Sino-Pak interests and proxy terrorism

Our state institutions still talk of terrorism and refrain from openly talking of externally-driven proxy terrorism

The deadly terror strike in Bisham on March 26 that claimed the lives of five Chinese citizens delivered yet another reminder on the grim circumstances that Pakistan faces. It took the number of direct attacks involving Chinese targets to at least 33 since the launch of CPEC.

A similar attack on a bust carrying workers of Dasu Hydropower Project in the same region in July 2021 had killed nine Chinese nationals.

This alarming situation calls for deep introspection here at home.

On March 17 President Asif Ali Zardari vowed to make the terrorists accountable for the blood of each martyred jawan after attending the funeral of Lt-Col Syed Kashif Ali and Capt Muhammad Ahmed Bader, who were among five other martyrs of an attack in Mir Ali in North Waziristan the same day. “The blood of the sons of the soil would not go in vain,” he said.

The President followed this up with another resolve on March 23. “We will not tolerate any efforts by terrorists or any group to destabilise our country,” he said in his speech at the main Pakistan Day ceremony in Islamabad.

Pakistan Army’s top brass also issues such statements, often after corps commanders’ meetings to underscore its determination against terrorist threats.

Does such rhetoric fend off terrorist threat? Has it helped in any way at all? Certainly not. Four brazen attacks within 10 days – on March 17 in North Waziristan, March 20 Gwadar, March 25 Turbat, March 26 Bisham – underline the ever-evolving nature of the terrorist threat. These are among the 236 attacks this year until March 25 this year, causing at least 413 fatalities, mostly in Balochistan and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa.

This carnage has been going on for several years , even though the Frontier Corps now has four majors general in both provinces i.e. IG FC South Balochistan, IG FC North Balochistan, IG FC South KP and IG FC North KP. Despite the expansion of security forces, the incidence of terrorism has been on the rise since late 2022.

What is the clear lesson to be drawn?

Firstly, it is proxy terrorism, and no quest for sharia. Nor are any adjectives like ‘coward’, ‘insensitive’, ‘infidels’ used for terrorists of any value because of the proxy nature of the challenge. Geopolitically-driven actors just move by the agenda, regardless of who comes their way.

Some of the instruments of this cold-blooded proxy terrorism include the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) Tehreek-e-Jihad Pakistan (TJP), Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP), Ahrarul-Hind, Ansarul Jihad (AuJ), Majlis-e-Askari, Jaish-e-Fursan-e-Muhammad, Jabhat al-Junud al-Mahdi (headed by Amir Sufiyan) and Hafiz Gul Bahdaur’s Jabhat Ansar al-Mahdi Khorasan (JAMK), besides Jundullah, Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) and Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and the Sindhudesh People’s Army.

They all claim to be vying for a caliphate, using Islam/sharia as a justification for their violent actions. But in reality they are agents of terrorism, instability and uncertainty. Franchises with different names on the same mission – of destabilising the region – threaten Pakistani interests, demoralise the security apparatus by pricking it here and there and scare Chinese economic engagement away from the region.

Any religious currency to these outfits amounts to naivety. The Bisham incident and the brazen attack on the Gwadar Port Authority Complex on March 20 leave little doubt on the intensions of this terror campaign.

Secondly, this proxy terrorism draws its oxygen from our neigbourhood and the border regions, where most of the terrorists associated with the aforementioned outfits had been sheltering. While Pakistan hunted out the proponents of the Haqqani Network and their Pakistani protégés such as TTP from North Waziristan, the Afghan Taliban still appear to be reluctant in a head-on collision with TTP and its associates. By implication – even if the Afghan Taliban claim not to be supporting terrorist outfits – they do serve as the umbrella for many of the outfits based there including the TTP, ISKP, ETIM (ITP) and IMU remnants.

Thirdly, terrorist forces also draw legitimacy from our own clouded thinking about the phenomenon. Our state institutions still talk of terrorism and apparently refrain from openly talking of externally-driven proxy terrorism. All visiting foreign dignitaries do talk of TTP or ISKP as the biggest security threat to the region and their countries. But our leaders appear to have failed in convincingly asking them one simple question: what is their assessment of the terrorist campaign? Why would members of these rag-tag armed groups kill innocent unarmed Pakistanis and Chinese, and systematically attack security forces? What is their interest in spreading fear and a sense of instability?

Fourth, will our bigwigs introspect as to whether – despite the omnipresent proxy terrorist threat – lapses and shortcomings in the management of security, particularly for the Chinese nationals, have facilitated the continuous terrorist campaign. No surprise that the Chinese demanded a thorough investigation into the attack, punishment for the perpetrators and effective measures to protect the safety of Chinese citizens.

Lastly, is the Pakistani leadership ready to finally realise and openly admit the proxy nature of the challenge both Pakistan and China are facing? A major step towards neturalising the challenge could perhaps be separating religion from politics. Strong messaging is required on the management of terrorism. Zero tolerance for any religious or religio-political group supportive of terrorist/militant outfits must be declared as the cardinal principle of new security policy. Ambiguity around militant outfits must make way for clarity on all those who represent a threat to the interests of Pakistan and its neighbours.

Published in The Express Tribune, March 30^th, 2024.

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