The story of a broken star: why Jinnah’s Pakistan split
The book Mashraqi Pakistan: Toota Hua Tara [East Pakistan: Broken Star) is Aqan Hasan Qureshi’s compilation of renowned writer and journalist Altaf Hasan Qureshi’s articles. Covering various aspects that led to the separation of East Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh, Altaf H. Qureshi edited and wrote extensively for Zindagi magazine and Urdu Digest, which he also edited, from September 1964 to December 2000. The comprehensive, research-based 1408-page book attempts to enlighten readers on how Jinnah’s Pakistan disintegrated.
Based on his travel, interaction and interviews with notable leaders of the then East Pakistan, Qureshi has ably summed up factors, between 1947 till 1971, that led to a paradigm shift and generated mistrust, hostility and hatred against the ruling elite of West Pakistan who wielded power in the then East Pakistan as well. Since his first visit in 1964 to the fateful days of 1971, Qureshi made sincere efforts through his writing, to keep the two parts of Pakistan together, but confesses that he failed in his endeavours because of faulty policies on both sides. After the 1965 war, the community of 10 million Hindus across East Pakistan and India also played a role in triggering the process of disintegration.
In the introductory part of his book, the author maintains that a lot of books and articles have been published on the fall of Dhaka, but his efforts are different because most of his writings are about travel to different parts of East Pakistan and discussions with people from a cross-section of society. Perhaps, it is the only publication in Urdu which is based on the author’s visit to Dhaka during a crisis, and interaction with journalists, students, politicians and religious leaders, which enabled him to build an in-depth account of the volatile eastern region.
On his first visit to East Pakistan in July 1964, Qureshi realised that the conflict between East and West Pakistan was rapidly growing because of Ayub regime’s unjust and unfair policies that created a sense of deprivation among Bengalis. The imposition of martial law in October 1958 and disbanding of the 1956 constitution, a result of East-West Pakistan efforts, deepened the discontentment among the people of East Pakistan. Qureshi believes that even then, the vast majority of the people in East Pakistan were committed to one country and hoped that the influential minority trying to exploit feelings against West Pakistan would not succeed.
Qureshi narrates that during his July 1964 visit to East Pakistan, his friend Khurram Murad in Dhaka pointed out that the Bengalis’ love and hate is extreme. Give them respect and justice, and they are ready to die for you, but if they are humiliated and exploited, their reaction is hostile. The ruling elite from West Pakistan failed to realise the Bengali sensitivity to their mother tongue, hence the maltreatment to their language and culture alienated them. Taking them for granted and imposing the West Pakistan-dominated policies was counterproductive.
The book is divided into three parts. Part one covers the dynamics of 1970 elections and the dramatic developments in the relations between the two wings of Pakistan. The second part deals with events following the December 1970 elections that led to violent happenings in March 1971, and part three begins with Qureshi’s articles entitled “pulling the curtain from the fall of Dhaka” published in Urdu Digest in early 1972, which had prompted arrests of the author, his brother Dr Aijaz Husain Qureshi and Mujibur Rehman Shami by the Bhutto regime.
The author had predicted the military coup against Sheikh Mujibur Rehman. The most valuable and interesting part of book are his interviews of leading characters of 1971 crisis, such as the military officers posted in the then East Pakistan, government officials, political leaders and intelligentsia of the beleaguered province.
Qureshi claims to have been an eye witness to the deteriorating situation in East Pakistan following the end of 1965 war, the presentation of six points by Mujibur Rehman in February 1966 in Lahore, the Agartala Conspiracy case of 1967, and the growing power of Awami League during General Yahya Khan’s regime. He laments the failure of the authorities in Rawalpindi to understand the sensitive situation that augmented Bengali nationalism.
Interviews with numerous political and military figures such as Mujibur Rehman the head of Awami League, General Tikka Khan, Governor East Pakistan, Air Marshal Nur Khan, Dr Mohammad Malik, the last Governor of East Pakistan, Khwaja Khairuddin, Head of Central Peace Committee and President Yahya Khan while he was in office and during his illness, reflect bitter events that culminated into the fall of Dhaka.
Qureshi also narrates his meeting with A.K. Brohi, the renowned jurist and defense council of Mujibur Rehman who faced treason trial in Lyallpur (Now Faisalabad) jail in 1971. Apparently, during the meeting with Qureshi in October 1971, Brohi seemed depressed with the situation and clarified that East Pakistan cannot remain with its West wing because of the non-seriousness of politicians, and the incompetence and arrogance of generals. Qureshi could see that the people there were losing hope for a united Pakistan. A bookseller in Dhaka feared that if the situation remained the same, East and West Pakistan would not remain one. Yet in 1964, hostility with West Pakistan was not widespread, Urdu language was still spoken by a segment of the population, and Urdu films were popular in cinemas.
