Pak-Afghan relations — DI Khan attack and TTP
The writer is a retired major general and has an interest in International Relations and Political Sociology. He can be reached at tayyarinam@hotmail.com and tweets @20_Inam
On 28th November, Pakistan’s Foreign Office (FO) summoned head of the Afghan diplomatic mission to convey four explicit demands: a) extradition of Hafiz Gul Bahadur of North Waziristan District to Pakistan, whose TTP component group carried out attack on a military convoy in Bakka Khel area of Bannu on 26 November; b) full investigation and action against perpetrators and abettors; c) immediate “verifiable actions” against all terrorist groups with sanctuaries on Afghan soil; and d) prevent the use of Afghan soil for terrorism against Pakistan.
According to ISPR, the motorcycle-borne suicide bomber, affiliated with Gul Bahadur Group, was an Afghan national. This was the 16th suicide attack in Pakistan with Afghan footprints. There has been a discernable uptick in TTP-generated terrorist attacks on LEAs, the most recent being in Daraban area of DI Khan District on 12 December, killing 25 soldiers. Terrorists rammed an explosives-laden vehicle into the Police Post used as Army base, followed by suicide attack. A relatively unknown TTP component Tehreek-e-Jihad claimed responsibility. Troops also neutralised terrorists in Darazinda and Kulachi areas of DIK. TTP-related terrorism fatalities since 2021 have been over 2,300. The eviction of Afghan refugees (AR) is also linked to enhanced terrorism, given the sleeper cells and other criminal elements among the ARs…miniscule but there.
After building pressure, FO spokesperson Mumtaz Zahra Baloch on December 01 conceded, “We have been given certain assurances with reference to our demands of the Afghan authorities.” She demanded ‘effective action’ and ‘substantial results’ on the grounds against TTP terror outfits.
TTP is a vexing issue, and the only ‘variable’ with the potential to further derail and irreparably damage relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Inability (most likely), unwillingness, or both on the part of Afghan Emirate (IEA) to resolve this very critical issue has severe implications that are not fully comprehended by the interim government in Kabul. There are powerful external lobbies, regional nemesis and internal detractors in both nations who would not want to see peace and amity between the two countries. So, what is Afghan locus standi on the issue?
While IEA publicly considers TTP as Pakistan’s internal issue, it privately, and at times in media, cites three reasons for not confronting the TTP. Nothing previously unknown, these reasons are: a) TTP as their comrade-in-arms in Jihad against US/NATO combine recently; b) taking action against hamsaya (the one who shares your shade i.e is under your protection as a guest) violates Afghan cultural ethos and Islamic credentials; and c) action against TTP will not only split IEA internally, it will beef up IS/Da’esh by the defecting TTP cadre. And this, in turn, will complicate IEA’s threat matrix. Hence IEA considers pacification through dialogue the only workable option. And IEA claims Kabul parleys between TTP and Pakistan Government in 2022 had ironed out maximum issues, when change of strategy by Pakistan caused breakdown of the process.
In a scenario like this, what are Pakistan’s choices as continued acrimony would escalate TTP/Afghan-related terrorism, vitiating the environment? Today, ironically the highest anti-Pakistan sentiment resides among Afghans, lately because of eviction orders. And common Pakistanis consider Afghans ungrateful and outright selfish. Allowing Afghans of all religious, ethnic and political dispensations to reside without limits and controls, all over Pakistan, for over four decades has created a situation that warrants over-arching comprehension and wise handling.
IEA is a monolith with southern Qandahari ideologues acting as its movers and shakers. The northern Khostwal pragmatists under Haqqanis also concede to the puritanical Qandahar. To crack this tough ideological nut, sustained religious diplomacy needs to be undertaken with “patience and perseverance and with a long view”, as IEA rationale for not taking anti-TTP actions is deep-rooted.
However, as previously analysed by this scribe, TTP is also a potentially meddlesome stakeholder in Afghan affairs, whose sidelining over time is inevitable. It also restricts IEA territorial control and suzerainty over entire Afghanistan. Plus, traditional Afghan hospitality has limits for groups that have no financial clout like Bin Ladin’s Al-Qaeda. So, at some stage IEA pragmatism will trump ideology. Besides, TTP cadre overtime will age and go into quietude like the Arab jihadist before them. TTP attacks also decry their desperation for a negotiated settlement, as being hamsaya in a foreign land, with movement restrictions and curtailed liberty of action imposed by IEA, also bestows an inferior social status on TTP, that definitely is not liked by TTP rank and file. Hence Pakistan’s compulsion for taking a patient long view.
As far as dialogue with the TTP whenever, that will never be a starter given TTP’s escalated terrorism, ludicrous demands (Army withdrawal, revocation of FATA merger, prisoner release, repatriation en-masse, keeping arms, sharia and not constitution, etc) and blood on their hands. And in the absence of Pakistan conceding (which probably was the case during 2022 Kabul parleys, as IEA cites), terrorism would continue to rear its ugly head now and then. Facilitation, logistics, aiding and abetting would never be a problem for TTP. However, TTP knows it cannot win, hence it operates under nihilist desperation.
The bottom line is that IEA will not budge on TTP anytime soon, and TTP will not reconcile to peace. So, it boils down to the only pragmatic option for Pakistan and its Military — that of patiently persevering with the IEA politically, using aggressive religious diplomacy; diplomatically, ratcheting up pressure now and then using our well-known leverages effectively; economically, enhancing legal trade and commerce, bringing Afghanistan under the ambit of CPEC, clearing our access to Central Asia and ruthlessly eliminating smuggling including currency trafficking and misuse of Afghan transit trade.
And in the Military realm, there is need to pursue steadfast policy of fighting terrorism in all manifestations through ‘all means’ possible; conduct sustained and ruthless operations to eliminate TTP, its Afghan sympathisers and facilitators; strangulate TTP funding, logistics, recruitment and narrative through reinvigorated NAP using ‘all’ means. And remember, the UN Charter allows Pakistan to take necessary measures in self-defence. Relevant clauses be invoked and pursued with the means that Pakistan and its Military possess. You do what you need to do, cis and trans frontier.
Finally, some words for Afghan brethren. Pashtuns never forget shegara (favour done). Pakistan provided you shelter when you needed it most, fed and clothed you, and helped you liberate your country. Turning against your erstwhile benefactor is not only un-Islamic, but also against Afghan traditions and Pashto lar. Weakening Pakistan would weaken Afghanistan…dream or no dream!
You need to rein in the TTP for your own good, however you can!
Published in The Express Tribune, December 14th, 2023.
Like Opinion & Editorial on Facebook, follow @ETOpEd on Twitter to receive all updates on all our daily pieces.