Cross-border militancy and our priorities
The writer is a public policy analyst based in Lahore. She tweets @durdananajam
The return of the Taliban to power in August 2021 was both a matter of joy and comfort for Islamabad. The expected outcome of the transition was peace returning to Pakistan’s long-embattled western borders. That was not to be. In fact, the number of strikes against Pakistan from the militants based in Afghanistan grew to an alarming rate. Pakistan’s repeated appeals to the Afghan interim government to rein in the rouge element using Afghanistan soil to attack Pakistan, at best, fell on deaf ears and, at worse, developed a cleavage between both countries. Today, Pakistan’s western border has turned into a battleground.
As patience wore off with the Taliban’s persistence to ignore all international and diplomatic norms as well as their refusal to obey the peace accord Pakistan brokered between the Taliban and the US, no other option was left but to hit the militant sanctuaries across the border through an air strike. The retaliatory artillery fires by the Afghan Taliban have now turned the situation extremely volatile. Tension with Afghanistan presents one of the major foreign policy and security challenges to the newly installed government, as the escalating incidents of terrorism can easily eclipse any development initiative involving foreign investment.
Combating the TTP is becoming difficult, given the Afghan government’s reluctance to take action against them. According to Pakistani officials, 5,000 to 6,000 TTP fighters are based in Afghanistan. Last week’s air strike on the Afghan border provinces of Paktika and Khost was in retaliation to the TTP’s attack on a security checkpost in North Waziristan, resulting in the killing of seven soldiers and officers. The attack was one of the most heinous carried out so far by the TTP, which in the last two years has killed more than 300 security personnel. Not only is the TTP provided with a haven in Afghanistan to operate with impunity against Pakistan, but at their disposal are highly sophisticated weapons.
Pakistan had attacked the militants in Afghanistan earlier as well but never acknowledged them. This was the first time that Islamabad openly admitted to the action. In other words, it is a tacit warning to the Afghan regime that if it fails to take action against TTP, Pakistan will not hesitate to take the war across the border. Pakistan, as is evident, is increasingly becoming frustrated by the Afghan regime’s inertia. The frustration further increases as Islamabad sees decades of political effort in bringing an anti-Indian and pro-Pakistan regime in Afghanistan failing miserably. Instead of mellowing down, as would have been expected in Pakistan, the Kabul regime has taken a definite position after the strikes. The Afghan defence minister has said that his country would use every force to defend its national sovereignty.
Though calm has returned to the borders, that does not mean peace has prevailed. The situation can become hostile anytime if the cross-border militant attacks on Pakistani security forces are not stopped. The attack on a military convoy in the northwestern district of Dera Ismail Khan a few days after the Pakistan airstrike indicates the as-usual approach of the Afghan regime.
The question is: can Pakistan afford a full-blown military action against Afghanistan? Realising the consequences of such an adventure, which threatens regional peace, the new government has taken a cautious approach to dealing with the situation. Pakistan’s defence minister has shown interest in solving the terrorism issues with Afghanistan through a dialogue. In this regard, a delegation led by Commerce Secretary Khurram Aga has arrived in Afghanistan to open talks on bilateral trade. Both sides have pledged “to tackle existing hurdles in the transit areas with joint and concerted measures”.
It is also essential to make the Afghan Taliban realise that after decades of foreign occupation, making the same mistake of harbouring militants could pose severe threats to Afghanistan’s internal security. It might as well pave the way for new interventions. The recent attack by the Daesh Khorasan in Kandahar, killing dozens of people, should be enough for the regime to smell the coffee.
Pakistan is right to blame the Afghan regime for disregarding the escalation in the TTP attack on Pakistan’s security forces. Pakistan may as well be right in retaliating against the rouge element hiding in Afghanistan. All these right actions, however, do not justify Pakistan’s lack of a coherent counterterrorism strategy, which has been a significant contributing factor in the return of TTP in a more organised form. Couple this with the never-ending political instability — a perfect condition to hatch militancy.
How is it possible to influence a foreign country to take action against the enemy when, internally, Pakistan is divided both politically and economically? The establishment’s practice of keeping the civilians at a distance from security matters has not been a successful experiment all these 75 years. If we are serious about giving a geo-economic spin to our diplomatic efforts, the starting point would be overhauling our security paradigm with clear demarcation between civilian and military law enforcement agencies and intelligence apparatus responsibilities.
Published in The Express Tribune, March 28th, 2024.
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