Corruption, ghost soldiers and unravelling of ANDSF

We continue to explore the reasons behind the collapse of Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF) in August 2022, as reasoned in February 2023 report by SIGAR (Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction), a US government entity.

SIGAR raised early red flags about the endemic corruption in ANDSF especially within its senior ranks, ‘throughout the 20-year reconstruction mission’. Corruption denied critical supplies at frontlines at critical junctures, eroding unit cohesion and morale, creating false impressions of force numbers. Most leaders preferred filling their own pockets, especially during the dying days of the Republic, when uncertainty, chaos and lack of accountability or its fear reigned supreme.

One persistent form of corruption was pocketing the salaries of ‘ghost soldiers’, including deserters, dead and fake soldiers on ANA and ANP payrolls. And the figure was as high as 80 per cent of ANDSF’s 300,000 standing strength. Some analysts estimate standing strength around 50,000 to 100,000 at the most, crediting most fighting in last days to uprising forces/militias. Numbers’ inflation under US/NATO watch amounts to criminal collusion. Complicity with contractors for fudging numbers and supplies etc was another way to pocket profits.

It was also standard for Corps Commanders, especially during the last three years, ‘to run ghost operations’, faking manpower (own and enemy) and vehicle casualties, and ammunition and fuel expended. Materiel reported destroyed was later sold. Although ANDSF manpower was biometrically enrolled, validated and logged into Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS), there were duplicate and invalid records. SIGAR audit discovered around 7,100 duplicate and 1,009 invalid entries in the 175,195 APPS records it reviewed. MOD-provided force strength data in APPS remained unreliable. Actual figure-fudging was on a much larger scale.

Covid-induced halt on in-person spot checks at troops’ locations and non-confirmation of APPS data spurred corruption. MOD and MOI had no ownership of the contractor-run APPS or other human resource systems, making data concealment possible. Interior Ministry was able to locate only 6,000 of the 17,000 locally hired Afghan Local Police personnel, present on pay rolls. Most recruitment was family members and friends under different names. Political interference and lack of interface between APPS and Police’s parallel paper-based system made corrections nearly impossible.

Although ghost soldiers, corruption and its debilitating effects on logistics sapped ANDSF’s war-fighting potential, its magnitude was revealed much later. An Afghan official was “astounded and confused and shocked” to learn there were only 700 police officers, and not 14,000, he believed were defending Kandahar City.

In the face of mounting threats, Kabul failed to articulate a coherent National Security Plan (NSP). A National Security Council sponsored international conference in August 2019 devised an ANDSF potential force structure for two possible scenarios: of ‘uneasy peace’ and ‘evolved stalemate’. Other recommendations presented spanned ANA Corps (structure and efficiency); territorial forces; security transition to ANP by 2021/22; ANP professionalisation; Air Force sustenance without coalition support; ANDSF command and control; coordination and intelligence sharing; and robust logistics. No recommendation was implemented to evolve a coherent NSP. Embroiled in petty politics, for leadership it was business as usual with overnight parties, when Taliban were over-running district after district, and military balance was rapidly shifting. Reportedly “a one-time army chief was seen more in Dubai hookah bars than in Afghanistan”. Relaxed emergency rules lured many to make quick money.

Ghani’s six-month plan to stabilise Afghanistan and reconfigure ANDSF, announced during June 25, 2021 meeting with President Biden, was too little too late. And when it came on July 26, 2021, the Republic was confined to Kabul only. This lax urgency is partially attributed to Afghan leaders’ delusions about Coalition not willing or able to withdraw completely, citing past precedence and transition from Trump to Biden in 2020. The ‘three men republic’ “remained insulated from larger reality” having lived too long in the Kabul ‘bubble’ under US security. A paranoid and disconnected President Ghani would prevent his Army Chief Gen Haibatullah Alizai from visiting troops in the field.

Ghani Administration is also criticised for not timely supporting the uprising forces, not that it would have made any difference. NSA Hamdullah Mohib defended not heavily arming militias for fear of civil war, and for not undermining the ANDSF legitimacy. He reckoned, these former warlords had an exaggerated sense of their present-day influence and following, eroded by their luxurious living, financed by foreign dollars. So, when charismatic leaders like Ismail Khan (Herat) and others surrendered or fled, state and Military collapse were imminent.

The US had urged President Ghani to redeploy troops from “thousands of difficult-to-defend, high-casualty checkpoints to more defensible positions” to relax pressure on ANDSF’s ‘underdeveloped’ logistic system. There was, however, no coherent national checkpoint consolidation strategy and many Afghan leaders dubbed relocations simply handing over territory to Taliban, or worse; the government was abandoning territory, especially in minority Uzbek and Hazara lands. ANDSF checkpoints were symbols of government in rural Afghanistan. Their closure/relocation showed weakness and had domino effect.

Fearing a coup, and beholden to his own sense of superior intellect, President Ghani sidelined or fired competent generals and staff, wasting those who could wage a protracted if not successful war against Taliban. His obsession with detail distorted his ability to see the bigger strategic picture. He believed “if it really got bad, the Americans would step in and fix it.” Then there were conspiracy theories galore, like Ghani deliberately allowing the fall of northern provinces “to teach Dostum a lesson”, or discrediting Atta Noor, or killing and weakening other former warlords and strongmen, or negotiating with Taliban to hand over power, or encouraging a state of chaos to stay in power, etc.

The seeds of collapse planted over two decades, sprouted by Ghani’s weak leadership, lack of political acumen and his sense of indispensability. His ‘technocrat-reformer-in-a-hurry’ and ‘nationalist-autocratic’ credentials; his efforts to disenfranchise warlords, retire corrupt generals, governors, and other officials in droves; his micromanagement of security sector without expertise; and his disregard for Afghanistan’s traditional politics of patronage and alliance building, became his undoing. In the brutal Afghan politico-social milieu, nobody was willing to die for Ashraf Ghani when the chips went down.

Lastly, ANDSF troops were more proficient in static defence, rather than forward operations. Fortresses in the middle of Taliban-held rural heartland surrounded by an ambivalent population were indeed battling the impossibility of survival. So, on August 15, 2021, President Ghani fled Afghanistan effectively dissolving the Republic and the resistance. Pakistan…beware!

Published in The Express Tribune, May 11^th, 2023.

Like Opinion & Editorial on Facebook, follow @ETOpEd on Twitter to receive all updates on all our daily pieces.