‘Expertise’ or ideological hegemony?

Pakistan’s policymaking domain is saturated with individuals who perceive their role as purely ‘technical’ in its fundamental essence. Akin to the manner in which science/engineering problems are approached, these self-proclaimed ‘experts’ — frequently economists — rely exclusively on textbook guidelines in attempting to resolve societal ills. At no point are the axiomatic principles of their holy texts ever challenged, their undergirding ideology ever laid bare, or their relevance in Pakistan’s context ever considered. Like missionaries, these opportunists have uncritically internalised the rhetoric passed down to them by their intellectual mentors and are adamant to latch onto the first opportunity to operationalise — via top-down means if necessary. It does not seem to matter how many times it has failed to generate any semblance of progress or prosperity in the past, because all those were just instances of ‘implementation failure’ rather than any faults in the prescriptions themselves. Is it any wonder Pakistan finds itself on the brink today; at the mercy of predatory international financial institutions?

The ‘No True Scotsman’ logical fallacy is when a proposition is defended by changing or distorting its original meaning after it has been proven to be false. For instance, the ‘development community’ in Pakistan has a tendency of proposing privatisation of state owned enterprises as a central policy prescription to address the country’s persistent fiscal account deficit. When it is pointed out that over 250 public enterprises have historically either been privatised or shut down altogether, these individuals engage in all forms of mental gymnastics to make the argument that these were not, in fact, examples of ‘true’ privatisation. Even worse: some go to the extent of claiming that unless the entirety of publically-run enterprises are divested from, positive outcomes are unlikely. In this way, a built-in excuse is always available. The key point here is that it is not actually possible to have a Hobbesian form of government which is only responsible for ensuring security (for private property) — as the proverbial neoliberal utopia demands — meaning that there is perpetually a convenient escape route to avoid accountability in case of failure.

Individuals in policy circles frequently fall back on the ‘implementation failure’ retort when challenged. The claim is that their job is done once prescriptions — based on earth shattering ‘expertise’ — are proposed. It is the government’s duty, they allege, to figure out how these proposals can be executed: in terms of strategy, logistics, procurement, human resources, resource mobilisation, stakeholder engagement, monitoring/evaluation, etc. This is akin to placing the cart before the horse, however. Good policy would be that which accounted for the various kinds of ‘legwork’ necessary for its implementation — at the outset. These considerations shouldn’t be outsourced to ‘government’ because an effective prescription must be one that actually works — otherwise it’s just fancy lingo on paper. In other words, the ‘technical advice’ must have already taken into account institutional/governance arrangements rather than relying on text book approaches. This dichotomy between ‘policy formulation’ on the one hand and ‘policy implementation’ on the other is the natural eventuality of neoliberal ideology following the Washington Consensus of 1989, which has sought to reduce the government’s role to a symbolic entity primarily serving to ‘facilitate’ private businesses.

Take the example of a sport like football. What good is advice to a particular team to play counterattacking football if the wing backs lack pace, if the central midfield doesn’t have visionary passing ability and prefer more ‘holding’ roles, if the strikers have always preferred more set-piece model offensive strategy? Good advice in this context would take into account the specific preferences, temperaments and historical details of the players on the field! Indeed, the best teams are the ones whose ‘experts’ actually have in-depth knowledge of each individual player and their unique capabilities/ histories/ preferences — largely because they choose to engage with them on a day to day basis. Those that opt to keep these two domains i.e. technical input and managerial functions, divorced from one another end up at the bottom of the table at the end of the year. It is worth asking: of what use is advice that is entirely unhinged from dynamics on the ground and purely reliant on outmoded theories — those too, written with a largely Western audience in mind?!

The irony here, of course, is that the ‘audience’ for the vast majority of policy folk in Pakistan is still Western: housed in the international financial institutions and multilateral donor agencies that offer massive financial incentives to consultants, think tanks, and ‘implementing partners’ most broadly for advancing their geopolitical interests — in turn equated to ‘technical’ policy prescriptions. Power relations do not figure into this equation whatsoever; and that is what ultimately needs to be challenged. For the policy domain to serve a useful function, its personnel must begin their analyses with the following three questions. 1) What are the historical factors, particularly in the governance domain, that have led to the situation in which the economic measures are being proposed? 2) How will the measures affect power relations in the context they are being proposed in? 3) What are the political settlements that have to take place for said measures to effectively be implemented?

It is far from self-evident what constitutes the ‘best’ policy in any given situation due to contextual details that always introduce a high degree of complexity to the mix. Ergo, a radical proposal: dispense with the notion of ‘expertise’ in governance affairs altogether. Policy formulation must adopt a new direction, one that is fundamentally participatory and bottom-up in nature by incorporating ordinary citizens in the decision-making processes that affect their lives. The goal must ultimately be to establish mechanisms that can signal information to ruling authorities to then be responsive to. This can come in various forms, including but not limited to free unions/associations, protected speech/assembly, empowered local governments, equitable land relations (via comprehensive redistribution efforts), vibrant/inclusive urban landscapes, unimpeded arts and culture activities, generous social protection programs (such as universal basic income), and non-interference in political affairs from extra-legal institutions.

Information — its production and dissemination — forms a core tenet of civilisational development. It is time to begin seeing state and society as entities that are intimately connected to one another, existing in a symbiotic relationship.

The only good ‘policy’ is that which assists in blurring the lines between the two — also known as ‘democratisation’.

Published in The Express Tribune, December 5^th, 2023.

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