Opinion

Contractors, clumsy logistics and collapse of ANDSF

AAF support was critical to warfighting by the ANDSF, as it was realised soon

Inam Ul Haque April 20, 2023

The writer is a retired major general and has an interest in International Relations and Political Sociology. He can be reached at tayyarinam@hotmail.com and tweets @20_Inam

The sudden aid cutoff and withdrawal of all foreign troops and contractors from Afghanistan by the US/Allied governments after Doha Agreement amplified a logistic catastrophe that was long in the making. This piece would continue the debate in the light of February 2023 report by SIGAR (Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction), a US government entity. SIGAR identified the multifarious factors for the spectacular failure of Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF) in August 2022.

First, the over-reliance of ANDSF for critical components on foreign-based contractor support. The AAF (Afghan Air Force) long accustomed to the Soviet inventory (MI-17 helicopters) was later equipped (rather thrust upon) with the more complex US aircraft, UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters, for which Afghans had no maintenance experience. Afghan crews never exceeded more than 40% maintenance ceiling for most AAF airframes. So, the maintenance support was outsourced to the mainly US contractors.

As per TAAC-Air, 2017 estimates, AAF was capable to maintain its Mi-17 fleet till 2019, yet transition to US-made Black Hawk helicopter was greenlighted, due to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and non-availability of Russian spares. This moved the AAF self-sufficiency timeline to 2030, a decade later than the US commitment to removing all US military and contractor support from Afghanistan. The DOD had also planned to “replace the Special Mission Wing (SMW)’s remaining Mi-17s with CH-47 Chinook helicopters by 2023”. DOD knew that both the AAF and SMW could not maintain their fleet without contractor support. After June 2020, for some time, the withdrawn contractors communicated with Afghan crews through available means to assist in the maintenance jobs, but this remained limited in utility. The AAF support was critical to warfighting by the ANDSF, as it was realised soon.

The argument that even the US Aviation was dependent upon ‘contractor-support’ appeared self-defeating because the US contractor community was home-based. For Afghanistan, it was foreign-based, expensive and remote. Here the role and the outsize influence of the Washington Beltway Contractor Community in the relevant policy formulation and implementation comes into question. Staffed with retired services personnel, this community knew how to make money, and reaped hefty windfalls in Afghanistan.

ANDSF especially the AAF, its SMW, and Special Forces were reliant upon US advisers and TAAC (Train, Advise and Assist Command). AAF force structure was also under constant changes till very late in the war, “creating additional managerial challenges for the Afghan government”.

Second, the effects of curtailed logistics. General Miller, the ‘Resolute Support’ commander warned of ANDSF’s lack of vital air support and maintenance in March 2021. Withdrawal of contractor support in June 2020 led to the grounding of 60 per cent Black Hawks, reducing operational support to ground troops, with no alternative plan in place. The AAF and SMW were providing food, ammunition, water, other military equipment, etc. These were used in relief rotation and evacuation support for the dead and injured, besides close air and operational support to ground troops. Removal of such critical air support, and the perils of ground transportation due to Taliban attacks further demoralised ANA and ANP soldiers on isolated bases.

The state of ANDSF’s motor vehicles was worse. The Afghan crews’ maintenance share was roughly 4 to 30%. The rest was by foreign contractors. Spares were available but could not be distributed due to limited or no air supply to the strung-out ANDSF elements deployed on remote and isolated check posts, and due to the dangers of overland movement. As a sad consequence of the impaired logistics, “ANDSF abandoned 200 checkpoints in Kandahar” alone in December 2020.

Third, effects on Special Forces. Afghan Special Security Forces, particularly the commandos of ANA Special Operations Command (ANASOC), were better trained than ANA or ANP units. However, these were over-reliant on their US advisers for direction and leadership in joint planning; maintenance of their operational readiness; and provision of intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, and air to ground coordination support.

