Terrorism and Pakistan’s response
The writer is a retired major general and has an interest in International Relations and Political Sociology. He can be reached at tayyarinam@hotmail.com and tweets @20_Inam
In the expansive literature on the subject, terrorism is considered a byproduct of ‘extremism’ which, once violent, transcends into terrorism. Extremism in both violent and non-violent forms is caused by radicalisation and an individual becomes radicalised once he/she loses ‘mental equilibrium’. At the philosophical plain, human ‘equilibrium’ is dependent upon ‘monism’ or ‘dualism’. Monism school believes that everything related to our experiences is rooted in ‘one universal attribute’, which can be ‘body’ (material) or ‘mind’ (non-material). The dualists believe in the attributability of human experience to the two ‘contrasting’ notions of body and mind. Western philosophy since Socrates is dominated by dualism. In theocracy, scholars add ‘spirituality’ as a third attribute to human experiences. And to be in equilibrium, an individual must have synergy in all three attributes…body, mind and spirit. Although different schools of Islamic thought especially Sufism challenge this assertion giving preeminence to spirit and mind.
Radicalisation hence is loss of equilibrium and moving away from collective consensus like peaceful co-existence with other religions and sects, abiding by the Constitution and laws or believing in the national unity across fault-lines. Challenging the above consensus on the basis of religion or ethnicity is being radical. And radicalisation manifested in violent extremism is considered terrorism.
Any ‘Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)’ campaign is multi-layered targeting the individual, the organisation, and the environment. Individual might have psychological propensities for terrorism based mainly upon misunderstanding of religious percepts, sense of deprivation, vengeance, distorted sense of identity, low self and social esteem, quest for seeking glory/martyrdom, and/or financial incentives, etc. At organisational level, the use of terrorism is motivated by political goals, considered more efficiently achievable through the use of violent means. Violence is also inspired by the conviction that the adversary (state) is not legitimate (read un-Islamic). Violence is also committed for gaining recognition, staying relevant, or psycho-social predilections and obsession of leadership with violence, etc.
At environmental level, political domination of one group over the rest, power grab to establish puritanical version of an ideological state, glorification and martyrdom, considering resistance as religious obligations etc are some of the main drivers of terrorism. However, these individual, organisational and environmental factors overlap in what is called ‘the feedback loop’ to inspire, sustain and motivate terrorism.
States do have to respond to the cited three levels of terrorism through their counterterrorism (CT) strategies targeting each level. The broad approaches in CVE are hard (kinetic) and soft (non-kinetic). Hardcore terrorism and militancy require kinetic response, at least initially, which entails application of military force in coordination with police and other Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs). While effective in restoring writ of the state in short to mid-term, it is not a lasting solution as it does not deal with radicalisation and extremism as root causes of terrorism.
Non-kinetic means include ‘deradicalisation, rehabilitation, transformation and counter-narrative’. Studies show that CT mix is 80% non-kinetic and 20% kinetic. Non-kinetic means are non-coercive, hence more efficacious and lasting. However, it is the kinetic means that create the immediate environment for non-kinetic means to be employed once terrorism is hardcore. Although, soft/non-kinetic means should be concurrently employed more broadly at societal levels to contain further radicalisation, by countering terrorists’ narrative and limiting their logistic support like recruitment, training and funding, etc.
Pakistan, in its CVE strategy has adopted both approaches. In kinetic response, it has focused on fighting violent extremists in countless CT operations. Its LEAs including the Military, especially the Army, Police, in particular the KP Police, Frontier Corps, Frontier Constabulary, Levies (tribal police) and intelligence agencies have fought terrorism long and hard after the invasion of Afghanistan first by the USSR in 1989 and later by the US in 2001.
In GWOT, Operation Al-Mizan (2003-04) remains the first ‘synchronised’ response by Military in FATA/former South Waziristan Agency (SWA) against Arab, Uzbek, Chechen and Uighur terrorists belonging to Al-Qaeda, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), and a host of other Pakistani and Afghan groups. Al-Mizan sanitised SWA, and in 2005 was extended to pacify NWA. Military operation was relaunched in 2008 in both Waziristan Agencies, besides Kurram and Orakzai Agencies. Concurrently Operation Sherdil (Lion Heart) was launched in Bajaur Agency (2008-2010). In 2009, Al-Mizan morphed into Operation Rah-e-Raast targeting the then combined TTP in Swat and Malakand division.
A somber reflection in these days of Army-bashing. Swat, bigger than some countries in area and population, saw massive exodus of population due to TTP-engendered terrorism that could not be contained even by clergy-led initiatives. Almost 75% of those migrating was housed in the Army-sponsored camps in KP. Of the remaining 25% or so, around 3/4th was hosted by people in KP, and the Government dealt with the little left. Army operation cleared Swat; enabled people to return with dignity, while their properties remained safe under Army’s watch…all within six months. No mean feat. When I, as part of Ministry of Defence delegation, presented these facts in the British MoD probably in 2011, the UK Defence Secretary was utterly shocked at not knowing Pakistan’s success story. One also remembers the US Office of Defence Representative in Pakistan (ODRP) Chief, a US Navy two star, taking Pakistan Army’s Swat operational template to Coalition Forces in Afghanistan.
Meanwhile, Operation Bia Darghalam (I come again) was launched in September 2009 to forestall terrorist attacks on NATO supply columns. Operation Rah-e-Nijaat (way of redemption) again in September 2009 cleared Dera Ismail Khan, Frontier Region Tank and Zhob. In 2011-12, over 144 operations were launched followed by massive development work targeting infrastructure, educational institutions, health and water supply across FATA and Swat.
In 2013, Karachi and Balochistan saw operations by the paramilitary Rangers. In 2014, Operation Zarb-e-Azb [strike by the sword of Prophet (PBUH)] re-focused on NWA. Operation Khyber-I in 2014 flushed out TTP and its partner Lashkar-e-Islam terrorists from Khyber Agency. Operation Khyber-II in 2015 cleared Tirah valley, a safe haven for TTP, Lashkar-e-Islam and Jamaat-ul-Ahrar. In 2016, Balochistan remained in focus with LEAs fighting TTP-led Baloch extremist groups, besides Lashkar-e-Jhangvi in Punjab.
In 2017, Operation Radd-Ul-Fasaad (countering evil) cleared Lahore, Sehwan Sharif, KP and erstwhile FATA mainly through IBOs (intelligence-based operations). It resulted in 59% drop in terrorist activities till 2018. Meanwhile Operation Khyber-IV in July 2017 cleared Khyber Agency’s Rajgal and NWA’s Shawal Valleys.
From 2009 to December 2018, over 27,622 militants were killed in more than 1,650 military operations. Over 12,500 alleged terrorists and militants were detained in around 1,997 IBOs all over the country.
More next week.
Published in The Express Tribune, December 21st, 2023.
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