A significant part of book is a 1964 interaction between the author and a group of Dhaka University students, where they shared in confidence, their plans to separate East Pakistan. Frustrated with the 1962 constitution, which augmented the sense of deprivation among the Bengalis, they showed maps that reflected their strategy to cripple the communication system of East Pakistan by launching subversive activities to disempower the West Pakistan-dominated military garrison and declare independence of East Pakistan from Islamabad. They had been trained by East Pakistan Rifles and some Navy officials and their plan was shockingly thorough.
While the 1965 war reflected overwhelming feelings of patriotism to defend their country from Indian aggression, some politicians stated that the Chinese support saved East Pakistan from Indian attack. This led to the presentation of six points by Sheikh Mujibur Rehman in an opposition parties’ meeting held in Lahore in February 1966.
The author argues that the loyalty of Hindus rested with India as many Hindu civil servants in East Pakistan felt comfortable migrating to India. A Hindu judge from Dhaka went to West Bengal for holidays and never returned. Smuggling from the then East Pakistan to West Bengal was also done mostly by the Hindus. The author maintains that, “in such a difficult situation, one point of reassurance was that a vast part of rural East Pakistan was not poisoned against West Pakistan, unlike cities where the atmosphere was hostile.”
Describing feelings of deepening mistrust and hostility against West Pakistan in the 1960s, the author quotes an old man from his 1966 visit. The man pointed out that power rests with West Pakistan because the President belonged to the Western wing along with important portfolios of the central cabinet. The Bengalis asked if East Pakistan with the majority of the population had been consulted by the central government when President Ayub decided to shift the capital from Karachi to Islamabad. They also claimed that Islamabad was built with resources from East Pakistan, and that the roads of the federal capital smelt of jute.
In the chapter, “A political overview of East Pakistan” Qureshi quotes various sources saying that Awami League would not get majority of the seats. On a visit to Khulna, a political activist confidently said that the Awami League will not get more than 45 seats out of 162 and the rest will be mostly won by pro-Pakistan political parties, however, the Awami League secured 160 seats out of 162.
Qureshi believes that the August 1970 floods followed by a devastating cyclone changed things in favour of Mujib and the Awami League exploited both natural disasters and blamed the West Pakistan-dominated regime to have failed to provide relief operation promptly.
The author has done thorough research and investigation. The first hand sources based on his interviews and extensive visits to former East Pakistan authenticate his deep analysis that depicts the gradual surge of mistrust and hostility between the two geographically and culturally diverse parts of Pakistan. But if viewed critically, the book lacks objectivity because the author disregards issues which led to hatred among the Bengali population of East Pakistan. For the author, Islam was enough to keep the country together, despite lack of social justice for the people of East Pakistan. Qureshi fails to forcefully criticise Ayub Khan’s biases against the Bengalis and his decision to shift the federal capital from Karachi to Islamabad, which was not appreciated by the people of East Pakistan.
Holding the Hindus, India and the Awami League responsible for the break-up of the country, Qureshi fails to condemn military brutality during the operation, and on the contrary, appreciates Tikka Khan’s efforts to normalise the situation. He also overlooks the non-serious attitude of the Yahya regime, and the moral lapses of military men such as General Niazi, who openly threatened to change the Bengali race. Their biases, exploitation and a well-crafted military operation focused on ‘teaching Bengalis a lesson would sort them out at least for 100 years’ were among the factors that caused the fall of Dhaka.
Qureshi’s readership is confined to Pakistan as the book is in Urdu language, but in order to get a realistic feedback of Qureshi’s book, it should be translated in Bangla and English.
Fifty two years down the road Bangladesh is certainly better off than Pakistan in terms of economy, infrastructure development, literacy and women empowerment. Had the Bengalis of East Pakistan not got independence from the abusive, humiliating and exploitive rule of Islamabad, they would have still been under subjugation and suppression of West Pakistan. Only a more objective account of this sad event in the history of Pakistan will allow the future generations of Pakistan and Bangladesh to discard the baggage of distorted history.
Moonis Ahmad is an author, Meritorious Professor of International Relations and former Dean Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Karachi. He can be reached at amoonis@hotmail.com
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