Before the Doha Agreement, commandos were conducting operations independently under ANASOC, and were still reliant on the US Forces for material support. Later, the absence of ‘partnered missions’ and dwindling logistics curtailed ANASOC’s operational effectiveness. After some time, commandos were placed under tactical control of ANA Corps, which generally interfered with their command-and-control structures. Commandos, being a desirable asset due to their air mobility and enhanced training, were also used to compensate for ANA/ANP’s limited operational efficacy due to their ground resupply difficulties. This led to commandos’ intense employment in roles “as little more than skilled infantry” under their own increasingly adverse air and logistics situation. Strung out and isolated Afghan posts frequently called upon ANASOC commandos “to conduct missions to keep ANDSF checkpoints from being overrun”. Commandos were generally employed beyond the mandatory 72 hours limit for rest, maintenance, and refit between missions. This overuse, misuse and consequent fatigue resulted in commandos’ loss of operational readiness. Conventional ANDSF units were able to react to the tempo of Taliban’s multi-front strategy. However, enhanced demand for commandos increased tempo for ANASOC. This combined with deteriorating operational situation, lack of US air support, overuse and clumsy logistics brought ANASOC almost to the breaking point.

Afghan government’s (and ANDSF) dependence on the foreign support was known to the US DoD, as Gen McKenzie, Commander CENTCOM, warned Pakistan in February 2021 of the government collapse in Kabul in case of an early pullout. As far back as 2014, in his testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Joseph Dunford, the then ISAF commander, warned of ANDSF’s deterioration asserting; “I think the only debate is the pace of that deterioration.” To make matters worse, Ashraf Ghani’s centralisation of the procurement system under the National Procurement Commission, established to curb corruption and enhance transparency, worsened both. The Ashraf Ghani regime sadly either did not know the extent of ANDSF-US dependency, or willfully ignored it, or tried using it as a bargaining chip against a complete pull-out of foreign forces.

But the larger picture of politicisation of ANDSF and over-centralisation of its planning process is next week. Meanwhile Eid Mubarak!

Published in The Express Tribune, April 20^th, 2023.

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COMMENTS (2)

