there is one theatre of war, straddling an ill-defined border, the Durand Line, and that on the Western side of that border, Nato and other forces are able to operate. On the eastern side, it’s the sovereign territory of Pakistan. But it is on the eastern side of this ill-defined border that the international terrorist movement is located.”
This remarkable statement merits a closer look. Over the last two centuries, peace between Russia and Britain in this region was maintained by agreeing to treat Afghanistan as a buffer state, with recognised boundaries. Since the 1890s the Durand Line demarcated the boundary between British and Russian spheres of influence. Having secured Pakistan and occupied Afghanistan, the US became a successor to both powers, and now finds the line superfluous. It constrains American schemes to “secure” the region, to serve as a base for the US, to confront Iran, to extend its influence north towards the mineral and energy resources of Central Asia (hedging in Russia and China) and south, towards the Arabian Sea, to secure its supply lines, to control the coastline overlooking the sea lanes out of the Gulf, and to dominate the Indian Ocean (restraining India).
This is a tectonic shift in the West Asian geo-strategic landscape which merits attention from all countries in the region, including Pakistan. The US is the sole hyper-power in the world and what it holds to be true — whether morally, intellectually, or empirically justifiable or not — must be dealt with pragmatically. A complex mix of American fears and desires have coalesced in the conviction that there is an essential instability in the present geopolitical map of the region that threatens the American homeland.
To mitigate the contingent risks created by this conviction, the establishment in Pakistan needs to craft ‘win-win’ solutions that enhance mutual security. Rather than rejecting AfPak thinking, it is time to examine however reluctantly whether a unified rather than a balkanised AfPakistan may not be more in the joint interest of all concerned? From the US perspective, a unified AfPak military led by Pakistan may offer the only chance of for a quick, secure exit with dignity from Afghanistan. The main challenge would be in crafting a mutually acceptable constitutional framework that guarantees local autonomy, without eroding the central authority needed to eradicate terrorism, quell insurgencies, and maintain order.
In Pakistan, however the suggestion initially will be met negatively as a revival of the discredited idea of “strategic depth”— against an attack from the east. This is understandable for at the time this was proposed, the risks on seeking “strategic depth” were far higher than those in maintaining the status quo. Today, however, the contingent risks of inactive passivity may exceed those of pro-active efforts toward meeting these risks. The danger now is not of being denied strategic depth, but of averting an existential threat emanating from our Western boundaries.
To put it plainly, our utmost priority must be to protect our existing boundaries, but — let us pray this never happens — if forced to choose between a Pakistan mainly on the left bank of the Indus river, or a unified AfPakistan extending way beyond the Durand Line, would we all not be better served by the latter option?
The writer is a retired economist who blogs at afpakwar.com (arshad.zaman@tribune.com.pk)
Published in The Express Tribune, July 1st, 2010.
Richard Holbrooke first used the term publicly in February 2009: “First of all, we often call the problem AfPak, as in Afghanistan Pakistan. This is… an attempt to indicate and imprint in our DNA the fact that there is one theatre of war, straddling an ill-defined border, the Durand Line, and that on the Western side of that border, Nato and other forces are able to operate. On the eastern side, it’s the sovereign territory of Pakistan. But it is on the eastern side of this ill-defined border that the international terrorist movement is located.”
This remarkable statement merits a closer look. Over the last two centuries, peace between Russia and Britain in this region was maintained by agreeing to treat Afghanistan as a buffer state, with recognised boundaries. Since the 1890s the Durand Line demarcated the boundary between British and Russian spheres of influence. Having secured Pakistan and occupied Afghanistan, the US became a successor to both powers, and now finds the line superfluous. It constrains American schemes to “secure” the region, to serve as a base for the US, to confront Iran, to extend its influence north towards the mineral and energy resources of Central Asia (hedging in Russia and China) and south, towards the Arabian Sea, to secure its supply lines, to control the coastline overlooking the sea lanes out of the Gulf, and to dominate the Indian Ocean (restraining India).
This is a tectonic shift in the West Asian geo-strategic landscape which merits attention from all countries in the region, including Pakistan. The US is the sole hyper-power in the world and what it holds to be true — whether morally, intellectually, or empirically justifiable or not — must be dealt with pragmatically. A complex mix of American fears and desires have coalesced in the conviction that there is an essential instability in the present geopolitical map of the region that threatens the American homeland.
To mitigate the contingent risks created by this conviction, the establishment in Pakistan needs to craft ‘win-win’ solutions that enhance mutual security. Rather than rejecting AfPak thinking, it is time to examine however reluctantly whether a unified rather than a balkanised AfPakistan may not be more in the joint interest of all concerned? From the US perspective, a unified AfPak military led by Pakistan may offer the only chance of for a quick, secure exit with dignity from Afghanistan. The main challenge would be in crafting a mutually acceptable constitutional framework that guarantees local autonomy, without eroding the central authority needed to eradicate terrorism, quell insurgencies, and maintain order.
In Pakistan, however the suggestion initially will be met negatively as a revival of the discredited idea of “strategic depth”— against an attack from the east. This is understandable for at the time this was proposed, the risks on seeking “strategic depth” were far higher than those in maintaining the status quo. Today, however, the contingent risks of inactive passivity may exceed those of pro-active efforts toward meeting these risks. The danger now is not of being denied strategic depth, but of averting an existential threat emanating from our Western boundaries.
To put it plainly, our utmost priority must be to protect our existing boundaries, but — let us pray this never happens — if forced to choose between a Pakistan mainly on the left bank of the Indus river, or a unified AfPakistan extending way beyond the Durand Line, would we all not be better served by the latter option?
The writer is a retired economist who blogs at afpakwar.com (arshad.zaman@tribune.com.pk)
Published in The Express Tribune, July 1st, 2010.