Wagner Group — an analysis

The Wagner Group, also known as PMC Wagner, a Russian paramilitary force, which staged a protest-cum-mutiny-cum-rebellion against Russian military leadership (not against President Putin) on 24 June 2023, capturing the city of Rostov-on-Don in Southern Russia, then marching towards Moscow, raises important questions. The Western media is in overdrive to paint this saga into exaggerated conclusions about Putin losing hold on power and Russian military operations losing steam in Ukraine etc.

Wagner network of mercenaries (some of Maj Gen rank) comprises predominantly Russian soldiers, but also troops from Belorussia, Syria, Afghanistan, Libya, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, and Africa etc, besides Russian prison inmates. Led by charismatic Yevgeny Prigozhin, the private military company (PMC), operates ostensibly under Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD), and in collaboration with Russia’s military intelligence, the GRU. It has been employed in the Donbas Region of Eastern Ukraine after Crimea, annexed by Russia in 2014. In Crimea, PMC Wagner soldiers were called ‘polite people’ or ‘little green men’ for their respectful behaviour, polite manners, and non-interference in everyday life.

Generally tasked with sneak attacks, reconnaissance, intelligence-gathering, targeted attacks on hostile leadership, and escorting VIPs, the Group’s battle-hardened soldiers were instrumental in capturing the city of Bakhmut this May after fierce and bloody battles. Earlier, in mid-January 2023, Wagner captured the salt-mining town of Soledar (Donetsk Oblast) after heavy fighting. Its experienced, slightly aged, well-resourced men, able to exercise initiative in the absence of orders, are adept at tactical and sub tactical battles, the mainstay of fighting-in-built-up-area (BUA). Prigozhin recently announced consolidating Russian defence of Luhansk region annexed by Russian last September, against Ukraine’s continuing counter offensive.

PMC Wagner has increasingly acquitted itself well in combat, compared to Russia’s mostly young, inexperienced, and poorly led conventional military in Ukraine, and this is the root cause of the chasm, Prigozhin’s disaffection and foul-mouthed diatribes against Russian Military high command especially Defense Minister Shoigu.

Co-founded with Dmitry Utkin (“Wagner”), Prigozhin has used his PMC in Syrian conflict and South Sudan civil war (military training and security), revolution in South Sudan, Libyan civil war, Venezuelan presidential crisis (military training and security), fighting ISIS in Mozambique and against Al-Qaeda in Mali. The Group has been deployed to Bosnia, Central African Republic, Madagascar Angola, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, and ‘possibly’ Congo (DRC).

Registered in Argentine, Wagner HQ (and technology center) is in St Petersburg and offices in Hong Kong and 20 African countries. Mr Erik Prince of Blackwater PMC has also rendered military services to Wagner PMC in Libya and Mozambique through a web of interacting companies associated with Prigozhin’s “Concord Group”.

Wagner trains at a Russian MoD facility in Molkino, Krasnodar Krai in north Caucasus. Trainees willing to accept a 10-year confidentiality agreement and social media blackout only are accepted. Wagner Group comprises a “Rusich” unit or ‘Task Force Rusich’; a Serb unit; and a Níðhöggr unit comprising Norwegian and Scandinavian mercenaries. Wagner strength estimates vary widely and go (incorrectly) up to 50,000.

Mr. Prigozhin, a close friend of President Putin — nicknamed “Putin’s chef” for his catering businesses, arranging Putin’s dinners for foreign dignitaries — maintained deniability of links with Wagner until September 2022. Chechen strongman, Ramzan Kadyrov, former leader of Chechen independence who defected to Russia, and is now heading the Chechen Republic, has similar forces under his command, employed in Ukraine as shock troops.

Russian military has traditionally taken longer to re-orient and perform effectively in combat. Operation Barbarossa by German Wehrmacht in World War II is case in point. Mercenaries with hands-on experience, contrarily, manage better TSR (Time, Space and Relative Strength) ratio at the point of force application in urban tactical battles in BUAs, and achieve speedier success, compared to the cumbersome mass application of Russian Military. This endears the PMC to Russian political leadership, in a war where quick success remains the essence. Russian Military was bogged down before Kiev in 2022, despite combat superiority over Ukrainian Military, upsetting Putin’s political timeframe besides its own reputation for prosecution of war. And that seems to be Mr. Prigozhin’s main grievance.

It is also a truism that a private military force, operating side-by-side with a conventional military, is bound to create problems especially when the military campaign is stalemated. Prevalent situation in Ukraine reflects trench warfare of World War I when front lines barely moved. Failure has no parentage. Fog of war and uncertainty generate doubts and blame games, especially when the lines delineating responsibility are not very clear. So, this show-down was long in the offing, and only a matter of time. Western, especially American indirect support cannot be ruled out despite denials, as acceptance of culpability would strengthen Putin domestically.

Following on from above, we can deduce that; a) President Putin still greatly values loyalty; b) he, like others, prosecutes dirty side of war through proxies ostensibly to claim and benefit from subsequent alibi, in case of atrocities and war crimes. Wagner’s Rusich unit is ‘reportedly’ accused of such crimes in Ukraine; c) war-by-proxies is cost effective and least consequential in implications; d) mercenaries fight well given incentives and motivations, are better-managed and ably led. They were part of European wars historically; and e) employing PMC alongside conventional forces creates friction.

So, in consequence, the outcome is sub-optimal. Mr Putin is bruised but not down. Mr Prigozhin played sensibly, back tracked in the middle of a crisis avoiding its harmful politico-military conflagration, thanks to Belorussia’s Lukashenko mediating successfully. Prigozhin allowed his PMC to reintegrate more effectively with Russian Military. For the Russian General Staff, a nagging problem is addressed, allowing it to focus on Ukrainian counter offensive. The risk of shifting larger forces from the frontline to the interior is averted.

Some analysts cite Putin having played military and Wagner Group against each other (by ignoring Prigozhin’s discomfort wilfully) in order to control both and retain his ultimate position as the final arbiter. Russia is an east-leaning western polity, where loyalties are stronger than institutions and loyalists have historically played greater role in crisis outcomes. Wagner cadre would likely get a better deal and Putin’s pardon reflects this.

So, in the final analysis, employment of proxies in a conventional war alongside regular military is an avoidable failure. And the outcome of war in Ukraine still depends upon the successful prosecution of Ukrainian counter offensive, rather than on the distraction caused by Wagner PMC.

Eid Mubarak to everyone celebrating.

Published in The Express Tribune, June 29^th, 2023.

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