Pulwama to Panjgur: Pakistan’s finest hour

Two major national security crises with neighbours, within a span of five years, have helped in delineating Pakistan’s ‘red lines’ for any would-be aggressors.

However, there is a qualitative difference between Pulwama 2019 and Panjgur 2024: India’s attack was strategic in nature. Given our adversarial relationship, Delhi was keen to impose its hegemonic diktat. Hence, relations remain frozen. Conversely, Iran’s Panjgur strike was a tactical gamble, which backfired badly. Moreover, the Panjgur aftermath has resulted in the quickest deescalation and normalisation in history, with restoration of Ambassadorial ties and impending visit of the Iranian Foreign Minister next week. Both Pulwama and Panjgur rank among Pakistan’s Finest Hours in handling major national security crises with skill, strong nerves and sophistication, since both crises had the potential of spinning out of control.

However, Panjgur was more complicated for three reasons. First, the element of total surprise. Second, the attack coming from an unexpected quarter, a friendly Muslim neighbour. Third, ensuring a retaliation that would require careful calibration so as to avoid both Iranian casualties and escalation.

While the trigger-happy overconfidence of the Revolutionary Guards, the core of Iran’s ‘deep state’, pushed them to embark on a hat-trick of attacks — Iraq, Syria and Pakistan — they obviously miscalculated in the case of Pakistan, assuming Iran would get away with it as Islamabad would likely take it lying down. This was the same fallacious assumption which led New Delhi to embark on a similar misadventure five years ago after the Pulwama incident in Indian Occupied Kashmir. Pakistan’s ‘Operation Swift Retort’ retaliated with shooting down two Indian planes and capturing one Indian pilot.

The Iran crisis brought out the best in the Pakistani System: deft diplomacy, mature media messaging, military precision and professionalism, tri-service coordination, and achieving objectives without resorting to jingoism. While Panjgur may have been the first military test for General Asim Munir, interestingly, he brings a number of ‘firsts’ to his role as COAS. He is the first senior most officer to be elevated to the command of the Pakistan Army. He is the first COAS who is not a product of the Pakistan Military Academy at Kakul. And he is the first ‘Asianist’ among Pakistan army chiefs, as he wasn’t trained in any Western military academy, rather, his overseas experience took him to Japan, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia.

The blunder from the Iranian ‘deep state’ detracted attention from the Gaza Genocide, undermined Muslim unity, pushed Iraq into the American lap, exposed the vulnerability of the Iranian attackers as they suffered the first foreign military foray in their territory (in retaliation) after the Iran-Iraq War 35 years ago, plus the Revolutionary Guards attack played into the hands of Iran’s detractors and revived suspicions about Iranian intentions in the region.

Ironically, the Iranian attack came at a time when relations between the two Muslim neighbours were robust, with greater coordination and communication between the military establishments of both countries. Some institutional steps were in place, including both sides agreeing to placing their security personnel on either side of the Pakistan-Iran border for better border management, opening of border markets and closer anti-narcotics cooperation.

What are some of the key lessons of Panjgur for Pakistan? Three are pertinent. First, amidst all this doom and gloom of a ‘broken system’, Panjgur demonstrated that the system works, and if there is good leadership with teamwork and homework, the system can deliver results. Panjgur came at a moment of governmental transition, caretakers moving towards elections, and intense political polarisation. Despite this context, Panjgur aftermath was a model in crisis management, with all components of the Pakistani System working in unison. Second, whether it was Pulwama in 2019 or Panjgur in 2024, Pakistan has responded to military adventurism that violated its sovereignty and territorial integrity, the United Nations Charter and International Law with coercive conventional deterrence, reflecting the high degree of professionalism of the Pakistan Armed Forces that was evident in the manner, speed and quality of the carefully calibrated retaliation. In the process, certain ‘rules of regional behaviour’ have been set. Panjgur sent out a broader message of Pakistan’s resolve to resolutely resist attacks on our sovereignty and territorial integrity. Third, there’s the new reality of non-state actors, acting either on their own or as proxies, which are a factor for regional destabilisation and in fact, national security is now inextricably intertwined with regional geopolitics. This means issues of counterterrorism and cross-border terrorism would require resolution beyond national borders, bilaterally, or in a multilateral framework. The bilateral framework can work in the context of Pakistan-Iran relations, but, for example, in Afghanistan, with multiple terror groups operating, a multilateral regional approach for counterterrorism cooperation is called for, especially involving China, Russia and Central Asian neighbours of Afghanistan.

For Pakistan, these challenges are likely to persist due to regional geopolitics and the current state of ties with India, Iran and Afghanistan. Given this context, in 2024, Pakistan’s Election Year, a new beginning is needed on foreign policy as well, a ‘Regional Reset’ based on a triangular approach. First, a whole-of-region economic-driven policy, rather than compartmentalisation of ties with each neighbouring country with a security-centric bunker mentality. Second, start with stamping out the root causes of terrorism and extremism at home, through a cohesive and coordinated counterterrorism strategy (which is currently absent). Third, placing priority on trade, connectivity and investment, making geopolitics subordinate to geoeconomics. For example, if CPEC is expanded to include Afghanistan, the Iran-Pakistan pipeline construction starts (Russia has already offered to fund this pipeline in Pakistan territory from the Iran border to Gwadar) or the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gets moving, the strategic stake of our neighbours in economic connectivity will trump any considerations of continuing proxy wars or using their territory to destabilise the neighbourhood.

Published in The Express Tribune, January 24^th, 2024.

Like Opinion & Editorial on Facebook, follow @ETOpEd on Twitter to receive all updates on all our daily pieces.