Saleem Akhtar Malik | 1 year ago | Reply In his article dated 20 April 2023 Major General Inam discusses the role of American contractors and poor logistics in the collapse of the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces ANDSF . The U.S. embarked on its longest overseas war on 7 October 2001 with the avowed aim of protecting the world from Al Qaeda and its Taliban proxies. They wanted to achieve their aim in three phases 1 Toppling the Taliban regime that had given refuge to Osama Bin Laden- the mastermind of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon. This phase lasted just two months 2 Defeating the Taliban militarily and rebuilding core institutions 2002-2008 3 Implementing a strategy of protecting the population from Taliban attacks and supporting efforts to reintegrate insurgents into Afghan society 2009 onward . The plan also had a timetable for the withdrawal of Coalition forces from Afghanistan. Starting in 2011 security responsibilities would be gradually handed over to the Afghan military and police. However the withdrawal schedule largely failed because of the insurgent attacks and the resulting high civilian casualties. By December 2014 when the U.S. and NATO combat mission formally ended the Afghan military and police units taking over security duties still appeared woefully ill-prepared to hold off the Taliban. America and NATO had gone into Afghanistan to fight and finish off the Taliban. But in February 2020 the Trump administration signed the U.S.-Taliban deal without even consulting the then-Afghan government. The deal placed fighting restrictions on both the US and the Taliban and provided for the withdrawal of all NATO forces from Afghanistan in return for the Taliban s counter-terrorism commitments. The Trump administration s US Taliban deal and the Biden administration s April 2021 decision to pull out all US troops by September 2021 without leaving a residual force were the two critical events that caused the collapse of the ANDSF. Following the deal the US dramatically reduced the number of air attacks and deprived the ANDSF of a critical edge in fighting the Taliban leading to the Taliban s whirlwind storming into Kabul on 15 August 2021 Afghan government s and ANDSF dependence on foreign support was known to the US DoD as Gen McKenzie Commander CENTCOM warned Pakistan in February 2021 of the government collapse in Kabul in case of an early pullout. In March 2021 four months before the American armed forces completed their withdrawal from Afghanistan General Miller the Resolute Support commander warned of ANDSF s lack of vital air support and maintenance. General Inam writes The sudden aid cutoff and withdrawal of all foreign troops and contractors from Afghanistan by the US Allied governments after the Doha Agreement amplified a logistic catastrophe that was long in the making. A military contractor or defence contractor is a military professional who uses his experience working in the military to provide a broad range of services to the security forces. Military contractors provided all types of goods and services that were essential to the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan including services such as weapons maintenance and fuel supply that made the U.S. military dependent on and arguably vulnerable to the performance of contractors. The awe-inspiring Osama bin Laden also held the honor of working as a CIA contractor during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Osama was a Saudi national who had supported the Mujahideen. He operated from the areas astride the Durand Line. While interacting with the Mujahedin Osama came in contact with the Americans and after some time became a CIA contractor. It is widely believed in Pakistan that during the Afghan Jihad Osama s construction company built the famous Tora Bora complex for the US Army. Tora Bora Black Cave is a cave complex part of the Spin Ghar White Mountains mountain range of eastern Afghanistan. It is situated in the Pachir Aw Agam District of Nangarhar approximately 50 kilometers 30 miles west of the Khyber Pass and 10 km 6 mi north of the border of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province in Pakistan. Tora Bora and the surrounding Safed Koh range had natural caverns formed by streams eating into the limestone that had later been expanded into a defence complex a sort of stronghold for the Mujahedin. This stronghold was used by the Mujahedin during the 1980s for their operations against the Soviet occupation forces. Interestingly Tora Bora was also the battleground some two decades later where the final engagement between the invading American forces and Al Qaeda led by Osama took place from 30 November 30 17 December. It was launched by America and its allies to capture or kill Osama bin Laden These details have been given to highlight the love-hate relationship between Osama and the US. Osama was the US Frankenstein Monster who like many others particularly Pakistan s Aimal Kasai turned against his US accomplices after the culmination of the Afghan Jihad . ANSDF s reliance on foreign-based contractor support and logistics was interrelated. Inside the Beltway is an American expression used to characterize matters that are related to the interaction between officials of the U.S. federal government and its contractors lobbyists and media personnel who cover them as opposed to the interests and priorities of the general U.S. population. Geographically Inside the Beltway describes Washington D.C. and those sections of Maryland and Virginia that lie within the perimeter of the Capital Beltway. Expectedly billions of dollars change hands between the Beltway stakeholders who fuel America s overseas war effort and the larger military-industrial complex. ANDSF was heavily dependent on the contractors both for the supply of critical spares but also maintenance of weapons platforms aircraft tanks APCs guns etc. Withdrawal of contractor support in June 2020 led to the grounding of 60 percent Black Hawks reducing operational support to ground troops with no alternative plan in place observes General Inam in his analysis. DOD knew that both the AAF and SMW could not maintain their fleet without contractor support. ANA and police were also reliant on contractor support though to a lesser degree. According to General Inam After June 2020 for some time the withdrawn contractors communicated with Afghan crews through available means to assist in the maintenance jobs but this remained limited in utility. Withdrawal of the military contractors thus affected both logistics and maintenance and was one of the major factors in the demise of ANDSF. Afghan Special Security Forces particularly the commandos of ANA Special Operations Command ANASOC had their peculiar problems. Like ANA and ANF they were also heavily dependent on their US advisers for their operational readiness. They also faced problems similar to Pakistan s SSG like dual command after they were placed under the tactical control of ANA this happened in Pakistan during the Siachen conflict ground resupply difficulties and intense employment in roles as little more than skilled infantry . The enhanced demand for commandos increased the tempo for ANASOC. This combined with the deteriorating operational situation lack of US air support overuse and poor logistics brought ANASOC almost to the breaking point. General Inam s analysis brings to the fore many aspects hitherto hidden of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan

M Farooq | 1 year ago | Reply An informative series on collapse of ANDSF with pertinent reasoning

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